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Preface to ”Modern Bioenergy for Sustainable
Development”
Access to affordable, reliable, and clean energy is a key Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 7),
which also underpins other SDGs since energy access facilitates economic development, food security,
health and well-being, education, and other related objectives. A large share of global renewable
energy is supplied by biomass; however, this is, in many cases, traditional biomass and waste
use, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), where biomass provides the main
energy source for domestic and productive uses at different scales, mainly for generating heat and
cooking purposes. However, in LMICs, biomass use is often unsustainable and inefficient, resulting in
deforestation, soil degradation, and health risks from household air pollution that disproportionately
affect women and children. Introducing modern bioenergy as a substitute for fossil fuel is one
of the options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions while also satisfying its rapidly increasing
energy demand, provided that bioenergy is produced sustainably. Bioenergy can be converted into a
variety of energy carriers/services, such as heat, electricity, liquid biofuels (i.e., biodiesel, bioethanol,
methanol, dimethyl ether (DME), and Fischer–Tropsch (FT) synfuels), or gaseous biofuels (i.e., biogas
and hydrogen). This means that modern bioenergy has the possibility of replacing each type of
fossil fuel. Bioelectricity can also provide a base-load and plays a key role in balancing the grid
and providing storage options.
The papers presented in this book highlight the role of modern bioenergy in the global
transition to sustainable energy and outline its key elements and their significance with respect to
the environment and development. The reader will find papers that explore a key question: What
are the synergies and trade-offs between bioenergy use and the SDGs? The nexus approach can
be useful in understanding the synergies and trade-offs, capturing the interdependence between
scarce resources (e.g., water, energy, land). It is also critically important to explore cross-cutting
issues such as socio-political, techno-economic, legal, and environmental ones when it comes to the
deployment of biofuels for sustainable development. Investment plans also need to be addressed
with consideration for the transformations and complexities associated with biofuels. Innovation
in the transition towards biofuel will only be possible if we consider a participatory approach that
considers people’s behavior and societal needs.
ix
The objective of the four research papers and one review article selected for this volume is to
capture a comprehensive understanding of major issues associated with the large-scale development
and dissemination of modern bioenergy technologies/systems. Despite diversity and complexity,
we aimed to find systematic commonalities and differences, identify best practices, and fill the most
critical knowledge gaps. As a result, the volume will be of great interest to policy, legal, and impact
assessment experts, as well as private companies, community organizations, and all those interested
in devising sustainable development options for a resource-scarce and carbon-constrained world
through economic growth and diversification. This Special Issue consists of four research papers
and one review, contributed by experts in the field, on topics including (i) mapping bioenergy supply
and demand in selected least developed countries; (ii) evaluation of the water and energy nexus in
Wami Ruvu River Basin, Tanzania; (iii) global investment failures and transformations in modern
biofuels; (iv) a socio-political, techno-economic, legal, and environmental analysis of the biofuel
energy industry in Europe; and (v) the role of participation in the responsible innovation framework
for biofuels projects. We hope that this work will be inspirational for further research on modern
bioenergy and sustainable development.
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This editorial aims to summarize the five scientific contributions that contributed to the Special Issue
assessing the modern bioenergy potential and strategies for sustainable development, considering
the several aspects, viz. biofuels–water nexus, policy analysis, complexities of biofuel investment
plans/options, and participatory innovation framework.
1. Overview
Modern bioenergy is widely acknowledged as a potential substitute for fossil fuels to offset human
dependence on fossil fuels for energy. It has the potential to make an important contribution towards
sustainable development, from rural development and poverty alleviation to energy security and climate
change mitigation. Modern bioenergy would play a key role in the sustainable transformation of energy
systems, along with its decisive contribution in developing a low-carbon growth path while contributing
to energy diversification and security [1,2]. Nevertheless, there are concerns and scientific debate on
sustainable bioenergy, especially on land-use change (LUC), food security, and biodiversity loss [3]. In
order to minimize the potential risks and challenges, we need to understand interdisciplinary dimensions
such as government policies, financing schemes, stakeholders’ engagement, and intersectoral linkages
while devising sustainable bioenergy strategies. Bioenergy accounts for the largest share of the global
energy supply compared to all renewable energy resources [4]. In spite of the largest share among other
renewables with 10% of the global primary energy supply [5], the current rate of bioenergy deployment is
well below the levels required for low-carbon scenarios [6]. Accelerated deployment is urgently needed
in order to ramp up the contribution of sustainable bioenergy across all sectors, notably in the transport
sector, where consumption is estimated to triple by 2030. There is an increasing understanding that only
bioenergy that is supplied and used sustainably has a place in a low-carbon energy future. Modern
bioenergy has several positive benefits, and synergies need to be established between energy and food
security through an integrated assessment of resources.
There is a plethora of bioenergy research either in the supply chains, conversion technologies, or
techno-economic analysis of different biofuel production pathways [7]. However, little attention has been
shown to how bioenergy production and consumption would have a role in sustainable development.
What are the synergies and trade-offs between bioenergy use and the SDGs? The nexus approach can
be useful in understanding the synergies and trade-offs, capturing the interdependence between scarce
Sustainability 2021, 13, 374; doi:10.3390/su13010374 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
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resources (e.g., water, energy, land). It is also critically important to explore cross-cutting issues such
as socio-political, techno-economic, legal, and environmental ones when it comes to the deployment
of biofuels for sustainable development. Investment plans also need to be addressed considering
transformations and complexities associated with biofuels. Innovation in the transition towards biofuel
would only be possible if we consider a participatory approach considering people’s behavior and societal
needs.
2. A Short Review of the Contributions to This Special Issue
This Special Issue consists of four research papers and one review, contributed by experts in the field,
on topics including (i) mapping bioenergy supply and demand in selected least developed countries; (ii)
evaluation of water and energy nexus in Wami Ruvu River Basin, Tanzania; (iii) global investment failures
and transformations in modern biofuels; (iv) a socio-political, techno-economic, legal, and environmental
analysis of biofuel energy industry in Europe; and (v) the role of participation in the responsible innovation
framework for biofuels projects.
2.1. Assessment of Modern Bioenergy: Conditions and Synergies
Bioenergy has crucial advantages over other energy sources as a tool for poverty reduction in the
least developed countries (LDCs). Though biomass resources are widely available in rural areas of
LDCs, little seems to have been done with regards to the national modern bioenergy sector. Khatiwada
et al. [8] assess the surplus agricultural residues availability for bioelectricity in six LDCs in Asia and
Africa, namely Bangladesh, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao-PDR), and Nepal in Asia and Ethiopia,
Malawi, and Zambia in Africa. The results indicate that the surplus biomass feedstock available from
the agriculture sector could provide the total current electricity demand in Malawi alone, followed by
Nepal (45%), Bangladesh (29%), Lao-PDR (29%), Ethiopia (27%), and Zambia (13%). Findings from the
study show that providing access to sustainable energy in the LDCs to meet the SDG7 by 2030 might be a
challenge due to limited access to technology, infrastructure, and finance. Site-specific investigations on
how much agricultural residue could be extracted in an environmentally benign manner for bioelectricity
and increased investment in the bioenergy sector are key potential solutions in a myriad of options required
to harness the full energy potential in the LDCs. Provision of infrastructure/technology, mobilization of
actors/stakeholders, regulatory action by governments, and market creation are essential for modernizing
traditional bioenergy [9]. Conversion efficiencies, investment costs, and government policies (taxes and
subsidies) are the key factors influencing the technological choice [10].
2.2. Water–Energy Nexus: Trade-Offs and Synergies
Land, water, and energy resource systems are integrated when it comes to the production of energy in
general and bioenergy in particular [11]. In African nations, national and regional development targets for
water and energy sectors seldom consider the nexus between the two, risking imbalances and inefficiencies
in resource allocation and utilization. A typical example is the development and expansion of biofuel
in the Wami Ruvu River Basin, Tanzania (WRB). Miraji et al. [12] applied the Water Evaluation and
Planning (WEAP) model to the WRB to investigate the water–energy nexus (WEN), specifically, whether
the development plan calling for biofuel expansion is a sound approach. The results indicate that WEN
is much stronger in biofuel irrigation consuming 69.3% and 61% of total biofuel’s water and energy
requirements, respectively. By 2035, the nexus continues to be stronger, consuming 54.5% and 49% of
total biofuel’s water and energy requirements, respectively, and thus first-generation biofuels use much
more resources in the growth than the refining process. An additional 768.2 million cubic meters of
water and 413.4 million kWh of energy are needed for planned biofuel expansion, and reallocating water
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to biofuels in water-scarce regions causes related problems for other sectors, such as increasing water
use for the industry, agriculture, and energy sector by 67%, 45%, and 9%, respectively, which could
further exacerbate stresses on water and energy supplies in the basin. Biofuel generation relies heavily
on energy imports, as it consumes substantially more energy than it produces. Policies should promote
the coordinated development of sustainable biofuel programs that are less water-intensive with very low
inputs of fossil fuels.
2.3. Investments in Modern Biofuels: Failures and Transformations
Substantial investments are needed in the promotion of modern biofuels [13]. There has been
a heightened global interest in large-scale Jatropha cultivation for the past few decades, and this has
encouraged investment in the crop in many developing countries [14]. Jatropha could be an alternative
to conventional fuel as it contributes to climate change mitigation. However, Jatropha investment plans
have not met global expectations. Antwi-Bediako et al. [15] review and synthesize the transformations
and complexities in failed Jatropha spaces in the six major Jatropha investment destinations across the
world—Mexico, India, China, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana. The review shows that the intended
goal of establishing global Jatropha investments to serve as an alternative source of fuel failed because of
the unexpected complexities of the hype. In all of the countries studied, promoters of Jatropha investments,
including central government and private investors, subscribed to a “wait-and-see” approach for global
Jatropha investments. Failure of the investments along with unmet expectations led to land-use changes
from Jatropha to the cultivation of other crops (often food crops) or total land abandonment. The authors
emphasize the importance of paying considerable attention to other feedstocks that might have a better
future as alternatives to fossil-based energy for the deployment of sustainable bioenergy. Furthermore, the
findings provide meaningful justification for policy- and decision-makers in the development space to
tacitly reflect and appraise new investment initiatives or interventions before endorsement.
2.4. Promoting Biofuel Industry: Interdisciplinary PESTLE Analysis Approach
Biofuel production is expected to be an intrinsic confluence with the renewable energy sector in the
coming years under the European regulations for renewable energy. Key standpoints for the promotion
of biofuels are the reduction of national carbon emissions and rural deployment. Despite the jubilant
outlook on biofuels for sustainable development, research efforts still tend to link the biofuel industry
and regional growth. To overcome a variety of caveats in the development of modern bioenergy/biofuels,
a novel approach, the “Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal (PESTEL)”
framework, has been used [16]. Achinas et al. [17] explore and review the biofuels industry through a
PESTLE approach and discuss the interrelation between technological facets and sustainable deployment.
The variety of the production characteristics and sustainability factors that were analyzed as a result of
this approach highlight the complexity of the industry faced by policymakers and production companies.
Socioecological aspects (origin of the feedstock, i.e., from agricultural land or a waste stream; food security;
water scarcity; biodiversity loss), environmental governance (lifecycle emissions and land-use change),
and economic landscape (yield and efficiency, cost of the conversion process) are found to be the key
correlated dimensions in the assessment framework.
2.5. Innovation in Biofuel Projects—A Participatory Framework
The growth in biofuel investments brings with it concerns about the social and environmental impacts
of the sector. Several tools and frameworks have been used to address these concerns, including the
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) framework. Postal et al. [18] analyze whether this framework
can be applied in contexts where local culture and values differently shape the freedom of speech and
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engagement, such as in developing countries in which biofuel innovation projects are often implemented. A
literature review focusing on eight case studies of other authors is used to explore the role of “participation”
as a structural element of the RRI framework and the impact of its absence where effective participation in
the innovation development process is not possible. The authors describe the case of biofuel development,
articulating four integrated dimensions of responsible innovation: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion, and
responsiveness. They highlight how the RRI inspirational normative framework, designed to influence
innovation, is misused to judge its impacts. More than that, the conclusions of such misused applications
reflect more the difficulties involved in applying guidelines than the responsible character of the innovation,
whose impacts are usually defined upfront materially and measurably.
In conclusion, these five articles are a clear illustration of the challenges involved, and possible
solutions, in the drive towards using modern bioenergy and strategies for sustainable development.
Modern bioenergy is essential when the world is transforming towards environmentally friendly energy
systems and low-carbon development. They should be developed while creating synergies with other
sectors of the economy such as agriculture, industry, and rural development. The coordinated development
and management of land, water, energy, and related resources in order to maximize economic and social
welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems are critically
important. Synergies and trade-offs should be balanced considering the optimal utilization of the resources
for sustaining living standards and preserving the environment. The sustainability of the biofuel industry
should be explored through a socio-political, techno-economic, legal, and environmental analysis approach,
and the interactions between technological facets and sustainable deployment should be discussed. When
it comes to large-scale biofuel investment, challenges need to be tackled while considering multilevel
perspectives and global value chain frameworks. Finally, responsible and participatory innovation
provides democratic governance of emerging biofuel technologies.
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Abstract: Bioenergy can play an important role in achieving the agreed United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, thereby
advancing climate goals, food security, better land use, and sustainable energy for all. In this study,
we assess the surplus agricultural residues availability for bioelectricity in six least developed countries
(LDCs) in Asia and Africa, namely Bangladesh, Lao-PDR, and Nepal in Asia; and Ethiopia, Malawi,
and Zambia in Africa, respectively. The surplus agricultural residues have been estimated using
residue-to-product ratio (RPR), agricultural residues lost in the collection, transportation and storage,
and their alternative applications. We use a linear regression model to project the economic potential
of bioelectricity. The contribution of bioelectricity for meeting the LDCs’ electricity requirements
is estimated in a time frame between 2017 and 2030. Our results reveal that the surplus biomass
feedstock available from the agriculture sector could provide the total current electricity demand
in Malawi alone, followed by Nepal (45%), Bangladesh (29%), Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Lao-PDR) (29%), Ethiopia (27%), and Zambia (13%). This study also explores the complementarity
and synergies of bioelectricity, SDG7, and their interlinkages with other SDGs. Findings from the
study show that providing access to sustainable energy in the LDCs to meet the SDG7 by 2030
might be a challenge due to limited access to technology, infrastructure, and finance. Site-specific
investigations on how much agricultural residues could be extracted in an environmentally benign
manner for bioelectricity and increased investment in the bioenergy sector are key potential solutions
in a myriad of options required to harness the full energy potential in the LDCs.
Keywords: energy access; least developed countries (LDCs); sustainable development goals (SDGs);
agricultural residues; bioelectricity
1. Introduction
Access to modern and reliable energy sources is a prerequisite for improving living standards
and promoting economic development. In 2015, the United Nations (UN) adopted the 2030 Agenda
of Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
SDG7 aims at securing modern, affordable, and sustainable energy for all, thereby increasing the
share of renewable energy (RE) in the global energy mix [1]. One in seven people still lacks electricity,
and most of them live in rural areas of the developing world [2]. Energy is the main contributor (60%)
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of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (climate change impact), and more than 40% of the
world’s population rely on unhealthy and polluting fuels for cooking [2]. These are mainly low-income
countries that do not have access to modern energy where the majority of the population lives in
rural areas.
Biomass (fuelwood, agricultural residues, and dung) is the main traditional energy source in the
least developed countries (LDCs) and it is utilized inefficiently for cooking and heating purposes [3].
The LDCs are characterized by low income (Gross National Income (GNI) per capita), low level of
human capital or human assets (health and education), and they are exposed to economic vulnerability
(e.g., high population growth, geographic remoteness, natural disasters, etc.) [4]. The LDCs have a less
diversified energy mix with traditional biomass accounting for 59% of the total primary energy supply
(TPES) [3]. Despite the large share of traditional biomass in the primary energy matrix, the majority
is combusted inefficiently. This, coupled with population growth, results in increased demands for
more biomass (especially from the forest), thereby leading to deforestation. Additionally, the use of
traditional biomass for cooking, especially in poorly ventilated facilities, results in indoor air pollution,
lung diseases, injuries, and in severe cases, even death [5–7]. The bloc of LDCs also import a significant
amount of petroleum (oil) products [8–10].
In this article, we assess the modern bioenergy potential for electrification, obtained from
agricultural residues in the selected LDCs in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Out of 47 LDCs
globally, three representative countries in Asia: Bangladesh, Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Lao-PDR), and Nepal; and three from SSA: Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zambia, are considered. Except
for Bangladesh, the rest of the countries are land-locked (see Figure S1). Bangladesh has the highest
population density (i.e., 1115 capita per square km), while Zambia has the least population density,
with only 23 capita per square km. The majority of people live in rural areas and agriculture is one
of the key contributors to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in their respective countries. Ethiopia,
Lao-PDR, and Bangladesh have more than 6% GDP growth rate during the past decade [11], while the
economic growth rates of Nepal, Malawi, and Zambia are not stable [12] (Figure S2).
Low-income countries are typically agrarian economies and the agriculture sector offers the
highest employment rate, for example, 72% in Malawi, 70% in Nepal, and 40% in Bangladesh [13].
They produce plenty of agricultural commodities/crops. As a result, there are agricultural residues
in farms and co-products in agro-industries that could be utilized for energy generation. Per capita
electricity consumption of the selected LDCs is far below the world average, i.e., 3150 kWh in 2017.
For example, Zambia has the highest per capita electricity consumption (i.e., 730 kWh/capita) while
Ethiopia has the lowest (i.e., 90 kWh/capita) among the selected LDCs in 2017 [10].
However, relatively few studies have explored bioenergy potential comparatively in a cluster of
the selected LDCs in Asia and Africa. Huda et al. [14] have presented the prospects and technologies
related to the biomass energy in Bangladesh. Halder et al. [15] assessed the biomass energy resources
and related technologies and practices in Bangladesh. Toth et al. [16] investigated the use of agroforestry
and fuelwood in Malawi. Shane et al. [17] assessed the bioenergy potential from biomass in Zambia.
In Nepal, Gurung and Oh [18] reviewed the conversion of traditional biomass into modern bioenergy
systems (improved cooking stoves and biogas). Khatiwada et al. [19] evaluated power generation
from sugarcane biomass in Nepal. Ackom et al. [20] assessed the biomass resource potential in
Cameroon from sustainably extracted agricultural and forest residues. Sasaki et al. [21] estimated the
woody biomass and bioenergy potentials in Southeast Asia, including Lao-PDR. The Least Developed
Countries Report 2017 presents the energy status of LDCs [3]. However, an exploratory assessment
of modern bioenergy’s contribution to SDG7, considering agricultural biomass/residues in the LDCs,
has not been done yet.
The primary objective of this study is to assess agricultural residues availability and their potential
for bioelectricity in the studied LDC countries in Africa and Asia. The contribution of bioelectricity for
meeting SDG7 in their respective countries is analyzed. Bioelectricity potential from the major crops
such as rice, maize, wheat, sugarcane, cassava, and potatoes is investigated. The paper investigates
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four interrelated questions: (i) How much is the supply of agricultural residues for energy production
(i.e., mapping bioenergy supply and demand) in the selected LDCs?; (ii) How can bioelectricity help
achieve SDG7?; (iii) How can bioelectricity be developed in LDCs in synergies with other SDGs?;
and (iv) how can we create an enabling environment for the sustainable deployment of bioelectricity
derived from environmentally benign agricultural residues in the selected LDCs? The contrasting
cases in terms of diverse topography, population/demography, natural resources, development plans,
and national priorities provide knowledge contribution for the studied countries and possibly other
nations with similar biomass resources and circumstances. This study also provides important insights
on the untapped agricultural biomass and informs relevant stakeholders (agro-industries, development
partners, and policymakers) in realizing the full potential of renewable electricity in synergy with
agricultural and rural development, climate change mitigation, etc. This paper is structured as follows:
first Section 1, the introduction, provides the background and sets the rationale for the study. In Section 2,
we contextualize the access to clean and modern energy services. The need for modernizing bioenergy
and the status of SDG7 are also presented in Section 2. Section 3 assesses the sources of electricity
generation and future projection of electricity demand up to 2030. Section 4 provides a framework
for estimating the gross and net agricultural residue availability for bioelectricity. The technical and
economic potential of agricultural residues for biomass power generation is also presented in Section 4.
Section 5 investigates the bioelectricity potential in the selected LDCs under different scenarios towards
meeting SDG7. It explores the complementarity and synergism of bioelectricity, SDG7 and their
interlinkages with other SDGs. Finally, concluding remarks are made in order to find a way forward to
achieve the SDG7 in the selected LDCs.
2. Energy and Development in the LDCs
2.1. Economy and Energy Profile
Energy plays a key role in the economic development of countries. The energy transition from
traditional biomass to modern bioenergy is essential for industrial and economic growth [22,23].
The majority of LDCs do not have access to modern energy services and they are characterized
by relatively low Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI—measure of health, education, and
standard of living (GNI per capita)—is quite less for the selected LDCs, ranging from low human
development countries, such as Ethiopia (0.46) and Malawi (0.48), to medium human development
countries, such as Nepal (0.57), Bangladesh (0.61), Lao-PDR (0.60), and Zambia (0.59). The population
has been continuously increasing in the selected LDCs, with average annual growth rates ranging from
1.0% (Nepal) to 2.9% (Zambia) during the past two decades (1998–2017); refer to Table 1. In spite of the
rapid urbanization, the majority of the population lives in rural areas (Table 2). Energy consumption
and GNI in the LDCs are low compared to developing and industrialized countries [11]. Table 1
provides the socio-economic metrics, energy, and related emissions of the six LDCs in Africa and
Asia. Refer to Figure S3 which depicts the historic trend of urbanization and population growth in the
selected LDCs.
Bangladesh has an average annual GDP growth rate of 7.8% since 1990 and its GDP per capita was
US$1564 in 2017 [11]. Lao-PDR has remarkably achieved an annual economic growth rate of around
8% during the period 2000–2016 and its GDP per capita was US$2424.5 in 2017 [9,11]. Ethiopia has
also made substantial progress in the economic development in the last decade with a 4-fold increase
in GDP per capita [11]. However, the country still has a low GDP per capita (US$768 in 2017) [11].
Malawi has the lowest GDP per capita (US$356.5) even though there is an annual average growth of
3.1% in the last decade [11], refer to Figure S3.
9
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Table 2. Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the economy, population, employment, and land
covered by the agriculture sector.
Parameters Bangladesh Lao-PDR Nepal Ethiopia Malawi Zambia Reference Year Source
Share (%) of GDP in the economy
Agriculture, forestry,
and fishing 13.1 15.7 25.0 31.1 26.1 2.6
2017 [11]Industry 28.5 31.5 13.4 27.3 14.4 36.3
Services 53.0 41.6 50.3 36.5 52.4 54.1
Others 5.4 11.2 11.3 5.1 7.1 7.0
Agriculture sector
% of total employment 39.1 61.3 71.7 68.2 84.7 53.3 2017 [24]
% of land area cover (2016) 70.6 10.3 28.7 36.3 61.4 32.1 2016 [11]
% of the total population in
the rural area 64.1 65.6 80.7 79.7 83.3 57.0 2017 [11]
Due to economic progress, urbanization, and rising population, energy supply and consumption
have also increased in the LDCs. In Bangladesh, energy consumption increased by around 50% in the
last decade (2006–2016) [10]. Nepal’s total primary energy supply increased by almost 40%, escalating
the share of commercial energy (hydro and fossil oil) from 9.7% to 18.5% [10]. In Zambia, the TPES
has increased by 3.6% annually from 7.78 million tonne oil equivalent (Mtoe) to 11.08 Mtoe between
2006 and 2016, whereas total final energy consumption (TFEC) has also grown by 3.7% in the last
decade [10]. In Ethiopia, in spite of the continuous increase in the energy supply (3.5% annual increase
in the last 10 years), TPES per capita has almost remained the same since 1990, with a value of 0.5 tonne
oil equivalent (toe) per capita [10].
In Bangladesh, of the total TPES (i.e., 39.54 Mtoe), natural gas has the largest share with a
contribution of 58.4%, followed by biomass/biofuels (23.9%), petroleum oil (13.3%), and coal (4.3%) [10].
Out of the total 5.58 Mtoe, coal, biomass, and hydroelectricity are the major sources of the TPES
in Lao-PDR, with the corresponding shares of 32.3%, 29.0%, and 22.1%, respectively [9]. In Nepal,
biomass, imported fossil (coal and oil products), and electricity are its main sources of the TPES
(12.65 Mtoe in 2016). Commercial energy amounts to 18.5% of the total in the form of fossil fuels
(15.6%) and electricity (2.9%) in the country [10]. In the LDCs, net energy imports (petroleum products)
has drastically increased in the last decade [10], thereby spending a huge amount of foreign currency
on the import of petroleum products. The import of petroleum products has increased from 1.75 Mtoe
to 23.99 Mtoe in one decade (between 2006 and 2016) in Ethiopia [10]. Domestic (or residential) sector
has the highest share in the TFEC, e.g., 92.7% in Ethiopia, 82.7% in Nepal, 65% in Zambia, and 58.5% in
both Bangladesh and Lao-PDR. Energy is mainly used for cooking and lighting purposes. On the other
hand, transport and industrial sectors have relatively low shares in the TFEC: Bangladesh (transport,
12.5%; industry, 28.9%), Nepal (transport, 10.1%; industry, 7.2%), Ethiopia (transport, 4.1%; industry,
3.2%), and Zambia (transport, 4.6%; industry, 30.4%) [10].
Agriculture is the major source of economic activity in the LDCs. Over 40% of the population in
the selected LDCs is employed in this sector [11]. Table 2 shows the share of GDP in the economy,
population employed in the agricultural sector, and rural population and land area in the LDCs.
Around 80% of population live in rural areas in Nepal (80.7%), Ethiopia (79.7%), and Malawi (83.3%),
whereas other LDCs also have the majority of the rural population: Bangladesh (64.1%), Lao-PDR
(65.6%), and Zambia (57.0%). The agricultural sector provides up to 85% of employment in the LDCs
(Table 2). In Nepal, the agricultural sector accounts for one-fourth of GDP’s contribution, whereas
the industrial and service sector has 13.5% and 50.3%, respectively. Regardless of the countries’ large
population employed in the sector, the contribution to the national GDP is relatively low. In Zambia,
the agricultural sector merely contributed to the economy with a small share of 2.6%, while the
population employed in the sector was 53.3%. This is mainly due to the lack of modernization,
productivity (production/hectare), and efficiency of the agricultural sector. There are still many people
in the LDCs who are living under the national poverty lines [11]. For example, poverty rate (population
below US$1.90 a day) is 14.8% (Nepal), 26.7% (Ethiopia), and 71.4% (Malawi) (see Table 1).
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2.2. Biomass in the Primary and Final Energy Consumption
As mentioned earlier, rural dwellers heavily rely on traditional fuels for cooking. Biomass and
wastes are the key primary energy sources in the selected LDCs, notably Nepal, Ethiopia, Malawi,
and Zambia. The shares (in the TPES) of biomass/biofuels were 23.5% (Bangladesh), 34.0% (Lao-PDR),
73.7% (Nepal), 87.7% (Ethiopia), 88.2% (Malawi), and 75.4% (Zambia). Refer to Table S1 for the TPES
in the selected LDCs by fuel type.
In Lao-PDR, the use of biomass has drastically decreased from 78% to 34% between 2000 and
2015 [9], which is mainly due to the rapid expansion of hydropower plants and increased consumption
of fossil fuels. In Nepal, traditional biomass has the largest share of the TFEC, amounting to 77.6%,
followed by oil products (12.5%), coal (4%), and electricity (3.4%) in 2015 [28]. Figure 1 presents the
share of fuel types in the total energy matrix in Nepal. Approximately 70% of the population use
fuelwood for energy consumption, mainly for cooking [28]. These numbers denote the present low
level of industrial and economic activities in the country.
Figure 1. Distribution of energy consumption by fuel type (in 2015) in Nepal [28]. (Note: Total energy
consumption was 500 PJ).
In Ethiopia, the share of biomass and biofuels was 87.5% in the TFEC (by source) in 2017, followed
by oil products (9.5%) [10]. It should be noted that Ethiopia has only 12.5% of forest land while 36.3%
area was covered by agricultural land [11]. In Malawi and Zambia, traditional biomass remains the
dominant source of primary energy (Figure 2). Zambia has a share of 75.4% of the traditional biomass
in the TPES [10], whereas Malawi has a gigantic share of 88.22% [8]. It is noteworthy to mention
that the share of biomass in the TPES is almost the same in the last ten years in Malawi and Zambia.
Among the total TFEC, traditional biomass has a significant role in the LDCs (see Figure 3). Table S1
summarizes the share of the TPES in the selected LDCs by fuel source.
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(a) (b) 
Figure 2. Total primary energy supply (TPES) by fuel types in (a) Zambia and (b) Malawi [8,10].
 
Figure 3. Total final energy consumption (TFEC) by fuel type in 2017 (for Bangladesh, Nepal, Ethiopia,
and Zambia) [10], and in 2015 for Lao-PDR [9] and Malawi [8,29].
2.3. The Need for Modernizing Traditional Biomass Utilization
As mentioned in the previous section, the majority of people live in rural areas in the LDCs using
traditional biomass fuel as a major source of energy. In the SSA, the share of biomass in the household
energy consumption is around 90% [30]. The incomplete burning of biomass poses a severe health
impact due to the release of small smoke particles and carbon monoxide (CO) [5,6]. Biomass burning is
a significant air pollution source, with global, regional, and local impacts on air quality, public health,
and climate [31]. Therefore, it is important to avoid an inefficient burning of biomass for cooking.
Furthermore, the open burning of biomass (agricultural residues) in the field also causes air pollution,
public health risk, and climate impacts [32,33]. There are also problems related to deforestation and
land degradation while using excessive fuelwood for cooking.
The expansion of agricultural land and the high demand for fuelwood as fuel promote deforestation.
Figure 4 shows the trend of agriculture and forestland in the selected LDCs. The farmland is increasing
in all countries, and consequently, the forest cover is decreasing, except in Lao-PDR. Thus, traditional
biomass shall have a considerable impact on the environment (i.e., deforestation and desertification)
and public health (i.e., indoor air pollution). Modernization of bioenergy can add value to existing
resources and serve to meet increasing energy demand, as well as create jobs and reduce poverty [34].
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Figure 4. Land covered by agricultural and forest land (% of land area) [35], also refer to Table S2.
An improved cooking stove (ICS) can help improve burning efficiency and reduce health hazards,
and it has a low rank in the energy ladder which describes the selection of fuel choices as per the
variations in the economic status of the individual household [36,37]. A transition toward cleaner
and more efficient forms of energy is achieved by moving up the energy ladder. Household incomes
(economic well-being) and availability of cleaner fuels also play an important role in switching and/or
diversifying energy services. We assume that there would be government incentives for promoting
locally produced bioelectricity and rural households can afford to buy/utilize it. Bioelectricity from
agricultural residues has the potential to contribute to resource efficacy, protection of forests, reduce
GHG emissions, and protect human health or avoid indoor air pollution in rural areas of the LDCs.
2.4. Defining SDG7—State of Art and Perspectives and the Possible Role of Modern Bioenergy
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopts 17 SDGs, which aim to end poverty,
improve health and education quality, reduce inequality, enhance economic growth while mitigating
climate change, and preserving ecosystem services, etc. Energy is a key enabler for several SDGs
including economic development and social wellbeing. SDG7 (ensuring access to affordable, reliable,
sustainable, and modern energy for all) has five targets and six indicators. The SDG7 targets and
indicators are outlined in Table S3.
The SDG7 is strictly related to several other SDGs, notably climate change (SDG13), poverty
eradication (SDG1), elimination of hunger (SDG2), gender equity (SDG5), health (SDG3), and clean
water (SDG6). In this section, we present the progress of the selected LDCs in their efforts towards
achieving SDG7—especially the targets 7.1 (7.1.1 and 7.1.2), 7.2, and 7.3. Targets 7.A and 7.B consider
the means of implementation, mainly financing. Table 3 summarizes the current status of SDG7 in the
selected LDCs.
Table 3. Status of United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG7) in the selected LDCs.
SDG7 (Targets/Indicators) Bangladesh Lao-PDR Nepal Ethiopia Malawi Zambia Reference Year
SDG7.1.1 Access to electricity
of the total population (%) 88 94 96 44 13 40 2017
of the urban population (%) 100 100 99 97 58 75 2017
of the rural population (%) 81 91 95 31 4 14 2017
SDG7.1.2 Access to clean fuels
for cooking (% of the population) 19 6 29 3 2 16 2017
SDG7.2 RE (% of TFEC) 34 52 79 92 79 89 2016
SDG7.3 Energy efficiency (MJ per
US$ PPP 2011) 3.1 5.9 8.1 13.1 4.2 7.7 2016
Source: [38], Also refer to Table S3, Table S4, Table S5, Table S6.
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2.4.1. Access to Electricity
There is significant progress globally in the access to electrification [38]. The recent report by
World Bank shows that the global electrification rate reached 89%, with a resultant drop in the number
of people without electricity to 840 million compared to 1 billion in 2016 and 1.2 billion in 2010 [38].
It is projected that only 8% of the world population will not have access to electricity in 2030 and 90%
of them will be in SSA [38]. Around 97% of the urban population in the world has access to electricity,
while only 76% of the rural population had access to electricity in 2017 [38]. Figure S4 presents the
historic progress in the global electricity access since 1990.
Historically, the LDCs are characterized by a lower rate of electrification, and access to electricity
is limited compared to the global average. Figure S4 shows the evolution of electricity access in the
selected LDCs, SSA, and the world. It depicts that there is a rapid growth in electricity access to
households in the studied Asian countries: Bangladesh, Lao-PDR, and Nepal.
As depicted in Figure S4, countries in Asia have a higher rate of electricity access compared to the
countries in SSA. In spite of the progress made in the last years, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Malawi still
have relatively low electrification access rates of 44%, 40%, and 13%, respectively (see Table 3). There is
a huge disparity in access to electricity. The urban population in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Lao-PDR
have almost 100% access to electricity, whereas rural people in Malawi surprisingly have very limited
electricity access. The majority of the population lives in rural areas where the rate of electricity in
rural areas is low. Only 4% and 14% of the rural population of Malawi and Zambia, respectively,
had access to electricity in 2017 [38]. It is worthwhile to mention that electricity is mainly used for
lighting. Access to electricity for productive uses such as irrigation and other agricultural activities
can also help promote rural development in the LDCs. Therefore, it is important to electrify the rural
population for economic development and social well-being.
2.4.2. Access to Clean Fuels for Cooking
As mentioned in Section 2.2, traditional biomass is the main source for cooking and heating in
the LDCs. The use of traditional biomass and inefficient burning of biomass is often associated with
negative consequences such as deforestation, indoor air pollution, ill-health (lung-related diseases),
injuries, and sometimes death (Section 2.3). Table 3 presents the status of access to clean fuels in
the LDCs. On a global scale, approximately 3 billion of the population did not have access to clean
fuels and technologies in 2017, and the majority of the population resided in the LDCs [38]. Malawi
(2%), Ethiopia (3%), Lao-PDR (6%) had the lowest access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking
in 2017. At the current annual rate of progress, it would be difficult to meet the SDG7.1.2 (target of
universal access to clean cooking) [38]. Thus, cleaner fuels and efficient cooking technologies should
be promoted with innovative scale-up schemes (models) for multiple benefits [39].
2.4.3. Renewable Energy Share in the Total Final Energy Consumption (TFEC)
All six LDCs considered in this study have more than the world average of around 20% share of
renewables in TFEC. Four LDCs including Ethiopia, Zambia, Malawi, and Nepal had the largest share
of RE which was more than 75% in 2017 [38], also refer to Table 3. Bangladesh had a 34% RE share in
the TFEC, which is the lowest among the six LDCs considered in the analysis, whereas the RE share in
Ethiopia (91.1%) was the highest, followed by Zambia (88.5%), Nepal (79.2%), and Malawi (78.5%).
2.4.4. Energy Efficiency (Energy Intensity)
Energy intensity is a proxy indicator to measure energy efficiency at national levels, which is
the ratio of the TPES to the GDP, measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2011 US$.
This indicates how much energy is used to produce one unit of economic output, and hence a lower
ratio depicts that less energy is required to produce one unit of economic product. LDCs have shown
the fastest decline in energy intensity compared to industrialized and developed countries. Table S6
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shows the trend in primary energy intensity in the LDCs. The increased share of industries and
consumption of commercial (modern) energy production by fuel type in the national economy have
contributed to making significant progress in the energy intensity.
3. Source of Electricity Generation, Consumption Pattern, and Future Demand Projection
In this section, we present the source of electricity generation and consumption patterns in the
selected LDCs. The future projection of electricity generation and demand is also presented.
3.1. Electricity Generation and Consumption Pattern in the LDCs
The major source of electricity generation in the LDCs analyzed in this study is largely hydropower,
except in Bangladesh (Figure 5). Nepal, Lao-PDR, Ethiopia, and Zambia have abundant hydroelectricity
potential. Nepal and Zambia have almost 100% hydropower share in their electricity mix. However,
electricity is mainly produced from natural gas in Bangladesh, in contrast to other LDCs, while Lao-PDR,
Ethiopia, and Malawi have a small share of electricity derived from oil products and other renewables.
 
Figure 5. Composition of gross electricity production in the LDCs by fuel source, 2012–2014. Source: [24].
In Bangladesh, the installed capacity of power generation was 12,540 MW in 2016, including
600 MW energy export and renewables [40]. At present, the public sector has a share of 53% of the
installed capacity and the private sector add up to another 42% of the installed capacity, whereas the
remaining demand is met through the imports. The country had generated 64,327 GWh of electricity
in 2016 [10]. Out of this total production, natural gas carried the majority share with 82%, followed
by fossil oil (15%). Renewables (hydro, solar, and wind) had only around 1% of the total production.
As regards the total sectoral retail electricity consumption, domestic sector held the major share with
a 50.2%, followed by the industry (35.5%), commercial, (9.3%), and agricultural sectors (3.1%) [40].
In Lao-PDR, the total installed power generation capacity was 6418 MW in which hydropower had
a share of 70.7% and combustible fuels had a share of 29.3% in 2016 [41]. Out of the total electricity
production of 16,302 GWh by source, hydropower contributed 86% and the remaining came from
coal power [9]. In Lao-PDR, a major portion of the electricity produced is exported to neighboring
countries, mainly to Thailand. The export of electricity accounted for around 75% of the total electricity
generated in the country. Electricity from coal has been used for export purposes since 2013. When
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it comes to the domestic consumption of electricity, 4248 GWh was consumed in several sectors:
the majority of the consumption in industries (41.1%), followed by households (37.6%), and service
(20.4%) [41]. It should be noted that the country also imports electricity during the dry season when
there is less production of electricity from hydropower plants [9]. Nepal had 1132 MW installed
capacity of electricity (including isolated/grid-connected or hydro/thermal) in 2016 [28,42,43]. Isolated
energy systems (i.e., micro-hydro and solar home systems) serve remote rural areas and constitute
5.5% (i.e., 62.2 MW) of the total installed capacity. Out of the total annual electricity demand of 6258
GWh, Nepal domestically produced 4476 GWh, while 2582 GWh was imported from India in 2017 [43].
In the national grid, electricity from diesel thermal plants has a negligible share due to high operation
and maintenance costs. The residential sector was responsible for the largest share of electricity
consumption (45.2%), followed by the industrial sector (36.0%). Over the last years, electricity demand
has significantly increased, including the peak demand, i.e., the highest power demand that occurs
over a certain period [43]. It should be noted that Nepal used diesel generators to provide electricity in
urban centers during load shedding periods, leading to huge local air pollution in cities [44].
In Ethiopia, the total installed capacity of electricity generation was 4238 MW in 2016 [41].
Hydropower has the largest share of around 89.9% [41]. The rest is from renewables (7.81%, mainly
wind and geothermal) and diesel power plants (2.34%). The country consumed 8802 GWh of
electricity in 2016 [41]. Electricity consumption is mainly in urban households and small industries.
The household/domestic sector used almost two-third of electricity and the remaining amount was
utilized by industrial/commercial sectors. In Malawi, the total installed capacity for large hydropower
was 345.5 MW, whereas 23.8 MW was from bagasse and small hydro in 2014 [45]. Net production of
electricity in 2016 was 2058 GWh and the household sector was the main consumer (878 GWh, 55.7%)
followed by industries (699 GWh, 44.3%) [41]. Zambia had the total installed capacity of 2829 MW
in 2016: 84.3% from hydropower and 15.7% from combustible fossil fuels with the generation of
11,695 GWh of electricity in 2016 [41]. Hydropower dominates the total electricity generation with a
share of 94.3%. The remaining electricity comes from coal and oil. Around 60% of the electricity is
used in industry and the remaining 40% in the household sector. The country also imports electricity
from the neighboring country depending upon the availability of water in rivers. For example,
the country imported 1391 GWh of electricity in 2016 [41]. Recently, Zambia has experienced an
extended load-shedding (power-cuts) in the country, reducing its electricity consumption by 30% in
2015 [46]. This is mainly due to low water levels in reservoirs and declining water flows in rivers [47].
The total installed power generation capacity by fuel type in the selected LDCs is presented in Figure 6.
3.2. Future Projection of Electricity Generation and Demand in the LDCs
For meeting the universal access to cleaner and renewable energy in the LDCs, there should be
an increased generation of electricity supply. We have taken into account the respective countries’
plans and policies in order to project the electricity generation until 2030. Anticipated trends towards
increased urbanization and industrialization, coupled with continued economic growth and population
rise, would trigger the rise in electricity consumption in the LDCs. As the bloc of countries is also
aiming to uplift their economies from the LDCs to medium-income countries, electricity is essential for
this transition. To assess the electricity generation and peak load demand in the near future we have
used the economic growth and electrification pattern of selected LDCs analyzed in this study. Figure 7
presents the electricity generation (TWh) and peak load demand (MW) in the selected LDCs until 2030,
also refer to Table S7.
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Figure 6. Installed power generation capacity by fuel type in the selected LDCs in 2016/2017;
Authors’ illustration based on data from the following cited sources for Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia,
and Lao-PDR: [41]; for Nepal: [28,43], and for Bangladesh: [48].
 
Figure 7. Projection of electricity generation (TWh, primary y-axis) and peak power (MW, secondary
y-axis) in the selected LDCs (source: authors’ compilation based on the results of projection). Also,
Refer to Table S7.
Bangladesh has increased its electricity demand at an annual average of 8.26% since 2000 [40].
For the projection, we use an annual growth rate of 7.85% in peak load, which is also aligned with
the current trend [48]. Energy production and peak power would be 175,926 GWh and 29,264 MW,
respectively, in 2030 (see Figure 7). As mentioned above, Lao-DPR’s net export of electricity was
around 75% of the total production. Domestic electricity demand is also increasing—it has increased by
a factor of thirteen from 2000 [9]. The increase is mainly in the household (domestic) and the industrial
sector. According to the Lao-PDR’s demand forecast (2016–2030), it is estimated that there would be a
13.4% annual increase in electricity generation in the country [49]. Electricity generation would be
32,923 GWh by 2030 and the corresponding peak load is set at 5892 MW. The export of electricity is not
considered in the projection.
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Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), the state-owned public company, is mainly responsible for
carrying out load forecasting, the generation planning of the power system of Nepal. Peak demand has
doubled from 722 MW in 2008 to 1444 MW in 2017 [43]. However, the generation of hydroelectricity
has not sufficiently met the country’s increasing demand. The demand for electricity is expected to
rapidly increase with an average annual growth rate of 12.48% due to the nation’s economic and
industrial development [43]. Peak load is estimated to be 7542 MW with the total electricity generation
amounting to 34,355 GWh in Nepal by 2030 (see Figure 7). Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation has
projected the national electricity demand in the form of energy generation (GWh) and peak load (MW)
from 2012 until 2037 in different scenarios [50]. For example, in the base case, the peak demand forecast
grows from 2657 MW in 2015 to 14,372 MW by 2030. This represents an average annual growth rate of
12.3% in energy generation (GWh) and 10.3% in peak load (MW).
There are a few old studies and reports which investigate the trend and future projection of the
electricity demand and generation in Malawi. Taulo et al. [8] undertook both short and long-term
energy demand forecasts for Malawi using the Model for Analysis of Energy Demand (MAED) for
the period of 1999–2011 and 2008–2030. The grid electricity demand has increased from 1032 GWh
to 1888 GWh from 1999 to 2011, representing an average annual growth rate of 6% [8]. As per the
UN report, the net production of electricity has increased from 1793 GWh to 1875 GWh between
2011 and 2016 with the corresponding 288 MW (2011) and 352 MW (2016) generation capacity in
Malawi [41]. The peak load in Malawi was 323 MW in 2016 [51]. Electricity Supply Corporation of
Malawi (ESCOM), a state-owned authority, is responsible for the supply and distribution of electricity
in Malawi. The government of Malawi in 2010 estimated that the projected electricity demand would
be 598 MW in 2015, 874 MW in 2020, 1193 MW in 2025, and 1597 MW in 2030 [8]. However, the demand
has been unmet, leading to load shedding up to 12 hours a day. In this study, the projected installed
capacity (peak load) of electricity generation is estimated to 1500 MW in 2030 (Figure 7), which is
approximately a 10% annual increase from the current capacity of 352 MW 2016. The corresponding
8541 GWh would be generated by 2030, considering a capacity factor of 65% [52]. Zambia developed a
Power Systems Development Master Plan in 2011 [52]. Energy demand forecasted by the government
of Zambia shows that there would be a 4.1% increase in the electricity production until 2030, reaching
the generation up to 21,481 GWh. The projected peak load was 4066 MW (in 2030) which is around
2.5 times higher than that of 1600 MW in 2008. While performing the estimation of electricity demand
(GWh), we consider the given peak loads and load factors from Power Systems Development Master
Plan, which lies between 68% and 74% [52].
4. Estimating the Bioelectricity: Methodological Approach and Data Sources
When it comes to assessment of bioelectricity from agricultural residues, this study looks at
three interrelated questions: (i) what is the supply of biofuels (agricultural residues) in the selected
LDCs?; (ii) what would be technical potential of supply of bioelectricity?; and (iii) what is the economic
potential of the bioelectricity in the selected LDCs considered in this study? The first research question
is more related to the availability of agricultural residues. Nevertheless, both the technical and
economic potential of bioelectricity require a detailed technical evaluation of surplus biomass feedstock
availability for energy applications.
The conversion of agricultural residues to biomass feedstock for electricity generation is developing
as a potential form of bioenergy. Bioelectricity can be mainly produced through the combustion of
lignocellulose feedstock which is obtained from biomass sources such as agricultural products and
residues, plantation forests, sawmill residue, and native forests. In order to estimate the amount of
agricultural residues that can be used for the production of bioelectricity, we use the methodology
developed by Tripathi et al. [53] that was further improved by Purohit et al. [54] after taking into
account the crop and its residue production, environmental constraints, and their competitive uses.
The gross agricultural residue availability essentially depends upon the area under the crop, yield,
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and residue to product ratio for the crop. Therefore, the gross agricultural residue, GARi, availability








where Ai,j and Yi,j respectively represent the area and yield of ith crop (i = 1, 2, 3, .... m crop) in the jth
LDC (j = 1, 2, 3, .... n LDCs) and RPRi,j the residue to product ratio for ith crop in jth LDC.
The surplus agricultural residue available for bioelectricity can be evaluated by introducing certain
restrictions on the GAR potential of the crop residues. It has been revealed that the competing uses of
a particular crop residue and the harvesting practices have a remarkable influence on the availability
of crop residues [55,56]. Moreover, a certain amount of crop residues is also required for retaining soil
fertility [56–59].
Therefore, the surplus agricultural residue (SAR) availability of ith crop in jth LDC for energy
applications can be estimated by using the following equation:
SARi, j = ξce
(









where ξce represents the collection efficiency of agricultural residues, ξfodder the fraction of agricultural
residues used for fodder applications, and ξoth the fraction of agricultural residues used for other
applications (i.e., paper industry, cardboard industry, construction materials, etc.).
Finally, the bioelectricity potential is estimated as a product of the surplus agricultural residue
availability (Mt) for biomass power and specific biomass consumption for electricity (kg/kWh). It
should be noted that not all agricultural residues are easily accessible, available, or economically
viable for energy production [60]. Several factors are required to help determine the extent to
which agricultural residues can be extracted in an environmentally benign manner from any specific
location [61]. This includes, for example, crop cutting height, crop yield, land slope, tillage, edaphic
factors (i.e., soil type and soil fertility), weather, and wind patterns [20,62,63]. Based in part on the
recommendation by OECD/IEA [64], this study adopts a rather conservative 20% extraction rate
for agricultural residues (leaving the remaining 80% for soil nutrient recycling, ecosystem function,
animal fodder, and other competing utilization). The authors recommend that further to their results,
geospatial analysis of crop production and robust field studies in situ would be required to inform
policymakers regarding the realistic potential of agricultural residues that can be extracted in an
environmentally benign manner in any of the studied countries. Additionally, the study helps provide
invaluable information on specific crop type(s) to concentrate edaphoclimatic investigations on residues
for future bioelectricity production. As reported in Ackom et al. [20], such information is essential to
help address both food security and modern energy needs (via bioelectricity from only 20% agricultural
residues) in developing countries.
The historical crop production data of major crops by the LDCs considered in this study has been
obtained from FAO-Statistics [13]. Table S8a presents the production of major crops by country in 2017
obtained from FAO-Statistics [13]. The specific ratios of residue-to-grain production of different crops
are taken from publicly available literature, as shown in the supplemental Table S8b. To assess the
technical potential of agricultural residue availability we assume that the gross residue available from
the crop production is available for bioelectricity. For the year 2017, the total crop production was
72.9 Mt in Bangladesh, 20.6 Mt in Ethiopia, 15.9 Mt in Nepal, 9.9 Mt in Zambia, 18.2 Mt in Malawi,
and 10.4 Mt in Lao-PDR, as shown in the supplement (Table S8a). The gross residue availability was
estimated at 111 Mt in Bangladesh, 34 Mt in Ethiopia, 21 Mt in Nepal, 15 Mt in Lao-PDR, 13 Mt in
Zambia, and 17 Mt in Malawi for 2017.
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We use a linear regression model to estimate the area and production of major crops in the near
future. It is a starting point for projecting the agricultural residues and their utilization. For the years
2018 and 2030, the projected crop productivity is based on the data from 2002 to 2017 [13]. We assume
that the increase in food production and productivity would follow the trend (2002–2017) for another
10–15 years, i.e., until 2030. In addition, there would no drastic increase or change in agricultural
practices and/or shift in agricultural commodities. Figure 8 presents the historical and projected
technical potential of agricultural residues by crop in the selected LDCs considered in this study.
The annual technical potential of agricultural residue availability for bioelectricity and associated
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Figure 8. Historical and projected technical potential of agricultural residues by crop in the
selected LDCs.
Figure 9 presents the technical potential of gross agricultural residue availability for biomass power
generation in the selected LDCs considered in this study. The gross agricultural residue availability for
energy applications is presented in the left panel whereas the technical potential of biomass power
is shown in the right panel. The specific biomass consumption has been taken to be 1.21 kg/kWh
with a capacity factor of 80% [65], whereas 1.6 kg/kWh specific bagasse consumption is assumed for
bagasse-based co-generation units with a capacity factor of 53% [66]. For the base year 2017, the gross
agricultural residue availability estimated at 111.4 Mt for Bangladesh is expected to increase 148.9 Mt
by 2030. Using the assumptions on specific biomass/bagasse consumption, the technical potential
of biomass power generation is estimated approximately at 13.2 and 17.6 GW, respectively, in 2017
and 2030. For Ethiopia, the gross agricultural residue availability estimated at 33.8 Mt in 2017 is
expected to increase 54.1 Mt by 2030 (Figure 9). The associated technical potential of biomass power is
estimated approximately at 4.0 and 6.4 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030. Similarly, in Lao-PDR, the
gross agricultural residue availability estimated at 14.6 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase 22.9 Mt by
2030, whereas the technical potential of biomass power is estimated approximately at 1.7 and 2.7 GW,
respectively, in 2017 and 2030. In Malawi, the gross agricultural residue availability estimated at
16.5 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase 25.5 Mt by 2030, whereas the technical potential of biomass
power is estimated approximately at 2.0 and 3.0 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030 (Figure 9). In Nepal,
the gross agricultural residue availability estimated at 20.6 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase 25.4 Mt
by 2030, whereas the technical potential of biomass power is estimated approximately at 2.5 and
21
Sustainability 2019, 11, 7091
3.0 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030 (Figure 9). For Zambia, the gross agricultural residue availability
estimated at 13.0 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase 20.8 Mt by 2030, whereas the technical potential of
biomass power is estimated approximately at 1.6 and 2.5 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030 as shown
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Figure 9. Technical potential of agricultural residues for biomass power generation in the selected LDCs:
(a) Agricultural residue availability for energy applications, (b) Biomass power generation potential.
The use of crop residues varies from region to region and depends on their calorific values, lignin
content, density, palatability by livestock, and nutritive value. The residues of most of the cereals and
pulses have fodder value. However, the woody nature of the residues of some crops restricts their
utilization to fuel uses only. The dominant end uses of crop residues in the LDCs are as fodder for
cattle, fuel for cooking, and thatch material for housing [17,67–69]. All the non-fodder, non-fertilizer
agricultural residues with low moisture content can, in principle, be considered as feedstocks for
energy applications. Approximately, 10% of the total amount of agricultural residues is lost in the
collection, transportation, and storage, whereas another 15% of the total amount of agricultural
residues is used in other competing applications [54]. A recent study by Purohit and Fischer [68]
estimated that approximately 53% of the gross residue availability is used for fodder applications in
India. Therefore, as mentioned above, to assess the economic potential of agricultural residues in the
LDCs in this study we have assumed a conservative estimate of 20% of the gross residue availability
(technical potential) used for energy applications. Figure 10 presents the historical and projected
the economic potential of agricultural residues by crop in selected LDCs considered in this study.
The annual economic potential based on surplus agricultural residue availability for bioelectricity and
associated biomass power potential for six LDCs considered in this study is presented in Table S9b of
the supplementary information.
Figure 11 presents the economic potential of surplus agricultural residue availability for biomass
power generation in the selected LDCs considered in this study. The surplus agricultural residue
availability for energy applications is presented in the left panel whereas the economic potential
of biomass power is shown in the right panel. For the base year 2017, the surplus agricultural
residue availability was estimated at 22.3 Mt for Bangladesh is expected to increase 29.8 Mt by 2030.
The economic potential of biomass power generation is estimated approximately at 2.6 and 3.5 GW,
respectively, in 2017 and 2030. For Ethiopia, the surplus agricultural residue availability was estimated
at 6.8 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase by 10.8 Mt by 2030. The associated technical potential of
biomass power is estimated approximately at 0.8 and 1.3 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030. Similarly,
in Lao-PDR the surplus agricultural residue availability was estimated at 2.9 Mt in 2017 is expected to
increase approximately 4.6 Mt by 2030, whereas the technical potential of biomass power is estimated
approximately at 0.3 and 0.5 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030. In Malawi, the surplus agricultural
residue availability was estimated at 3.3 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase 5.1 Mt by 2030, whereas
the technical potential of biomass power is estimated approximately at 0.4 and 0.6 GW, respectively,
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in 2017 and 2030. In Nepal, the surplus agricultural residue availability was estimated at 4.1 Mt
in 2017 is expected to increase 5.1 Mt by 2030, whereas the technical potential of biomass power is
estimated approximately at 0.5 and 0.6 GW, respectively, in 2017 and 2030. For Zambia, the surplus
agricultural residue availability was estimated at 2.6 Mt in 2017 is expected to increase about 4.2 Mt by
2030, whereas the technical potential of biomass power is estimated approximately at 0.3 and 0.5 GW,
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Figure 11. Economic potential of agricultural residues for biomass power generation in the
selected LDCs: (a) Agricultural residue availability for energy applications, (b) Biomass power
generation potential.
The prevailing practices of using agricultural residues for alternative applications (fuel, fodder,
construction materials, cardboard industry, etc.) varied across the countries analyzed in this study.
Therefore, we have carried out a sensitivity analysis to show the impact of using different shares of
surplus agricultural residues on biomass availability for energy applications (Figure 12). As expected,
surplus biomass feedstock availability and associated bioelectricity potential are highly sensitive to the
collection, transportation, and storage losses, and other prevailing practices of agricultural residue
used for several end-use applications across the countries analyzed in this study.
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Figure 12. Impact of using different shares of surplus agricultural residues on biomass availability for
energy applications.
5. Electricity Supply and the Role of Bioelectricity for Meeting the SDG7
5.1. Technical and Economic Potential of Bioelectricity in the Selected LDCs
Using the input parameters and assumptions mentioned above (Section 4), Figure 13 presents
the technical and economic potential (in TWh) of electricity generation based on gross (technical) and
net (economic) agricultural residue availability in selected LDCs. Table S9c presents the technical and
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Bangladesh Lao-PDR Nepal Ethiopia Malawi Zambia
Actual Projected
Figure 13. Technical and economic potential (in TWh) of electricity generation by surplus biomass
obtained from the agriculture sector in the selected LDCs analyzed in this study.
Table 4 presents the economic potential of biomass power (MW) and its contribution (% share)
in peak power demand of the selected LDCs. In Malawi, bioelectricity contributed around 92% of
the total installed capacity, followed by Nepal (30%), Bangladesh (24%), Lao-PDR (22%), Ethiopia
(21%), and Zambia (12%) in 2017 (see Table 4). Table 5 provides the economic potential of bioelectricity
(GWh) and its contribution to the total electricity demand of the selected LDCs. It is observed that
in the base year 2017, bioelectricity obtained from surplus agricultural residues provided 110% of
the total electricity demand in Malawi, followed by Nepal (45%), Bangladesh (29%), Lao-PDR (29%),
Ethiopia (27%), and Zambia (13%). As expected, the share of bioelectricity will decrease in the near
future primarily due to the rapidly increasing demand for electricity in the selected LDCs (see Table 5).
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5.2. Achieving Universal Access to Electricity (SDG7.1) in the Rural Households in the LDCs
As mentioned above, access to electricity is critically important for economic development in
the LDCs. SDG7.1 (Indicator 7.1.1) aims to achieve affordable, reliable, and modern electricity access
at the household level by 2030 (see Table S3). Electricity consumption (kWh/capita) and HDI score
(development indicators) are proportionally related, i.e., higher electricity consumption leads to
the higher development and human welfare indicators [70,71]. Rural households in the LDCs lack
electricity access and it is important to provide basic electricity services. This should be affordable
since the households cannot spend a lot of their monthly expenditure on purchasing electricity [72].
The “Energy for All” initiative aims at providing electricity access at the initial level of 250 kWh
per rural household [72]. Brecha [70,71] argues that access to sufficient amounts of electricity is a
prerequisite for social well-being and proposes an electricity access threshold for meeting non-energy
SDGs at 400 kWh per capita, i.e., less than this average per capita threshold may lead to the poor
HDI score.
The World Bank developed a framework/matrix for measuring access to household supply [73]
and the UNDP recently reflected on how the electricity consumption is related to the SDG1, SDG3,
SDG4, SDG5 using the five tiers of access to electricity [74]. The first scenario or level of electricity
consumption would be “Tier 1,” i.e., lighting and phone charging. The indicative consumption of
electricity per household in the five tiers is presented in Table 6. If we consider lighting, phone charging,
television, and medium power appliances, the total annual electricity consumption per household
would be more than 365 kWh [73].
Table 6. Multi-tier matrix for household electricity consumption.
Particulars Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5




Tier 2 + any
medium-power
appliances
Tier 3 + any
high-power
appliances






≥4.5 ≥73 ≥365 ≥1250 ≥3000
Source: World Bank [73].
The average household size varies from 4–5 persons in the LDCs [75]. Table 7 provides the
number of rural households in the LDCs and bioelectricity available for domestic uses. The study finds
that bioelectricity can meet the Tier 3 electricity demand in the rural households (see Tables 6 and 7),
except in Ethiopia. Lao-PDR has the highest bioelectricity supply, i.e., 522 kWh/capita, which crosses
the 400 kWh threshold for meeting the SDGs, followed by Zambia (211 kWh/capita), Malawi (183
kWh/capita), Bangladesh (179 kWh/capita), Nepal (151 kWh/capita), and Ethiopia (66 kWh/capita).
Table 7. Bioelectricity availability for domestic (household) uses in rural areas in 2017.
Country







(Million) % of Total Per Household Per Capita
Bangladesh 102.3 64.1 4.5 22,744 18,358 807 179
Lao-PDR 4.6 65.6 5.3 860 2378 2764 522
Nepal 22.3 80.7 4.4 5068 3358 663 151
Ethiopia 84.8 79.7 4.6 18,435 5567 302 66
Malawi 14.7 83.3 4.5 3271 2687 821 183
Zambia 9.8 57 5.1 1923 2069 1076 211
* Available for domestic and other productive uses. Source: Authors’ estimates.
5.3. Strengthening Interlinkages: Modern Bioenergy, SDG7, and Other SDGs
As mentioned above, low-income countries in SSA and Asia are predominantly using traditional
biomass in inefficient devices for cooking and heating purposes. Modern bioenergy has a potentially
positive impact on the fulfillment of the SDGs, ranging from SDG7 (increase share of RE) to SDG13
26
Sustainability 2019, 11, 7091
(mitigation of climate change), SDG1 (no poverty) and SDG8 (on poverty and economic growth, e.g.,
by enhancing the competitiveness of agro-industries, thus contributing to job creation and social
welfare). It is important to discuss the interlinkages between modern bioenergy production and
targets of SDGs. Recently, Fritsche et al. [76] presented the interlinkages between the SDGs and
the Sustainability Indicators for Bioenergy (GSI). Souza et al. [77] highlighted the role of bioenergy
in a climate-changing world. Synergies on food security and bioenergy, improvement in resource
efficiency, and integrated assessment of bioenergy systems are needed for meeting the SDGs. IRENA
(International Renewable Energy Agency 2017) has highlighted the constructive role of bioenergy
in achieving the agreed UN SDGs and implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change [78].
This includes climate goals (SDG13), food security (SDG2), better land use (SDG15), and clean and
sustainable energy (SDG7). A holistic approach is required to evaluate the performance of bioenergy
supply chains for meeting SDGs, including energy and food security, and socio-economic development.
Rural electrification based on biomass power would greatly contribute to the welfare of rural
people. The implications are obviously lighting, (also TV and radio), education, health, productivity
increase, and environment [79]. Kerosene lamps are widely used for lighting the households in
low-income countries. Around 53% of the population still use kerosene or oil lamps for lighting
purposes in SSA (WHO, 2016) as there is no access to electricity. Small particulate matters (PM)
emissions would be emitted while burning the lamps and they are associated with severe indoor health
risks [80,81]. Lam et al. [82] observed that reductions to fine particulate matter (PM2.5) resulting from
reducing kerosene use for lighting in India could avert between 50 and 300 thousand adult DALYs
(Disability Adjusted Life Years Lost) in 2030. Bioelectricity can help replace kerosene lamps, thereby
improving indoor air quality and reducing associated health impacts and saving fossil fuel (kerosene).
When food systems are integrated with agricultural residues for energy production, there would
be an increase in agricultural productivity and income of small-scale food producers (SDG2.3).
As mentioned above, the open burning of agricultural residues would cause air pollution. Abandoned
biomass residues are collected and utilized in agro-industries, such as sugarcane industries or rice
mills, can help improve the competitiveness of agro-industries and the economic contribution of
the agriculture sector would increase. Thus, biomass power would contribute to improving the
productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers (SDG2.4).
If we use bioelectricity for productive use in SMEs (small and medium enterprises) or water
pumping or to electricity in schools and hospitals for displacing diesel/back-up generator, there would
be direct GHG savings in a range of 1.7 Mt (Lao-PDR) to 13.4 Mt (Bangladesh). Table 8 shows the
potential diesel substitution and GHG emissions mitigation potential in the selected LDCs. Modern
bioenergy contributes to reducing GHG emissions and brings added benefits [77]. Electricity supply
might also contribute in increasing the crop yields (agricultural productivity) by irrigating farmlands
using water-pumping schemes.
Table 8. Fuel savings and avoided global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the substitution of
diesel power generation by bioelectricity.
Particulars Bangladesh Lao-PDR Nepal Ethiopia Malawi Zambia
Total bioelectricity
production (TWh) 18.4 2.4 3.4 5.6 2.7 2.1
Total diesel savings
(million liters) 5038 6536 922 1528 737 568
GHG emissions avoided
(million tonnes) 13.4 1.7 2.5 4.1 2.0 1.5
Source: Emission factor is taken from IPCC, 2006 [83].
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5.4. Bioelectricity: Complementarity with Hydropower and Synergy with Agro-Industries
Nepal has only harnessed around 1.3% (i.e., 1051 MW hydropower from the total potential
83,000 MW) hydropower potential mainly due to the high cost of constructing large power plants,
the scattered population in rural areas, and associated grid extension costs in remote and mountainous
topography [84]. Therefore, distributed or isolated electricity systems such as small micro-hydro,
solar, and bio-power (electricity from biomass) might be one of the reliable alternative options for
rural electrification. The Government of Nepal (GoN) has enacted policy instruments (subsidies and
tax benefits) to promote the RE (especially micro-hydro and solar photovoltaic systems) which has
provided electricity to more than 12% of the country’s population [42]. Most of the hydropower
plants in Nepal are of run-of-rivers types [28,43]. This means that the water flow varies significantly
between the wet and dry seasons. Therefore, electricity generation fluctuates and is highly seasonal.
In the past, Nepal has faced an extended load-shedding [19], resulting in negative implications for
economic development in the country. It is important to complement hydroelectricity by other sources
of electricity. This not only helps to reduce the cost of electricity infrastructure but also to reduce the
electricity imports and promote the rural development. Nepal has also planned to generate 220 MW of
electricity from bioenergy by 2030 in its first NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution) report [85].
In Zambia, electricity generation has not increased in the last three years [41], mainly due to less
water flows in rivers, leading to negative consequences on the nation’s economic growth. The country
also imports electricity from the neighboring countries (such as Mozambique and South Africa)
depending upon the availability of water in rivers. For example, the country has imported 1391 GWh
electricity in 2016 [41]. As mentioned earlier, Zambia’s electricity supply is dominated by hydropower.
Recently, Zambia has experienced an extended load-shedding (power-cuts) in the country, reducing its
electricity consumption by 30% in 2015 [47]. This is mainly due to low water levels in reservoirs and
declining water flows in rivers [46]. Thus, it is important to diversify electricity generation capacity for
sustaining the current level of economic growth in order to meet SDGs.
In Malawi, electricity generation output reduced to 150 MW in December 2017, due to less
water flow in the river, with more than two times reduction compared to its installed capacity [51].
This is to mention that 98% of this electricity comes from hydropower plants installed along the
Shire River [45]. The installed capacity for electricity generation is lower than the demand. Thus,
biomass-based electricity could enhance the security of electricity supply in Malawi. Furthermore,
the household or domestic sector consumes a large amount of electricity and peak demand occurs in
the morning and evening. For example, in Zambia the highest power demand (peak demand) happens
between 7:00–10:00 a.m. and 4:00–9:00 p.m. [52]. Therefore, bioelectricity from agriculture residues can
contribute to both baseload and peak-load power in the LDCs.
How much biomass power can contribute to meeting the existing domestic consumption and
saving the import of electricity from the neighboring countries? Bioelectricity could cover 57% of
the domestic energy consumption in Bangladesh, 90% in Ethiopia, and 43% in Zambia. Interestingly,
bioelectricity is more than the domestic demand in Nepal, Lao-PDR, and Malawi (Table 9). On the
other hand, imported electricity can be fully substituted by bioelectricity in Bangladesh, Lao-PDR,
and Nepal.
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Bangladesh 29.1 4.8 18.4 2017
Lao-PDR 1.6 0.8 2.3 2015
Nepal 1.8 2.2 3.4 2017
Ethiopia 5.8 - 5.4 2016
Malawi 0.9 - 2.2 2016
Zambia 4.4 2.2 1.8 2016
* Note: Domestic energy consumption and electricity imports are obtained from [48] for Bangladesh; [9] for Lao-PDR;
[43] for Nepal, and [41] for Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zambia.
Electricity production from agricultural residues would help in improving the economic
competitiveness of agro-industries such as sugarcane mills and rice mills. Surplus electricity from
the mills can be sold to the grid. This needs high attention from policymakers since agricultural
productivity has been stagnating in many other developing countries and the sector’s contribution to
GDP is decreasing across the LDCs analyzed in this study.
5.5. Realizing the Bioelectricity Potential—A Way Forward
There are several technologies for energy generation from biomass [19,65,86–89], mainly
combustion (heat and power plants) and gasification (gasifier coupled with gas or diesel engine).
Biomass combustion is a widely used technology for power generation from agricultural residues
and biomass co-products [19]. Recently, electricity from biomass gasification has fast emerged for
rural electrification using agricultural residues in developing countries [87]. Rice- and straw-based
biomass power plants can be integrated with other electricity sources and the utility grid [90]. A few
novel technologies on efficient conversion of biomass are being investigated [91], which may help in
diversifying the energy systems using different pathways.
Biomass gasification generates producer gas (a mixture of combustible gas) which can be later
combusted in a diesel engine (in dual mode) or cent percent (100%) gas engines for producing electricity.
Thus, it is suitable for distributed or off-grid power for rural areas. We need to scrutinize several factors
such as the price of biomass, investments, logistics costs, electricity price, environmental constraints,
and regulatory uncertainties for making the biomass gasifiers cost-competitive [89,90,92,93].
Despite government policies on modernizing bioenergy in the LDCs, there is a lack of investments
in biomass power projects. Therefore, governments should make efforts towards creating a favorable
environment for electricity generation from agricultural residues, ranging from policy frameworks,
financing, and business models. The utilization of agricultural residues for decentralized power
generation could also provide financial incentives to the farmers if the pricing system for agricultural
biomass is well designed. The involvement of local agencies and stakeholders (farmers, agro-industries,
and investors) is also important in a successful implementation of efficient biomass power technologies.
A synergetic approach with other sectors of the economy such as agriculture and industry would help
in mobilizing the stakeholders and resources, especially investments.
6. Conclusions
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) still do not have full access to modern energy services
(electricity and clean cooking fuel), especially in rural areas. The utilization of conservative and
environmentally benign amounts of only 20% of surplus agricultural residues for bioelectricity could
help complement the grid regarding baseload electricity supply as well as provision of the service to
rural households via decentralized systems in developing countries. Bioelectricity can provide power
to small and medium enterprises (e.g., agro-industries) and help in modernizing agricultural systems
such as irrigation and tillage operation, thereby improving the agricultural yield.
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Modern bioenergy would help in creating synergies with other sectors of the economy such as
agriculture, industry, and rural development. The productive uses of bioelectricity in agro-industries
can substitute backup fossil-based generators. Based on findings, surplus agricultural residues could
provide the total current electricity demand in Malawi alone, followed by Nepal (45%), Bangladesh
(29%), Lao-PDR (29%), Ethiopia (27%), and Zambia (13%). This study also explores the complementarity
and synergies of bioelectricity, SDG7, and their interlinkages with other SDGs. Bioelectricity could
potentially improve ambient air quality and improve public health (SDG3) and reduce GHG emissions
(SDG13) as well. It is recommended that the transition to bioelectricity needs to be planned together
with investment plans, infrastructure, linkages with other sustainable development goals (SDGs),
and engagement with relevant stakeholders (investors and policymakers). The established positive
link with the other SDGs would help expedite the process of transitions towards the effective use of
bioelectricity in the LDCs.
Technologies for biomass to bioelectricity conversion are mature. As part of the global climate
agenda for reducing GHG emissions, promotion of sustainable RE technologies, and universal access to
electricity, international cooperation might be sought to attract financing for a successful implementation
of bioelectricity projects. This will help promote clean electricity using local indigenous resources.
Hence, the management of biomass logistics and financing options should be further explored while
harnessing the bioelectricity potential. A systems approach in policy design and close cooperation
with public and private sectors is needed together with the engagement of farmers and communities
in energy planning at the local level. Therefore, bioelectricity holds the potential to provide a catalytic
role in mobilizing efforts to create a new impulse in national economies in the studied LDCs and other
developing countries.
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Abstract: In African nations, national and regional development targets for water and energy sectors
seldom consider the nexus between the two, risking imbalances and inefficiencies in resource allocation
and utilization. A typical example is the development and expansion of biofuel in the Wami Ruvu
River Basin, Tanzania (WRB). Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) model was applied to the WRB
to investigate the Water Energy Nexus (WEN), specifically, whether the development plan calling
for biofuel expansion is a sound approach. Results show that WEN is much stronger in the biofuel
irrigation consuming 69.3% and 61% of total biofuel’s water and energy requirement, respectively.
By 2035, the nexus continues to be stronger, consuming 54.5% and 49% of total biofuel’s water
and energy requirement, respectively, and thus first generation biofuels use much more resources
in the growing than the refining process. An additional 768.2 million meter cubic of water and
413.4 million kWh of energy are needed for planned biofuel expansion, reallocating water to biofuels
in water-scarce regions inherit related problems to other sectors such as increasing water use for
the industry, agriculture, and energy sector by 67%, 45%, and 9%, respectively, which could further
exacerbate stresses on water and energy supplies in the basin. Biofuel generation rely heavily on
energy imports, as it consumes substantially more energy than it produces. Policies should promote
the coordinated development of sustainable biofuel programs that are less water intensive with very
low inputs of fossil fuels.
Keywords: water energy nexus; biofuel; Wami Ruvu Basin; Tanzania; Africa
1. Introduction
The sustainable management of water and energy resources faces enormous challenges globally
in the upcoming decades due to the increasing complexity of dealing with them [1–3]. By 2050, global
demand for energy will nearly double, while water and food demand is set to increase by over 50% [3].
Sustaining this upswing resource demand has driven the search for efficiency in water and energy
sectors conjunctively, given competing needs for limited global resources in the era of climate change
reality. The water–energy nexus has received global attention in recent years with a focus on how to
balance their trade-offs [4], development agenda [5], interdependence [6], resources governance [7],
and integrating one constraint into the other [8]. Proponents of the concept argue that by governing
these resources in an integrated manner, problems such as resource scarcity, quality, and human
wellbeing will be addressed in a more sustainable way [9]. The Water-Energy Nexus(WEN) captures
the interdependency between the two resources, and focuses on the need for water in the Energy
supply chain, and on the energy used to collect, clean, move, store, and dispose of water [10–13].
In the fast developing regions of the world, it is expected that the WEN approach applied to
development plans may offer benefits such as increasing energy efficiency, decreasing water pollution,
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reducing costs of energy, and water delivery. However, WEN studies are few for the fast developing
regions of Africa [14], despite well-known water scarcity issues facing 300 million people in sub-Saharan
Africa [15–17]. The estimated reductions of about 20% in rainfall by 2080 from the current level of
650 mm/yr in the region is expected to exacerbate water, energy, and food insecurity if no action is
taken [15,16], with indirect impacts on nutrition, health, sanitation, and water conflicts, among other
social challenges.
Recent biofuel trends such as biofuel mandates in the EU [17] and USA [18] have heightened
demand for bio-ethanol and biodiesel, thereby further contributing to the increased demand for land in
sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia [19]. With large biofuel land deals reported in Zambia, Sudan,
Botswana, Namibia Mozambique, and Tanzania [20]. Sugarcane alone in Southern Africa occupies
approximately 785,000 hectares (ha), of which more than 40% is irrigated. Several catchments are either
closed or rapidly approaching closure [21,22], due to combined effects of resource over-allocation and
poor rainfall to runoff conversion ratios sprinkled by high evaporation rates [23]. Several studies [19–21]
pointed out the importance to take regional-specific characteristics and the multi-dimension approach
into consideration when implementing biofuel policies [24].
Prior nexus studies often used WEAP modeling tool, with applications in dozens of basins across
more than 170 countries worldwide [25]. Relevant for planning purpose is the model’s ability to
simulate climate change impacts on the water supply to different sectors [26–28], to optimize allocation
priorities [29–31], to investigate supply-demand relation [32–34] and energy demands [35–37], and to
conduct environmental assessments [38,39]. The model has enough flexibility to adopt different levels
of data availability with a graphical interface, deals with distributed basin demand sites in large spatial
scale with supply, and demand internally matched [40,41]. The model is considered to be the most
suitable available methods for the nexus analysis at the basin level, due to its robust decision-making
support and scenario generation features that govern the nexus [42]. Abdullahi et al. [26] applied
the WEAP model and found that climate change will significantly reduce the runoff, and increases
evapotranspiration in the Sokoto-Rima river basin in Nigeria; Höllermann et al. [27] revealed that the
pressure on water resources will increase, decreasing inflows and groundwater recharge due to climate
change aggravate the situation in the Ouémé–Bonou catchment in Benin; Kinoti et al. [31] used the
model to balance the water requirements of competing users against the available water resources and
found that the use of WEAP improved the complex system of demand-supply of the Ewaso Ng’iro
river basin in Kenya. Johannsen et al. [33] used the model and found that climate change shows a
significant decrease in available water resources and drastic reduction of irrigated agricultural area is
the only solution to guarantee sustainable water use in the Drâa Basin in Morocco; Adgolign et al. [43]
used the model and found that there will be 10.3%, reduction in the total annual flow and watersheds
will have unmet demands towards the year 2050, but the impact of the existing and planned water
resources development on delivery of instream flow requirements and downstream water availability
is minimal in the Didessa Sub-Basin in Ethiopia. Despite the model being used to tested various
water demand management options in various water-stressed basins in Africa [26,27,29,31,33,43,44],
the WEN in these regions like the Tanzania’s Wami Ruvu Basin remains unstudied and the influence
of biofuel on water and energy availability and consumption have high levels of uncertainty. It is
crucial to quantify the WEN and illustrate its complexities for effective operational and long-term
water resource management, governance, and integrated water-energy resources management at the
basin scale.
We evaluate WEN in the WRB of Tanzania where a development plan calls for 50% increase in
biofuel production by 2025 [45,46]. The capital city of Tanzania, Dodoma as well as commercial and
agriculture center of Dar es salaam and Morogoro respectively are located in WRB. In 2013, about 80%
of the WRB population lives in urban areas, while 20% in rural areas—in complete opposition to the
rest of Tanzania [47].
The aim of the study is to evaluate the WEN based on multi-sector water demands estimated
under basin-developed scenarios and how uncoordinated biofuels agriculture impacts the basin’s
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water resources. The study applied the WEAP model to simulate natural hydrological processes
(e.g., evapotranspiration, runoff, and infiltration) and anthropogenic activities superimposed on the
natural system to influence water resources and their allocation (i.e., consumptive and non-consumptive
water demands) to enable evaluation of the water used for the entire Energy sector and energy used
for the entire water use.
Following this introduction, the Materials and Methods part is found in Section 2, whereby,
Study area, WEAP model development and input data, Scenario design, Country energy balance and
the Water and energy for biofuel has been explained. Section 3 describes the results such as model
performance, water and energy for biofuel in 2015, and water and energy for biofuel in 2035 were
detailed as well. Section 4 includes discussion on resource security in the context of nexus, resource
footprints management, and mitigation strategy in the nexus systems. Section 5 gives the general
conclusion and some recommendations for future research. The conclusion shows the implications
of the findings for the region and the world where multiscale biofuel expansion projects are being
considered in various basins.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Study Area
Wami Ruvu Basin is located to the eastern part of Tanzania, which lies between Longitudes
35◦30′00” to 40◦00′00” E and Latitudes 05◦00′00” to 07◦30′00” S in the Eastern side of Tanzania, Figure 1.
The area of the Wami Catchment is 43,742 km2 and the total length of the Wami River is approximately
637 km. The area of the Ruvu Catchment is 11,789 km2 and the total length of the Ruvu River is
approximately 316 km. The basin area is the home of two estuaries, two national parks (Mikumi and
Saadani), and two forest reserves. The Wami and Ruvu rivers are managed by the Wami-Ruvu Basin
Water Office (WRBWO).
Figure 1. Map of the Wami-Ruvu Basin located in Eastern Tanzania.
2.2. Model Development and Input Data
As inputs to the model, climatic, hydrological, biophysical, and management data were collected
from different sources and archives such as Wami Ruvu basin Water Atlas developed by Florida
International University (FIU) [48], Integrated Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (iWASH) Program [49],
and Global Water for Sustainability Program [50]. Sectorial water consumption (e.g., agriculture,
domestic, industrial, energy, etc.), groundwater extraction, hydro-climate, and meteorological data
(e.g., stream flows, temperature, precipitations, and rainfall) from various gauges were obtained from
WRBWO’s inventory.
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The WEAP model was chosen because it is user-friendly, well documented, has enough flexibility
to adopt different levels of data availability with a friendly graphical user interface, and has the
advantage in dealing with distributed basin demand sites on a large spatial scale. The WEAP model
was used to simulate natural hydrological processes (e.g., evapotranspiration, runoff, and infiltration)
and anthropogenic activities such as agriculture and their water allocations between upstream and
downstream users. Due to the high degree of interactions between water and energy related sectors,
flow records at 1G1, 1HA8A, and 1H8, with 6%, 27%, and 26% missing data, respectively, were chosen
to simulate demand and supply options. The gaps in the data were filled using the linear interpolation
between the previous and next (non-missing) values.
The water system was characterized by: water demand sites, reservoir, flow gauging station, and
river head flows. The study area boundaries were used to describe the spatial location of the water
system. The demand site, reservoirs and catchments sources were represented with nodes. These
nodes were linked to the Wami and Ruvu rivers through transmission links and return flow links.
The demand is the product of total activity level and sectorial water user rates. The demand site nodes
were created in the schematic view at relative positions, Figure 1. The demands were then named
accordingly and demand priority set. Flow data for the year 2015 were used to create the current
account (representing the system as it currently exists) in WEAP for scenario analysis.
After model construction and sectorial demand computation, the model performances were
assessed using Nash and Sutcliffe coefficient, E, and Pearson’s square method, R2. The model
interpolated (assign input time series for each WEAP catchment object for the climate data) inputs
and created parameters (GDP growth, industrial growth, urbanization rate, population growth, and
irrigation efficiency) for the entire simulation period. Monthly inflow data of 1955–1980 at the 1H8
(Ruvu river), 1G1 (Wami river) and at the 1HA8A (Ngerengere Catchment) gauging stations were
used in simulating the flows for the 2016–2035 period. The model was run on a monthly time step
(12 time steps per year), giving both E > 50% and R2 > 50%, which is the acceptable hydrological
model performance. The current accounts year is set to be 2015, and then the model was run from the
year 2016, beginning of projection to year 2035, and end of simulation by introducing three different
set of scenarios.
2.3. Scenarios Design
An analysis of global datasets reveals a statistically significant relationship between water
availability and per capita GDP [51,52]. The water-energy trade-offs to be tested using different
water-centric scenarios, which is based on GDP growth rates.
For Scenario 1, the current GDP growth 6% and uncoordinated water management practices
continue, neither water resources allocation nor priority setting between downstream and upstream
water users are in place.
In Scenario 2, resource use management practices were in place, efficiency for water (drip irrigation,
sprinkles, etc., 15–30%) and energy (pump efficiencies, 40–75%) were applied, then the biofuel demand
was kept constant, only the population growth, GDP growth, industrial growth and urbanization
rate were raised to 6%, 8%, 11%, and 85%, respectively, due to expected transformation to middle
income countries.
In Scenario 3, energy intensifications (thermal + renewables energy deployments) accompanying
with biofuel expansion were examined. The irrigated biofuel land was doubled whereby population
growth, GDP growth, industrial growth, and urbanization rate were raised to 8%, 10%, 16%, and 90%,
respectively, due to the expected socioeconomic development.
2.4. Country’s Energy Balance
The most important measure in the energy balance of Tanzania is the total consumption of
5.7 × 109 kWh of electric energy per year. The balance is dominated by biomass-based fuels, constitutes
88% (5.02 × 109 kWh) of total energy consumption [53]. Commercial energy sources such as oil,
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gas, electricity, and coal, as well as non-biomass renewable energy, account for the remaining 12%
(0.68 × 109 kWh), [54], Figure 2. The country has very low levels of electricity consumption per capita
(100 kWh per person per year), far much less than the global average consumption of 2000 kWh per
annum and average consumption in developing countries such as Sub-Saharan African of 552 kWh
per annum [55].
Figure 2. Tanzania’s energy consumption pattern in 2015 [54,55].
2.5. Water and Energy for Biofuel
The estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are for three major estates in the Wami, Ruvu, and Coast catchment).
The study consider water withdraw (from well or surface) as a measure of water use since they are
continually metered by authority. Figure S1 in the Supplementary Materials show the relative position
for all biofuel projects in the basin. First-generation biofuels are presently available biofuels produced
using conventional technology, i.e., fermentation of carbohydrates into ethanol, and extracting and
processing oil from oil crops into biodiesel [56]. Crops that are common used as biofuel feedstocks in
Africa includes jatropha, oil palm, sugar cane, oil seeds, and sorghum [57]. Sugarcane is regarded as
the main feedstock for the production of biofuel and considered in this study.
Energy intensity values for surface water and groundwater extraction in Tables 1 and 2 were
adopted from Wakeel et al. [58] since there is no country specific data, while waste water and recycled
water treatment based on widely used technologies in Africa such as lagoon ponds and trickling
filter—as reported by Wang et al. [59] and Paul et al. [12].
3. Results
3.1. Model Performance
The model calibrated using the streamflow data monitored during the time period from 2005 to
2015, which contained both drier and wetter years. The sensitive analysis was used to determine the
best value for some specific parameters. The model performances using the Nash-Sutcliffe Efficiency,
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where Qoi is the observed streamflow (m
3/s), Qsi is the simulated streamflow (m
3/s), Q̃ is the average
streamflow (m3/s), and N is the total number of observations.
Equations (1) and (2) above indicated that performances at Wami River during calibration (E = 0.69,
R2 = 0.74) and validation (E= 0.63, R2 = 0.78) and Ruvu River during calibration (E= 0.80, R2 = 0.86) and
validation (E = 0.79, R2 = 0.88) were all satisfactory and acceptable model performances, (see Figures
S2 and S3 in the Supplementary Materials).
3.2. Water and Energy for Biofuel in 2015
The agricultural sector accounts for 61% of total water consumed in the basin and biofuel irrigation
constitutes 29% (251.9 × 106 m3) of agricultural water use. Biofuel consumes 35% (104 × 106 m3) of
total water use in the energy sector to process bagasse in the energy (electricity and heat) production
in the manufacture of ethanol. The industrial processes in the estates use 8% (10.5 × 106 m3) of total
water in the industry sector (Figure 3, Table 1, and Table S1). The WEN is much stronger in the biofuel
irrigation sector consuming 69.3% and 61% of water and energy, respectively, thus biofuel use much
more resources in the growing than the refining process (Table 1).
Figure 3. Sankey diagram of water flows from sources to destinations in 2015 (106 m3). Sankey;
diagram is made by eSankey (www.e-sankey.com).










Rivers 247 (68%) 0.50 125.22 (61%) WRB inventory,
Wakeel et al.
(2016)
Reservoirs 4.91 (1.3%) 0.35
Groundwater extraction 104 (29%) 0.75 78 (38%)
Recycled water treatment 0.57 (0.1%) 0.48 0.27 (0.1%) WRB inventory,
Paul et al.
(2018)
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3.3. Water and Energy for Biofuel in 2035
3.3.1. With Biofuel Expansion
If the GDP turns to double digit (e.g., 10% growth) then the projected water needed for biofuel
will be two times higher, additional 768.2 × 106 m3 of water needed to accommodate the expansion.
The energy needed for biofuel will grow by two-fold with additional 413.4 × 106 kWh needed for water
extraction, recycling, and wastewater treatment (Table 2).
In this scenario biofuel irrigation share 36% (621.6 × 106 m3) of the total agricultural water use and
will consume 57% (312 × 106 m3) of total water use in the energy sector to process bagasse into energy.
Industrial water use for biofuel will increase from 8% (2015) to 12% (81 × 106 m3) in 2035 (Figure 4,
Table 2 and Table S1). The WEN continue to be stronger in the biofuel irrigation sector consuming
54.5% and 49% of water and energy, respectively, thus biofuel use much more resources in the growing
than the refining process (Table 2).
 
Figure 4. Sankey diagram of water flows from sources to destinations in 2035 (106 m3). Sankey;
diagram is made by eSankey (www.e-sankey.com).










Rivers 570.5 (50%) 0.50 303.1 (49%) WRB inventory,
Wakeel et al.
(2016)
Reservoirs 51.1 (4.5%) 0.35
Groundwater extraction 312 (27.5%) 0.75 234 (38%)
Recycled water treatment 131.4 (12%) 0.48 63.1 (10%) WRB inventory,
Paul et al.
(2018)




3.3.2. Without Biofuel Expansion
Implementing resource use management practices without altering biofuel demand and resource
efficiency for water (e.g., drip irrigation, sprinkles, etc.) being in place. With GDP growth 8%, the
basin’s water use for industry, agriculture, and energy will decline by 67%, 45%, and 9%, respectively
(see Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials). Thus, water resources for industry, agriculture,
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and energy are becoming increasingly scarce in the basin as a result of increased competition with
biofuel expansion.
Tables 1 and 2 shows that there is interdependence between water for biofuel and energy needed
to support biofuels. Currently, biofuel consume 205.18 × 106 kWh, producing 138.1 × 106 kWh and
will consume 618.6 × 106 kWh, to produce 290 × 106 kWh by 2035 (see Table S2 in the Supplementary
Materials). This makes biofuel heavily rely on energy imports. Thus, it only provides a small benefit
over fossil fuels in regards to greenhouse gases since they still require high amounts of energy to grow
and process.
The current energy generation potential from excess bagasse in sugar mills is about 138.1 × 106 kWh
per year that is 2.4% of the national electricity generation. By 2035, estimated potential from excess
bagasse will be more than 290 × 106 kWh per year, which is 5.1% of the national electricity generation
(see Table S2 in the Supplementary Materials). The biofuel is yet to replace the fossil fuel in the main
grid system. The sugar and ethanol produced are only used for the domestic market.
4. Discussion
4.1. Resource Security in the Context of the Nexus
The impacts of biofuels on water resources can be mitigated by infrastructure expansion and
allocation priority between upstream and downstream water users, which reduces surface water
influence over total water abstraction and hence balance WEN trade-offs. Water use by the Energy
sector is directly proportional to the water use for the biofuel irrigation that is related by efficient
technologies in place. Despite the rapid sectorial growth, the nexus consumption trends are better
saved under Scenario 2 (resource use efficiency) than under any other scenario. Mainly because high
amounts of water savings are derived from technological advances and improved pumps efficiencies
in the large irrigation areas that impacts a basin’s water demand growth.
4.2. Resource Footprints Management
The current water and energy conservation measures in several basins in the developing regions
such as Africa (e.g., Sokoto Rima River basin, Didessa Sub-basin, Mara River Basin, Niger River
Basin, etc.) have largely focused water-efficient systems such as pressurized irrigations, which are
more energy intensive [61]. Water and energy conservation can both be more effectively achieved by
focusing on biofuel irrigation and its related sectors (e.g., water extraction) as well as improving pump
efficiencies. Most water consumption occurs during the irrigation activities, which produce the biofuel
feedstocks. Thus increasing global WEN productivity means decreasing the resource footprints for
water, as well as mitigating their impacts on water resources.
4.3. Mitigation Strategies in the Nexus Systems
The demand surge of water and energy resources in basin areas can be mitigated by focusing on
two major sectors, irrigation and surface water conveyance as both have major shares in most of the
river basins in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Niger etc. The increase of agricultural withdrawal is
due to rapid population, high urbanization and industrial demand. This has caused rising withdrawal
to support livestock, crop-specific irrigation needs and energy (electrification) drive on the other
hand. Meeting this rising demand could increase global water withdrawals in the energy sector by
20%, and water consumption in the sector by 85%, as indicated in the World Bank [2] and IRENA [3]
reports. If water supply is reallocated to biofuels in water-scarce regions, this will pressure the other
sectors that require it, which could inherit related problems. Thus, it is so important to optimize
the freshwater efficiency of energy production as well as energy efficiency of water management,
treatments, and distribution.
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5. Conclusions
This study answers an important question on how to balance the resources tradeoffs by promoting
coordinated development and why the water basins found in semi-arid regions such as West Africa,
East Africa, Southern Africa, and South Asian countries should not apply freshwater resources to the
production of Energy crops unless water energy nexus has been considered.
The nexus synergies and trade-offs should be balanced by the fact that, quantity of the water
required for different energy production varies significantly according to the region, process, and
technology of energy production, from rather negligible quantities of water used for solar and wind
power generation to vast water use for biofuel irrigation, processing and production. For example, oil
palms in Indonesia, Malaysia, and sugarcane in Brazil are grown in large quantities without irrigation
due to the fact that the tropical lands they are grown on receive abundant rains, contrary to semi-arid
regions such as WRB where sugar cane for ethanol is grown under irrigated conditions and water
availability is a constraint.
First generation biofuels symbolize a step forward in energy independence and get-off fossil
fuels for energy demands. These biofuels also support agricultural industries and rural communities
through increased demand for crops production. That being said, first-generation biofuels, unlike
second and third generation biofuels, they are extremely water intensive, requires lots of land to grow,
compete with food crops over arable land in some parts of the world and still require high amounts of
energy to grow, collect, and process.
Rapid increase of biofuel production could cause other environmental concerns in the basin
such as water stress due to rapid population growth and abrupt increase in consumption. This
study could be instructive to other regions facing similar problems. Highly urbanized, densely
populated, loss of biodiversity, and freshwater scarcity regions share the concern that energy sector
may scramble water resources with other sectors. Meanwhile, increase in energy production, water
resources overexploitation as the global facts may have the trickle down effects on basin water budgets
worldwide. Rational development policies and well-designed management practices are needed to
ensure sustainable development of biofuels in this regard.
The analysis of nexus systems in the semi-arid basins is challenged by huge gaps in available
data, inadequate water and energy utilities data that impedes careful nexus plans. These data are
useful for a close examination of the nexus components and deserves increased attention in a world
of growing scarcities to ensure optimal resource allocation to sustain living standards and preserve
the environment.
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Figure S1. Spatial distribution of biofuel projects; Figure S2. Calibration and validation hydrographs at (a) 1G1,
Wami River (b) 1HA8A, Ruvu River; Figure S3. Calibration and validation scatter plots at (a) 1G1, Wami River
(b) 1HA8A, Ruvu River; Table S1. Sectorial water use per scenario; Table S2. Biofuel generation in the Wami
Ruvu Basin.
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Abstract: There was a heightened global interest in large-scale Jatropha cultivation for the past
few decades, and this incited investment toward the crop in many developing countries. Many
saw Jatropha as a green fuel that could possibly be an alternative to fossil fuel, which has adverse
implications to deal with the impacts of climate change. However, Jatropha investments failed to meet
global expectations, leading to unexpected social, environmental, and economic transformations in the
investment spaces. This paper reviews and synthesizes the transformations and complexities in failed
Jatropha spaces in six previous major Jatropha investment destinations across the world—Mexico, India,
China, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana—by employing qualitative data analysis. The findings
generally show that, in all of the countries studied, promoters of Jatropha investments, including the
central government and private investors, subscribed to a “wait-and-see” approach with positive
expectations. The review revealed that the intended goal of establishing global Jatropha investments
to serve as an alternative source of fuel failed because of the unexpected complexities of the hype,
which dwelled much on the deferment option of the “wait-and-see” approach for global Jatropha
investments. Failure of the investments along with unmet expectations led to land-use changes from
Jatropha to the cultivation of other crops (often food crops) or total land abandonment. Although
we are not totally pessimistic about the economic and production viability of Jatropha as a biofuel
feedstock, we emphasize the importance of paying considerable attention to other feedstocks that
might have a better future as alternatives to fossil-based energy for the deployment of sustainable
bioenergy. Furthermore, our findings provide meaningful justification for policy- and decision-makers
in the development space to tacitly reflect and appraise new investment initiatives or interventions
before endorsement.
Keywords: biofuel; Jatropha; investment; transformation; government; corporate; hype; bust
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, investment options toward large-scale Jatropha investments gained
prominence around the globe. This was driven by the outrageous prices of oil in the international
market, a desire to ensure energy security, and the quest to reduce the emissions of harmful gases
leading to climate change [1]. According to Openshaw [2], Jatropha was favored by investors because
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the crop has many attributes, multiple uses, and great potential for meeting the global anticipation.
For instance, the by-products of Jatropha can be transformed into a fuel source [3] and used for preparing
soaps and candle wax [4]. The crop could also be used to impede soil erosion caused by rainwater and
fencing, as well as to reclaim degraded lands [2,5]. Under this expectation, governments, multilateral
organizations, and investors all entered into Jatropha investments [6].
According to Jingura et al. [7] and Tsegaye and Glantz [8], with growing global demand for
climate-friendly transport fuels, countries and continents notably underwent large-scale land acquisition
and investment for biofuels including African countries (Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, etc.), Asia
(China, India, etc.), and South America (Mexico, Brazil, etc.). Hence, governments in Africa, Asia,
and South America partnered with countries, notably, Brazil and India, which are known to have
considerable experience in biofuel development, to transfer technology into their biofuel sectors to
invest in cultivating biofuel crops such as Jatropha, sugarcane, teak, and oil palm [8]. The interest of
governments was further heightened by the acclaimed indications that Jatropha could improve local
livelihoods, alleviate poverty, and kindle local development [9]. Jatropha investment took the center
stage of agricultural investments in many countries south of the globe due to its immense contribution
to socioeconomic development [10,11].
Historically, the origin/home of Jatropha is Mexico, and its knowledge and use were initiated by
the Olmeca people of Mexico 5000 years ago [12], who planted Jatropha for medicinal purposes [13].
Jatropha then moved to Brazil and some portions of Central America. According to Henning [14],
the Portuguese seafarers distributed Jatropha through the Cape Verde Islands to Africa and Asia.
Openshaw [2] indicates that the potential of Jatropha as an oil-producing crop was long acknowledged
in the form of demonstration farms in countries such as Nepal, Zimbabwe, Mali, and Brazil for the
utilization of the oil. One of the first wide-scale productions of Jatropha was the Austrian–Nicaraguan
project instituted in 1990. This project failed as investors saw it to be unprofitable [15]. Interest
in energy security and climate change concerns re-ignited interest in Jatropha in the early 2000s.
International funding bodies started to robustly support investors to invest in Jatropha [6,16] with
the anticipation of ensuring sustainable energy security whilst having a positive impact on climate
change mitigation [17]. Jatropha is argued to be a “marvelous crop” with huge potential for economic
growth [2] and environmental management attributes [2,3] since it strives well even on less productive
lands due to its lower requirements for water and non-competition for nutrients with other crops [18].
During the 2010s, there were burgeoning studies on the effects of large-scale Jatropha investments on
environment and socioeconomic development [10,11,19,20]. The findings from these studies are mixed.
On one hand, Bosch and Zeller [10] and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) [11] showed
that such investments enhanced employment opportunities, improved biodiversity, and increased
revenue in the host communities. On the other hand, Schoneveld et al. [21] and Hughes et al. [20]
provided evidence to suggest that the investments led to impoverishment, since the households’ access
to non-timber forest products, which are often considered as common-pool resources, is curtailed by
such investments. The international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), Action Aid [22], also
disclosed that Jatropha investments created unintended consequences on total food production and
the aggravation of poverty in investment-centered communities. These revelations, together with
the quest to deal with energy poverty and climate change, motivated governments to support and
allow large-scale Jatropha investments without sound preparation and arrangements. Preparations
and arrangements in terms of studies on available and suitable lands, the legal incorporation of social
and economic benefits, and conceptualized scientific studies were virtually absent [22]. Many of the
countries did not have legal mechanisms to protect the interest, rights, welfare, and livelihoods of
the rural population [23]. Even during the Jatropha investments, Skutsch et al. [24] and Birega [25]
confirmed their doubt in Jatropha in terms of its potential to bolster Africa’s rural development. The
Jatropha hype without commensurate arrangements for its investments led to poor development
outcomes including negative environmental implications, land alienation, rural livelihood loss, food
insecurity, conflict, and high investment losses.
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According to Timko et al. [26] and Hamenoo [27], outcomes of initial Jatropha investment were
negative on local land tenure systems, food production, and livelihoods. The annual output of
farmers declined due to their use of parcels of land that were smaller than the ones they had access
to before the large-scale Jatropha plantations were established [28]. However, little was discussed
about the relationship between the initial drivers of Jatropha investments, which were intended
to do good, and the environmental and socioeconomic development outcomes of the investments
and transformation patterns after the Jatropha investment failures, and how and why the Jatropha
investments failed to generate the expected positive environmental and socioeconomic development
outcomes, as well as what prospects the land had for future investments. This article presents a
critical review of the published articles and literature on the Jatropha hype and bust, most of which
were derived from the Sustainability journal special issue, dubbed “Global Jatropha Hype-Drivers
and Consequences of the Boom and Bust of a Wonder Crop”. This paper reviews and synthesizes
the Jatropha investment transformation experiences and the drivers influencing Jatropha investment
initiatives, government-driven initiatives, and private sector-driven initiatives impacting the production
approaches of Jatropha investment, as well as how the transformation experienced influenced the
environment, social, and economic systems in the six previous major Jatropha investment destinations
of Mexico, India, China, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana.
Transformation and Investment Debates
Transformation theories are not entirely new in research dispensation, as they were long
identified [29] in other fields, but are new in land grab and investment debates. The term transformation
can elicit reactions ranging from organizational change and leadership to land-based investment
intervention changes. According to Deming [30] and Daszko and Sheinberg [31], transformation
is like a never-traveled journey and, as such, its destination is unknown, is tentative, and cannot
be predicted, but welcomes new learning and actions based on new discoveries. Transformations
in land spaces are a phenomenon of uncertainties engulfed with development decision-making at
any given time [32]. Several models of decision-making under uncertainty were proposed including
modern investment policy decisions [33]. In recent times, investment hypes like Jatropha were driven
by uncertainties, randomness, and unpredictable events [34,35], and some uncertainties occurring in
transformations are expected. Therefore, in the phenomenon of uncertainties in investment trends in
such transformations, nothing happens out of nowhere, but outcomes are induced by cause–effect
relationships with their attributed challenges. In some instances, unexpected events come on board by
mere chance and/or an accident with or without recourse to modern investment, thereby adding to
the risk element in modern investment. Even though the futuristic outcomes of transformations are
unknown, predictions such as goal-setting are key in modern investment. According to Deming [30],
predictions without information and knowledge constitute guessing, which leads to crisis-related
risk. Muys et al. [36] support Deming’s assertions and postulated that policy measures toward the
adoption and promotion of new initiatives should hinge on multiple, interconnected, and viable data.
Therefore, interconnected and viable data to predict policies and develop policy are key to promoting
new initiatives. Lempert [37] revealed that a single policy implementation is usually insufficient to
tackle a particular development problem and risk. Farazmand [29] highlights the more persuasive
nature of risks associated with crisis in these contemporary times than before. The outcomes in modern
large-scale investments include land grabbing, with significant changes in the transformation of
property relationships and social relationships of production [38,39]. Kenny-Lazar [39] also postulated
that modern large-scale investments may result from a variety of agrarian problems such as land
degradation, larger firms out-pricing smallholder crops on the market, or the availability of more
lucrative off-farm employment, which, before the investment, could not be predicted most probably
due to the lack of an indigenous knowledge of the system. Keijzer and Lundsgaarde [40] did not
consider whether unforeseen or unintended changes occurred, but instead focused on two lenses of
why they occurred: (1) the occurrence of un-intendedness linked to human errors made in planning
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and implementing development interventions, and (2) the idea that reality is inherently complex to the
extent that unintended effects would be unavoidable even when assuming the possibility of planning
and implementing a perfect development intervention [41].
2. Methodology
To understand the outcomes of how Jatropha investments transformed global systems
socio-economically and environmentally during and after the hype of Jatropha, our research reviewed
the existing literature by employing qualitative data analysis. This was done through a case study
design involving six countries that witnessed major Jatropha development (Mexico, India, China,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana) to describe the pattern of transformation in terms of undesired
socio-economic and environmental outcomes. These countries were selected because they served
as countries that witnessed major Jatropha development in a world where Jatropha investments were
intensified through a mixed bag of government and corporate interventions. Again, after Jatropha was
abandoned for almost a decade in these countries, no relevant studies were conducted to understand
the transformational complexities of endorsing other crops. It, therefore, became very necessary to
integrate the divergent unintended development consequences and transformational complexities of
Jatropha. The qualitative data analysis helped provide insightful knowledge and understanding in
a pragmatic manner [42,43] on investment transformation, which has very rare theoretical bedrocks
and literature in the land grabbing debate. Secondary data collected through the review of literature
from the Sustainability journal special issue “The Global Jatropha Hype-Drivers and Consequences
of the Boom and Bust of a Wonder Crop” were reviewed to derive major themes as endorsed by
Morse and Field [44] and Miles and Huberman [45] in tandem with each country by capturing the
precise word that captured the key thought considered as “transformation in Mexico, transformation
in India, transformation in China, transformation in Ethiopia, transformation in Mozambique, and
transformation in Ghana”. Based on the major themes, the findings were organized into a meaningful
and logical cluster as suggested by Patton [46]. Furthermore, the analysis helped ensure that other
relevant research findings were addressed in the discussion section of the study to inform the policy
actions and academic thinking in a concretized manner.
3. Review of Country Cases: Transformations during the Jatropha Regime
A review of country-specific transformations for this article in the Jatropha space during the hype
implies how approaches from investment sources transformed socio-economic and environmental
systems during the era of Jatropha. Governments became the major driving force behind Jatropha
investment during the Jatropha investment hype [47]. Government policies led to two main investment
approaches and sources: (i) government-led investment approaches, and (ii) corporate-led investment
approaches, which eventually defined the productions approach and investment sources, as well as
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Figure 1. Jatropha investment sources and utilization.
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3.1. Transformations in Mexico
In Mexico, the Jatropha investment sources and approaches were government-led. Mexico is known
as the “home” of Jatropha, but the potential of Jatropha in producing biofuels was unknown until the early
1990s. The renewal in interest in Jatropha cultivation started in 2003, when its potential contributions
to sustainable energy security drew global attention to invest in the crop [1,25]. As the “home” of
Jatropha, the Mexican government enacted a national biofuel law, the 2008 Bioenergy Promotion and
Development Act, as a quick response to (i) diversify Mexico’s domestic energy production, (ii) commit
to reducing greenhouse gases, (iii) rehabilitate and reforest degraded land through the ProArbol
program of Comisón Nacional Forestal (CONAFOR), the National Forestry Commission, (iv) enhance
rural employment, (v) stimulate rural development, and (vi) produce biofuel energy for local and
global needs [24,47,48]. The primary focus of the law was to contribute to energy diversification and the
sustainable development of the country’s agriculture sector whilst making Mexico a prominent center
of biofuel energy in the world, as well as contributing to the global goal of reducing greenhouse gases
(GHGs) [48]. To sustainably move the 2008 act forward with biases, the Bioenergy Interministerial
Strategy (2009–2012) was introduced with the aim of reducing political favoritism in other districts
which lacked agronomical requirements to cultivate Jatropha [24]. The government had the task of
obtaining additional energy sources for export [47,49], with the expectation of spearheading the future
provision of additional energy sources to countries in the north. The drive for the biofuel policy
was to enhance competitiveness and to “open the gate” for locals to utilize economic opportunities
associated with biofuel investments. The government initiated Jatropha projects in the Chiapas state
through the National Forestry Commission and instituted subsidies to achieve positive outcomes.
Other states were Colima, Michoacán, Morelos, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, and Yucatan [50,51]. The government
strategically encouraged Jatropha amidst other biofuel crops such as castor and oil palm, which were
already known. Jatropha was tagged as the preferred feedstock for biofuel investment [52]. This
preference was strengthened by the revelation that Jatropha could be successful on marginal lands [53]
and the intention of the government to increase forest area [24].
The labor-intensive approach to investment was adopted to allow for the engagement of large-scale
farmers to enhance their livelihoods through job creation and income provisions [24,54]. Both local
and international private investors and agro-industries were also motivated to invest in Jatropha on a
large scale, but the intention of the government was to limit their dominance [53]. The locals were,
thus, made the key actors in Jatropha production. Farmers engaged in bean and maize production
also resorted to the production of Jatropha [54,55]. Agro-businesses were involved in the production
process, but the locals had a greater platform for Jatropha production.
Generally, Jatropha was invested in for more than three years in Mexico [25]; however, the
investment outcomes were poor [55]. In states such as Michoacán, Veracruz, Chiapas, Quintana Roo,
and Yucatan, the use of marginal land for the cultivation of Jatropha yielded poor returns [56]. It was
expected that the use of marginal lands for Jatropha would not lead to negative implications on food
production in the country [57], but bean and maize farmers moving into the Jatropha field contributed
to falls in the production levels of these crops [24,53–55]. In addition, new diseases that caused harm
to the production of other food crops affected Jatropha production [58], and Jatropha investment did not
make any meaningful impacts on local livelihoods. Although new jobs were created for farmers [24],
they could not obtain adequate and expected profits from their newly found jobs.
Valero et al. [55] highlighted that, in Chiapas, the motivation of the participants was to earn enough
income through the sale of the Jatropha seeds. This motivation behind the farmers in Chiapas was
similar to the Mexicans in Quintana Roo, who were selling the seeds for biofuel production and export
for revenue [49,59,60]. With frustration growing from the investment, some local individuals and
agro-industries opted out of the production of Jatropha, and, in Chiapas State, authorities forewent the
Jatropha project. Institutions and refinery centers that were previously created were closed down [58]
as the production could not lead to a substantial reduction in poverty as proclaimed in many studies,
but instead deepened the levels of poverty of its actors [24].
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The environmental implications of Jatropha were generally a mixture of positive and negative
outcomes [24]. Regarding positive environmental implications, the Jatropha project led to afforestation/
reforestation in Yucatan; for instance, Skutsch et al. [24] observed that about 2000 hectares and
350 hectares of lands were used in two different commercial ranches to expand the forest. However,
in Michoacán, the Jatropha farmers adopted a shifting cultivation approach, which saw a significant
number of farmers clearing the secondary forest on a rotational basis for Jatropha plantations. Mexico’s
government, corporate investors, and individual local farmers felt disappointed in the outcome of
Jatropha in terms of spearheading economic transformation and meeting energy needs [55]. As a result,
the National Biofuel Policy shifted its ultimate attention from Jatropha to focus on other biofuel crop
research projects and development (Mexican Bioenergy Network as in GAIN [61]). Investors withdrew
their investments and some Jatropha lands currently lie idle, whilst others are being used for food crop
production by previous Jatropha farmers [58].
3.2. Transformations in India
In India, Jatropha investment sources and approaches were government-led initiatives through the
Indian Government’s declaration of National Mission on Biofuels in 2003 [62]. The global interest in
biofuel investments aroused the awareness of the Indian Government to invest in Jatropha, [63] as in the
case of Mexico. The government saw Jatropha cultivation as a means to improve soil fertility, contribute
to the reduction of soil erosion, help in the rehabilitation of lands through greening, and create jobs for
local members [63]. Even though several biofuel crops such as palm trees, maize, and sugar cane had
higher attention from the government, Jatropha was ranked as the most preferred biofuel crop based on
the following reasons: the easy cultivation of Jatropha; the faster growth and hardy nature of Jatropha;
the seeds of Jatropha are easy to collect as they are always ready to be plucked before the rainy season;
Jatropha plants are not very tall, but cannot be browsed by animals; the crop is rich in nitrogen; and the
seed cake is a source of plant nutrients. Based on the attributes of Jatropha, the government realized
that the cultivation of the crop could help the country achieve the 20% blending target [62,64]. About
11.2 million hectares of land was needed for the cultivation of Jatropha in the country [64].
Although the major source of investment was expected from the government through its
policy which revealed its total commitment in supporting local actors in Jatropha enterprises, the
implementation saw corporate local actors and farmers using their financial resources for the cultivation
of Jatropha [64].The government policy paid credence to massive local involvement, as well as the
engagement of private and corporate investment through minimum support price mechanizations,
which were proposed in the Biofuel Policy of India [65]. To ensure active and massive local participation
in the production of Jatropha, the government proposed a special support package for the locals who
wanted to be involved in Jatropha cultivation. This proposed support was quite different from Mexico’s
case, as the government never promised to directly incentivize local Jatropha farmers. In the Andhra
Pradesh State of India, the government promoted Jatropha through incentives in the form of free
seedlings provided for farmers, a 90% subsidy for the installation of drip irrigation systems, and free
land preparation under the Food for Work and Assigned Land Development program [62]. Poor
farmers who were assigned lands owned by the government were to be provided with full financial
assistance by the government with 40% secured as a bank loan for the cultivation of Jatropha. In the
state of Tamil Nadu, companies and non-governmental organizations were encouraged to partake in
the cultivation of Jatropha. Thus, India’s Jatropha cultivation was made up of massive local participation,
as well as a few other private entities that were mainly local companies and organizations, due to the
government’s enticing proposals in its policy.
Axlesson and Frazen [62] found that, in certain parts of India, Jatropha was cultivated on
productive lands, but still failed. Therefore, it became very complex for stakeholders to explain why
such production could not yield enough output. Studies also acknowledged that Jatropha has positive
environmental outcomes by reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases [3]. Jatropha production was
perceived to have an insignificant contribution to climate change [66] since the number of plants per
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hectare of Indian farms was unlikely to have an important effect on the uptake of carbon [64]. This
revelation supports the position of Prueksakorn and Gheewala [67] that the cultivation of Jatropha has
insignificant adverse impacts on climate change. Indian engagement in Jatropha production led to
intense pressure on the limited water resources, which was due to the demand of water for irrigation
purposes. Although it is perceived that Jatropha is a drought-resistant crop, farmers realized that
water was needed for positive yields. The government developed a financial plan with the quest to
provide financial incentives, as well as input to support the production of Jatropha by the locals [62].
The government’s failure to deliver its promises affected Jatropha cultivation, and the locals were forced
to use their limited financial resources for the production process, to a point where they could no
longer finance their investments. As a result, they withdrew their efforts. Additionally, the farmers also
had very limited knowledge concerning the cultural practices and maintenance of Jatropha plantations.
Extension officers failed to periodically visit to educate the farmers on the maintenance practices
needed for successful outputs, which also contributed to the disappointing yields. The national biofuel
policy failed to provide clear marketing plans for Jatropha products such as biodiesel, and there were
no communication plans and strategies drawn and implemented to ensure the flow of marketing
information between the farmers and biodiesel producers to ensure sustained demand. This led to
the absence of a market for Jatropha products and made the Jatropha business unattractive for the local
farmers to engage in. Thus, instead of Jatropha investment contributing to poverty alleviation, it further
exacerbated it [62].
Axlesson and Frazen [62] further elaborated that poor cultural practices due to lack of requisite
technical management support from agricultural extension officers paved the way for pests and
diseases to attack Jatropha crops. In Tamil Nadu State, for instance, the pest attacks were generally mild
and could have been tackled with the use of pesticides; however, in a few instances, the attacks were
more severe than expected and this adversely affected the growth of the Jatropha plants, leading to
their forced removal. The common pest identified was the mealy bug, which destroyed several crops.
Jatropha production saw the creation of jobs, but this did not really contribute to advancements in
local livelihoods. Issues on land alienation were virtually absent as the government largely promoted
private land use for the cultivation of Jatropha and incentivized local farmers to use their own land
for the cultivation of Jatropha, which were government lands in some cases [62]. The government,
investors, and local members halted Jatropha investment, and some Jatropha lands are now occupied by
local members, whilst others are yet to be approached. The government subsequently lifted its focus
on Jatropha to a wide array of potential feedstocks including palm trees and sugarcane, with the hope
of producing biofuels at a cost-convenient level [68].
3.3. Transformations in China
Even though China has a centrally controlled economic system, Jatropha investment sources
and approaches leant toward a corporate-led production scheme with close monitoring by the
government. According to Li et al. [69], in 2005, the government of China took the lead in developing
a policy environment to allow for biofuel cultivation, one being the “Renewable Energy Industry
and Development Supervision” policy. This policy paid credence to supporting biofuel plantations
through the selection of a better variety of crops. The government’s initial attention was geared toward
technological research and demonstration projects. Therefore, the government passed the National
Forest Construction Plan in 2006, which aimed to provide about 13 million hectares of energy forest by
2020, as well as supply raw materials for about six million tons of biodiesel. In 2007, several plans of
actions were developed, where significant among them was the “Medium–Long-Term Development
Plan on Renewable Energy”, which paid attention to (i) the production of biofuel plants; (ii) the
establishment of Jatropha-breeding biodiesel experiments in some selected provinces; (iii) an increase
in the yearly target for the utilization of biofuel with an expected increment of 1.8 million liters by
2020; and (iv) the management instruction on financial subsidies supporting crops for energy. In 2011,
the Chinese Biofuel Policy on Biodiesel Fuel Blend had the aim of blending 2–5% biodiesel with 95–98%
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diesel. With these government policies, several governmental bodies were engaged, including the
Chinese Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture, to promote the development of Jatropha
production across the country. In Sichuan Province, about 14,667 hectares of land was acquired for
Jatropha cultivation in 2007. Other provinces were Guanjxi and Yunnan. Concerned ministries came
together to coordinate how best the country could engage in the investment of Jatropha to meet their
energy demands and for export [70]. Furthermore, there were plans to increase the cultivation of
Jatropha [70]. The southwestern part of China was seen as a suitable avenue for Jatropha due to the
numerous hectares of unproductive lands for cultivation [71].
The investment sources of Jatropha were from investors in collaboration with the government.
The government mainly played a supportive role, but the actual funds for Jatropha cultivation came
from the investors. The government had an interest in enhancing well-being and dealing with poverty
amongst the rural population; hence, the plan was to allow the locals to engage in the production
of Jatropha. Corporate bodies could employ locals and train them in the production process, thus
ensuring higher yields whilst enhancing the living conditions of the people [69]. Corporate bodies,
including international investors and individuals, were engaged in Jatropha production. Two provinces,
Sichuan and Guanjxi, were the two predominant centers for the cultivation of Jatropha in China.
Corporate bodies employed community members to work as field workers/laborers for the production
process; thus, the production approach was to make Jatropha production labor-intensive to allow for
employment generation and advancement in local livelihoods.
The Chinese government was unable to achieve its expectation of meeting the growing energy
needs of the local people using Jatropha. According to Li et al. [69], the poor government support,
the limited demand for biofuels produced from Jatropha, and the severe frost led to the withdrawal
of corporate investment, which contributed to the poor outcomes. The poor investment outcomes
made the corporate entities leave without compensating the farmers for their services. In Guangxi, for
instance, a private corporate company known as the Guangxi Zhilian Renewable Energy Company was
involved in the Jatropha investment. The company employed farmers using a contract farming scheme.
The company withdrew its investment within a short period of operation because the company needed
subsidies from the central government, which were not forthcoming. During the periods of operation,
the companies paid the workers through an investor–government coordinated system. This, however,
failed and, as a result, the workers’ livelihoods did not see massive improvements [69]. It is purported
that the heightened interest in biofuel investment led to dynamics in land-use rights and land tenure
security of the local participants [23,72]. However, in China, the Jatropha investment did not alter
land-use rights and tenure security [69]. This was because the lands used were government-acquired
land, and, as such, community members were not affected. However, Jatropha production and
processing expenses escalated its market value higher than fossil products, thereby affecting demand
and profitability. This blocked the investors’ interest, as the government failed to grant them subsidies,
leading to the Jatropha bust [69].
3.4. Transformations in Ethiopia
Even though Ethiopia has a centralized controlled economic system, the Jatropha investment
sources and approaches leant toward a corporate-led production scheme with close monitoring
by the government using the “Open-Door Policy” [73–76]. The Jatropha era saw Ethiopia as an
attractive destination for advanced countries to undertake large-scale investment in biofuel production,
particularly in Jatropha. Faced with global pressures from foreign-based investors, the government
was concerned about how the country could take advantage of the Jatropha hype to create a greener
economy and produce energy to meet the local needs. The government developed the Biofuel Strategy
to ensure that its aims were achieved [73]. The strategy paid attention, first and foremost, to ensuring a
green economy using Jatropha biofuel production, as well as improving agriculture, ensuring natural
resource management, and alleviating poverty in the country [74]. Jatropha investment was fueled by
two main forces: the government’s quest to secure energy through local production and global forces
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due to the increase in demand for biofuels on the international market [75]. In 2006, a biofuel company
known as Sun Biofuels in the United Kingdom (UK) started its Jatropha investment in the country. By
2010, Ethiopia had about 83 licensed foreign companies to invest in biofuel production [76]. Bossio
et al. [77] revealed that foreign direct investments in Jatropha amounted to 50% of the total foreign
investment in the country in 2011. A land deal matrix in 2012 indicated that about 1,360,670 hectares
of land was released for biofuel projects with more than 700,000 hectares being used for Jatropha
investment [78]. The global interest and pressure on Ethiopia influenced the government to make
two main policy changes. The first was the government’s introduction of the Ethanol Blending Policy,
and the second was the changes made to the agriculture development and taxation policies, making
the country an attractive center for foreign biofuel investors. This policy, from the perspective of
Rahmato [79], was known as the “Open-Door Policy”. In 2007, the government further developed a
“desperate” policy dubbed the Biofuels Development and Utilization Strategy [75]. The policy spelt
out the approach to enhance biofuel production and use within the country, and marginal lands of
about 23.2 million hectares were earmarked for commercial Jatropha production [80].
The major source of investment was from foreign investors. The investors acquired large land
sizes for Jatropha enterprises, and the government played a facilitating and supporting role in the
entire Jatropha experience [75,76]. The flexible and open-door policy of the Ethiopian government saw
the influx of foreign investors acquiring large hectares of land for Jatropha. The corporate investors
employed the local people to work on the plantations on a paid scheme. Some of the locals were
permanent workers whilst others were temporal. The production approach involved the use of both
labor and machines on the plantation farms [81].
The government was very much interested in ecological integrity, which explains why the
Climate-Resilient Green Economy Strategy was developed. The Jatropha investment did not make
any significant contribution to a greener economy in Ethiopia after the bust, but Portner et al. [73]
indicated that the Jatropha production had great potential of reducing soil erosion and retaining
water for agriculture production in Ethiopia. In terms of livelihood benefits, Jatropha failed, as its
production did not make any substantial impact on positive livelihood transformations. Jatropha could
not be used to alleviate poverty, which explains why Portner et al. [73] elaborated that, for farmers
to have economically benefited from Jatropha, there had to have been measures placed on their
workloads, the local processing of seeds, training programs, and market interconnectedness for Jatropha.
The investment saw the local farmers’ land alienation, which served as their economic asset. Power
holders and investors did not have respect for local land rights, and, as such, individuals whose
farms were on the investors’ acquired land were alienated, and this worsened the poverty in the
project-affected communities [7]. Some local communities did not support the Jatropha project and/or
were promised developmental co-benefits such as basic infrastructure and employment opportunities.
The findings confirmed the assertion of the UN-Energy1 [82] that biofuel production such as Jatropha
plantations did not entirely benefit the poor farmers; rather, they put them into “deeper” poverty. This
explains why Openshaw [2] indicated his doubt in Jatropha as a “poor man’s crop”. In the direction of
the implications of the Jatropha investment on food production, the study by von Maltilz et al. [81]
in Niqel, a Jatropha investment destination in Ethiopia, revealed changes in food availability and
accessibility due to income received from the involvement of the locals in the Jatropha production
process. According to their study, the changes were mixed. In some areas, food production was
negatively affected, as farmers using grazing and farmlands for rotational farming were alienated.
The widespread outcome of Jatropha was negative, as investment proved impracticable to continue.
Hence, they abandoned their acquired lands, thus allowing local farmers to utilize some areas of the
Jatropha land for food crops [81].
3.5. Transformations in Mozambique
Even though Mozambique has a centralized economic system, Jatropha investment sources and
approaches leant toward a corporate-led production scheme with close monitoring by the government.
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Mozambique is amongst the countries where Jatropha investment took place. As indicated by
Mataveia [83], the country is highly dependent on the international market with about 700,000 cubic
meters in the annual consumption of petroleum products. During the phase of global forces for the
widespread production of biofuel crops such as Jatropha, Mozambique also needed to enhance its energy
security and reduce its over-dependence on international oil products. According to Schut et al., [57]
the National Biofuel Policy and Strategy (NBPS) for the country was, therefore, developed in 2009
based on the following motivations: the unstable and volatile nature of oil prices in the world market;
biofuel as an alternative energy product to reduce the dependency on fossil fuels; and the reduction in
the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), as well as encouraging the use of safe and clean energy in
the country [83]. The policy further emphasized poverty reduction and focused on encouraging private
sector participation through collaboration and networking with the government, ensuring cross-sectoral
coordination in the country through strengthening inter-institutional collaborations and frameworks
comprising ministries, departments and agencies, tertiary institutions (notably, universities), financial
bodies, non-governmental organizations, and civil groups in biofuel development. The country further
deployed the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms and other international instruments with the quest to speed
up the utilization of green fuels and to make an impact on the environment through the reduction of
greenhouse gases (GHS) [83].
The major sources of investment were from the central government’s coffers and corporate
funding. The government established a network with interested private investors both locally and
internationally to ensure effective investment in Jatropha enterprises in the country [81]. The government
allowed the private sector to take dominance in Jatropha cultivation, which allowed the locals to obtain
employment in the Jatropha companies. The private companies partnered with the government during
the production processes, and the local people participated in Jatropha cultivation on individual farms.
The government had the intention to collaborate with the tertiary institutions to provide theoretical
footprints to support the investment [81], but this was unsuccessful. During the production processes,
the government mainly focused on small holders and communities by supporting them to cultivate
Jatropha. Key production actors were foreign investors, local private entities, and individual farmers,
who either worked for the investors or planted Jatropha on their own.
The government of Mozambique showed great commitment to Jatropha. Even with poor initial
production outcomes in 2007, the government encouraged investors to continue with the Jatropha
project by providing tax incentives [84]. Regardless of such incentives, Jatropha failed as a biofuel crop.
Jatropha business was unprofitable, and the farmers withdrew their investment and efforts [85]. Instead
of Jatropha becoming a safety net, it became a huge risk venture for the local people. Mozambique was
noted to have used large hectares of land for Jatropha cultivation [86–88], and, during the investment,
issues on land rights and tenure security became a critical development challenge in the country.
Aggrieved community members closer to the investment sites did not support the project since their
lands were taken from them without their due consent. Mozambique also had issues with the influx of
diseases and pests [84], where the adverse effects of these diseases and pests are yet to be made known.
Generally, van Eijck et al. [89] noted that Jatropha production in Mozambique received mixed results on
the farmers’ food production. This is because, whilst some community members stated that Jatropha
production adversely affected their food production, others witnessed improvements in meeting their
food needs. Schut et al. [57] realized that the outputs and income obtained from Jatropha production
were lower compared to other crops; thus, it was better to utilize available land space to produce cash
or food crops instead of Jatropha. In terms of job creation, Bos et al. [85] postulated that many of the
locals were employed by investors during the Jatropha experience. The study by Romijn et al. [90]
confirmed that more than 500 permanent jobs were created due to the investment decision in favor
of Jatropha.
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3.6. Transformations in Ghana
Jatropha investment sources and approaches in Ghana were similar to those in Mozambique and
Ethiopia, where there was a corporate-led production scheme with some monitoring mechanisms and
interest from the government. The Jatropha investment in Ghana was started by a corporate entity
known as Annuanom Industrial Project Limited [91]. In 2003, this entity called on the government to
consider Jatropha investment as an innovative avenue to ensure local development transformations [92].
Through background studies, the government was convinced to commit its resources to Jatropha
investments. According to Ahmed et al. [93], a National Jatropha Project Planning Committee was set up
to assist in establishing Jatropha plantations in the country. The committee recommended pilot Jatropha
plantations in 53 districts over a period of five to six years, on unproductive and dormant lands [94,95].
The government was expected to lead the Jatropha investment initiative by engaging local farmers to
transform their livelihoods positively [92]. The committee suggested that these farmers should be
trained extensively by Ghana’s agriculture ministry [96] to ensure that they gained knowledge on the
agronomy practices of Jatropha. A market strategy specified that the government should purchase the
outputs of the farmers as the biofuel policy-mandated government-owned vehicles were to run on
biodiesel on a minimum of B20 [96].
Technoserve [97] unveiled that the Ghanaian government had two biofuel crops to choose from:
oil palm and Jatropha. The government made its choice in favor of Jatropha and decided to pump
funds toward its cultivation. The Ghana Energy Commission [98] confirmed that the government
was dedicated to Jatropha investment because of the huge importation cost of crude oil in 2004, which
ranged from around United States dollars (USD) 516.8 million to USD 816.1 million. Unfortunately,
the intended Jatropha project to be implemented by the government in the selected districts came to
a halt when Ghana discovered crude oil in 2007. Therefore, both foreign and local investors were
granted the opportunity to invest in Jatropha [99]. These investors acquired large stretches of land for
Jatropha plantations [21,91] through negotiations with the chiefs [100]. Energy-inclined civil society
groups such as the Kumasi Institute of Technology, Energy, and Environment (KITE-Ghana), the Gratis
Foundation, and New Energy-Ghana also engaged in Jatropha investment, but on a smaller scale with
funding support from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These organizations had an
interest in using Jatropha to have a positive impact on communities [101,102].
Jatropha investment in Ghana generally unfolded transformations as unsatisfactory development
outcomes for both investors and local communities. In a study conducted by Timko et al. [26], several
outcomes were identified in some selected Jatropha investment sites in Ghana. Firstly, an average of
55.5 acres of land utilized by farmers were taken over by investors for large-scale Jatropha production.
The takeover of farmers’ land was never expected, as the motivation for the push for Jatropha was that
Jatropha could be successful on marginal lands (supported by Reference [53]). Hence, there was the
stance that local farmers would not be alienated from their farmlands [103]. Most of the large-scale
investments were featured on productive lands, leading to the alienation of farmers. The second
revelation by Timko et al. [26] was the failure of large-scale Jatropha investments to massively impact
infrastructure growth and expansion. Except for the Jimle/Kpachaa investment destination, the Jatropha
investment communities never benefited from the investors in terms of infrastructural provisions.
This revelation runs parallel to the stance of Brittaine and Lutaladio [104] that Jatropha investment
could trigger the provision of rural-based infrastructure for local transformation. In many of the
Jatropha centers, jobs were created, but this did not have substantial economic improvements in affected
communities. In fact, community members were generally worse off due to the large-scale Jatropha
cultivation [105].
Jatropha investments also led to conflict of varying types [105] amongst the various interest groups,
including investors, farmers, traditional authorities, and government agencies. The cause of the conflict
was triggered by the following conditions: the lack of community participation and official notifications
of the affected individuals during the periods of Jatropha investments; the meager and inconclusive
compensation packages; the lack of transparency in the lease arrangements; the lack of trust in the
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overall negotiation process for Jatropha investments; ambiguous land ownership structure; and the lack
of alternative productive agricultural lands for dispossessed farmers. Acheampong and Campion [105]
vied that Ghana’s Jatropha investment outcomes in the initial stages were indications that large-scale
Jatropha plantations may not help the country attain the proposed ecological and livelihood benefits
from Jatropha as widely spread in secondary sources.
4. Discussion
This review shows that, in all of the previously Jatropha-producing countries considered, none of
them were committed to initiating scientific studies on the crop before jumping into its investment [47].
The general enticing attributes granted to the crop were enough to lure these countries to invest in the
crop, thus placing huge expectations on the crop as a “miracle” to solve most of their development
expectations. Indications including Openshaw’s [2] provisions that Jatropha could rapidly spearhead
economic growth provided a sound ground for the countries to jump into its cultivation. The motivations
of countries were manifested through the initiation of biofuel policies with various levels of targets
within a specified period. However, as the biofuel policies of the six reviewed countries hinged on
specific investment opportunities in favor of green fuel in such countries, the central and common
reason for the quick jump to Jatropha investment without commensurate and proper empirical research
works was due to the quest to become energy autonomous.
The researchers were not totally pessimistic about Jatropha, as there were wide expectations for
the young crop in a new system with no previous extensive practically scientific proven research.
There was no local level research to prove country-specific conditions and the suitability of Jatropha,
genetic composition, characteristics of Jatropha, its soil requirements, suitability, agronomy practices,
marketability, and other undisclosed information about the crop. In Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
Ghana, where land is the greatest asset for rural livelihoods, there was no critical consideration
granted to land issues in terms of how best to incorporate Jatropha investments without local land
denial and subsequent land alienation. The research, thus, acknowledged that the time for Jatropha
investment was generally wrong, since it was the period for in-depth studies and knowledge-sharing
amongst countries before gradual investments were started. The period was. thus, “research to prove
before production” instead of the “wait-and-see approach after production” [106], which was an “easy
way out and a short-cut to meet doubtful expectations”. The wait-and-see approach, according to
Gordon et al. [107], is a deferment approach. The deferment approach is due to the uncertainties
associated with the potential allocation of information breaches. This uncertainty is the result of the
potential vulnerabilities and threats associated with breaches. Due to these uncertainties, it may be
rational to take a wait-and-see approach. In the case of Mexico, it was obvious that the local systems of
Jatropha investment needed improvement through training and capacity building before the actual
Jatropha investment, but this never took place. In the Indian case, the government was not financially
prepared for Jatropha investments, and vague promises were made without fulfilment; as such, no one
expected positive outcomes from the Jatropha investment in the country. The Chinese case also saw
limited support offered by the government to corporate Jatropha investors, which led them to pull
out from the investments. Perhaps, if the government had positioned itself to substantially support
corporate bodies through subsidies during the investment, the development outcomes would have
been positive. In Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana, foreign investors rushed to invest without giving
recognition to the traditional land rights of the locals. Without this social license from the tradition
land-owners and users, instituting a successful business will always be contentious without local
support. Figure 2 presents a summary of the global transformation creation trajectory through Jatropha
investment and its diversity based on the approach to investment.
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Figure 2. Global transformation trajectory through Jatropha investment.
Transformations in Government- versus Corporate-Led Jatropha Investment
Transformations of Jatropha investment took two main forms, that is, production initiated by the
government and production initiated by corporate or private investors. In all six countries considered
in the research, Jatropha production failed whether it was led by the government or by corporate
investors. In Mexico and India, Jatropha investment was a national agenda with the government
taking direct involvement in the cultivation process. The Chinese embraced a mix of socialist and
capitalist approaches, but the government was somewhat reluctant to inject subsidies into the Jatropha
initiative. Although Ethiopia and Mozambique have a centralized government control system, the
corporate agenda (capitalist approach) was embraced. In Ghana, it was corporate-led in a decentralized
democratic system. Based on the corporate production approach adopted by these countries, there
were diversities in terms of the environmental, economic, and social transformations after the collapse
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of Jatropha. From the narrative, government involvement (socialist approach) tried to put “people”
at the center of the investment, whilst corporate investors (capitalist approach) placed emphasis on
“profit”. In relation to the differences in priorities, government-led production focused on “marginal
lands”, instead of “productive lands” occupied by indigenous and tenant farmers [48,63,69,74,93].
Thus, the rate of environmental destruction for government-led production was lower than that of
corporate investors. In fact, government-led production tried putting environmental integrity at the
core of its investment. In India, for instance, Zafar [63] reiterated that the government involvement in
Jatropha production was aimed at reducing soil erosion and the rehabilitation of land for the benefit
of communities. The use of marginal lands in Mexico by the government also meant that Jatropha
cultivation would not consume the green vegetation of communities [57]. In the Yucatan State, Mexico,
the government tied Jatropha production to afforestation/reforestation with some hectares of land used
specifically to expand forest. Chinese government engagement in the investment also led to extensive
use of marginal lands, thus safeguarding productive land for the production of food crops.
In relation to corporate investors, the top priority of “profit” meant that lands as livelihood assets
for host communities were taken away from them, and forested landscapes were transformed to
large-scale Jatropha plantations, as in the case in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana. Flexibility in the
use of abandoned lands by both the government and corporate investors varied sharply. In most of
the government-led projects, local farmers were advised to use their lands for Jatropha production.
After the poor outcomes of the initial investment, farmers later transformed their lands back to food
crop production with ease. The marginal lands designated by the government for Jatropha lay idle,
probably due to the fear of low fertility to support farming or the complexities associated with using
government lands for personal projects [107]. In Mexico, India, and China, for instance, where there
was some active form of government participation, lands used for the investment still lie dormant.
With the corporate investors, once they were unable to realize gains from their investment, they
left their lands dormant, and some community members ended up using such land for their own
farming. In Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana, where investments were predominantly led by private
investors, some farmers returned to the Jatropha lands for farming purposes [81,86,88]. The subsequent
re-transformation of land back to farmland helped advance the livelihood of such farmers, although
they can be alienated at any point in time, especially when another investment sets in. There were
also instances where corporate lands were re-leased to other private investors for investment; hence,
farmers still faced alienation despite the bust of Jatropha projects in their communities.
The social implications associated with government- versus private-led investment varied.
Whilst land-resource conflict became the hallmark of private investment due to alienation and unfair
compensation, government-led investment intensified social capital, helping concretize social cohesion.
In Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana, where investment was intensified by private actors, issues on
land rights became critical, leading to investor–farmer conflicts in the host communities [73,83,105].
This conflict affected social relations, and somewhat interrupted the operational peace investors needed
for sound investment. In the case of government-led investments, government-owned lands were
used; hence, issues of eviction were negated [55]. Again, farmers were encouraged to use their own
lands for Jatropha cultivations. This solidified the unity of work, as farmers had to coordinate efforts
and share responsibilities for the cultivation of a common crop, Jatropha. As a result, government-led
investment did not create social disturbances vis-à-vis private investments.
In countries where Jatropha projects were led by the government, particularly in India, the
government’s intentions and plans were to encourage local farmers through incentive-driven
approaches, even though they were not successful. However, the government continually provided
the leading role, allowing farmers and agro-business groups to use their own resources for investment.
Jatropha was planted on a large-, medium-, and small-scale basis, depending on the financial viability
of the entities and individuals involved. Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ghana, and China, to a certain extent,
saw the direct participation of corporate bodies in Jatropha investment. These corporate bodies were
both local and foreign-based entities. The greatest proportion of foreign investors (corporate bodies)
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featured their investment in these countries due to the government’s “open-door policy”. Unlike in
Mexico and India, Jatropha in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana was basically instigated on a large
scale, with investors acquiring large tracts of land for their investments. Although there was land-use
change, issues regarding land takeovers and the recognition of local land rights were rare in Mexico,
India, and China due to the wide use of marginal lands (especially in Mexico and China) and the
farmers’ decision to use their own lands for Jatropha (India). In contrast, issues of land-use rights and
tenure security became a critical development issue in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and China, as many
local farmers were evicted from their lands without their approval or commensurate compensation.
This affected local agriculture, with direct negative implications on food security. Concerns about food
insecurity were also common in Mexico and India, where new pests and diseases were introduced,
thus affecting food crops. Particularly in Mexico, the case was further worsened by some of the farmers
deciding to vacate crop production for Jatropha cultivation. China very rarely had issues concerning
the negative outcome of Jatropha on food production as marginal lands were predominantly used for
Jatropha cultivation.
Jatropha investment led to the creation of temporal jobs for the local actors involved, but this
did not really enhance the livelihood outcomes. In all six cases, Jatropha was unprofitable; as such,
the target of meeting global energy needs through biofuel was dashed. This led to the Jatropha bust,
with governments shifting their policy focus from Jatropha to make room for evidence-based research,
refocusing their attention on a wide range of possible agro-fuel crops. Actors, including governments,
local agro-business groups, farmers, and foreign investors, largely withdrew their investment due to
the unprofitability of Jatropha. In Mexico, India, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique, some acres of
Jatropha lands are used for the cultivation of other crops either by farmers or other investors, whilst
other portions are yet to be used. Since marginal lands were used for Jatropha in China, the lands
are still idle after the cessation of investment. Generally, Jatropha failed because of the quick leap
to its investment without commensurate empirical studies, especially at country-specific levels to
prove/disprove the heightened proclamation on the crop. Jatropha was just an ordinary crop, instead of
the fancy names given to it such as “wonder crop”, “miracle crop”, etc.
The ongoing discussions imply that interventions based on lessons from both government-led
and private-initiated investment need variations to critically address the outcomes associated with
large-scale investment projects. There is a need for critical scrutiny and policy-based initiatives to
comprehensively address the problems associated with large-scale investments either initiated by the
government or by private individuals.
Currently, these countries have come to terms with the uncertain path of Jatropha transformation.
Transformation patterns ultimately followed policy, investment, and land-use transformations (see
Table 1). Thus, biofuel policy attention shifted from Jatropha to other feedstocks, investment toward
Jatropha transformed to other crops or to no investment, and land use for Jatropha was transformed to
farming grounds by either smallholders/other investors or to total abandonment without any crop
production. Jatropha transformation led to socio-economic and environmental outcomes, with their
diversities widely dependent on the perspective from which such investments were tackled, either
led by the government (Mexico and India), corporate investors (Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Ghana),
or concurrently by the government and corporate investors (China). As inferred from Deming [30], and
Dazko and Sheinberg’s [31] theory of transformation creation, the socio-economic and environmental
outcomes of Jatropha transformation in these six countries as the initial uncertain destinations led to new
discoveries and learning, especially toward an effective response to inform future investments. These
countries have, therefore, come to terms with the outcomes of investment transformation (system)
change through the path of transformation; thus, vast potential lessons exist for them to tap into so
as to drive future agro-investment in a positive direction. Table 1 shows a summary of the reviewed
literature on transformation creation through global Jatropha investment of the six selected previous
Jatropha-producing countries, and their patterns of transformation vis-à-vis policy, investment, and
land use.
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5. Conclusions
The global recognition given to Jatropha as a “wonder crop” was clearly a bust. The major
investment destinations reviewed in this paper failed to achieve their expected results in terms of
alleviating local and global energy poverty, reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and
enhancing local livelihoods and development. The review established that the intended goal for
establishing global Jatropha investment, which was to serve as an alternative source of fuel, failed
because of the unexpected complexities of the uncertainties and the ubiquitous nature of the hype, which
dwelled on the wait-and-see (that is, the deferment option) approach for global Jatropha investment.
These frustrations caused governments and investors to lose interest in Jatropha. It should be accepted
that Jatropha was over-hyped, in the absence of extensive and convincing scientific research works.
Jatropha will not gain popular attention any longer, as countries seem reluctant to massively pay
credence to its re-investment. Notwithstanding, the current phase of Jatropha transformation in the
studied countries calls for them to move forward, as countries need to appreciate diversity in policy
interventions in relation to key factors that lead to the investment implementation processes. This
is premised on the fact that the outcomes of the Jatropha transformations in the countries studied
are parallel to that which was premised, but not based on the approach and perspective to which
Jatropha investments were tackled. Differences in socio-economic and environmental outcomes call for
these countries to reflect upon the existing potentials and constraints created for responsive policy
measures toward their biofuel sectors. Currently, these countries have transformed their biofuel policy
attention from Jatropha to other feedstocks, and it is expected that these transformed policies will take
precautions based on lessons learnt from the previous investments, as well as the current situations
that are presented as an outcome through their respective travels on the path of transformation [30,31].
We support the shift in policy attention, since we are not all that pessimistic about the economic and
production viability of Jatropha (even if treated with adequate responsibility). Perhaps considerable
attention granted to other feedstocks, as these countries adopted, might have a future as a better
alternative source of energy. It is expected that countries which embrace similar investment approaches,
for instance, Mexico and India for government-led investment, and Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
Ghana for corporate-led investment, might have some interrelated responses. Policy measures should,
however, deeply reflect the peculiar dynamics in each country for effective outcomes.
Our research incites policy lessons that the adoption and promotion of any new crop must be based
on incremental measures for sound policy responsiveness and implementation. The “quick jump” to any
new crop by countries just because it is widely propagated by the international community as a response
to a particular development need is not adequate enough for mere acceptance. Thought-provoking
policy measures are needed, premised on wide consultation and a participatory paradigm characterized
by in-depth empirical research within a particular country. As suggested by Muys et al. [36], policy
measures toward the adoption and promotion of new crops should hinge on viable data from proposed
investment communities, as well as a cost–benefit analysis of the outcomes of such investments.
Even if this proves satisfactory, initial investment based on experimental trials in selected locations
should be embraced as the first step, as this can help to unravel peculiar uncertainties and problems
associated with such crops, as suggested by Soto et al. [108]. Another insightful policy implication
of these findings is centered on policy interconnectedness, and the need for countries to be aware
of and appreciate such connections for effective measures. Lempert [37] revealed that a single
policy implementation is usually insufficient to tackle a particular development problem. Therefore,
there is a need for national governments, corporate investors, and other important stakeholders to
understand that the policy environment is a system made up of a network of several policies that work
interrelatedly to address a particular development need [109]. This policy system is also applicable to
the emergence and promotion of a new crop, which is likely to present solutions to a development
problem. Ultimately, government and private investors must sufficiently reflect on the suitability of
endorsing new investment initiatives before accurately appraising the investment viability. Even if
66
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there is such an endorsement, the aftermath of the failures of such initiatives should be appraised to
understand the impacts of the failure to transform the system.
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Abstract: Biofuels production is expected to be an intrinsic confluence to the renewable energy sector
in the coming years under the European regulations for renewable energy. Key standpoints of the
biofuels promotions are the reduction of national carbon emissions and rural deployment. Despite
jubilant outlook of biofuels for sustainable development, research efforts still tend to link the biofuel
industry and regional growth. The aim of this study is to explore and review the biofuels industry
through a socio-political, techno-economic, legal and environmental (PESTLE) analysis approach,
and discuss the interrelation between technological facets and sustainable deployment.
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1. Introduction
The drive to switch to an alternative transportation fuel is to reduce the dependency on oil and
decrease the pressure on the environment [1–8]. The targets set in the RED by the European Commission
are to support the development of biofuels [9–14]. Most of the legislations that are developed to
achieve these targets are based on life-cycle assessments which often only account for greenhouse
gas emissions (GHG) [15–17]. Several other limitations regarding the sustainability of the production,
including the competition of feedstock cultivation with the food industry, create difficulties to achieve
the short-term production goals of biofuels set by the European Commission [18–23]. This results
in the need to develop standard production practices as well as licensing and certification of biofuel
manufacture, so that all relevant environmental and social impacts can be regarded [24–27]. To create
such production standards, the governing organizations, which are the European Commission and the
governments in Europe, need to understand the production processes and its impact on sustainability.
Even when policies directed towards a more sustainable production are in place, the production
companies need to understand how to adhere to the legislation. They will need to increase their
research and development into the energy production processes [28–31].
The biofuel industry is still developing, as the consumption of all biofuels in the European Union
(EU) increased with 8% from 2016 to 2017 [32]. In the EU, the renewable energy directive (RED) is created
as a policy to support the production and development of these renewable energies [13]. Especially for
the transportation sector, the objective for all the EU countries is to have 10% renewable energies in
2020 [33]. Biofuels are considered as the key product to achieve this target and further criteria regarding
their sustainability are developed [34]. Several literature sources stress the importance of understanding
the role of biofuels in the possible reductions in life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that can be
achieved with respect to fossil fuels to inform policy development and the decisions regarding the
best fuel types [35]. This research will take this broader by analyzing the sustainability factors which
influence the biofuel industry, and relates this to the biofuel characteristics, including the type of fuel,
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feedstock, and conversion process. In addition to the support for policy development, the research and
discussion of the biofuel characteristics have the intent to provide a foundation for the directives that
companies are going to take to adhere to the policies. Sustainability assessment of biofuels production
from biomass and biowaste is an important prerequisite for informed and sound decision-making.
However, life-cycle analysis (LCA) is still constrained by the difficulty of pointing out the most relevant
impact factors. To underwrite the mighty risks confronted by the industrial efforts are pointed out
in order to bestow the optimal use of energy and resources. Identification of key stakeholders and
deployment of the political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental aspects from
the updated literature, reports, and guidelines are intrinsic to achieve a thorough understanding of
the complex landscape of biofuel industry. The contribution of the biofuel industry to sustainable
development is key in the growing biofuel industry that is driven by the renewable energy targets
of the European Union. Both policymakers and production companies require an understanding of
the relation between biofuel production characteristics and the sustainability of the industry to be
able to support sustainable development [36–44]. The objective of this report is to (1) summarise the
key interdependencies in the biofuel industry based on PESTLE analysis and (2) create a review in
which the key biofuel production characteristics are correlated with the sustainability factors that
are affected by the biofuel industry. Hereafter, the different aspects influencing the sustainability
of bioethanol, biodiesel, and biomethane industry are determined and these are allocated to the
economic, environmental, socioecological, and geopolitical facets [45–55]. Finally, both quantitative
and qualitative data are assessed to correlate both aspects and determine the strengths and weaknesses
of the different biofuel characteristics. The analysis of the production processes shows that the key
factors to be considered are both the choice of feedstock and the conversion technology that is applied.
A key distinction in the feedstock is the cultivation of crops dedicated to biofuel production or using
wastes and residues from other sectors as feedstock. Regarding the conversion processes, all three
biofuels can be produced via a biochemical or the thermochemical pathway [56–58]. Both feedstock
and production process influence the economic sustainability, showing that crop-based biofuels have
a high feedstock cost and low capital cost, compared to the relatively low cost for feedstock and high
capital cost for the biofuels from lignocellulosic biomass, wastes, and residues [59–76]. Moreover,
the latter are also significantly more environmental and socioecological sustainable compared to the
crop feedstock that imposes the impacts of land use and land-use change. Geopolitically, the EU
supports the EU biofuel producers by protecting the market from lower prices introduced by imported
biofuels. The political support for the more extensive development that is required for the biofuels
from lignocellulosic biomass, wastes, and residues is starting to increase, but significant differences
are detected among EU countries due to a lack of budget and existing infrastructure. Finally, a small
discussion about the future of the biofuel industry is provided, considering the future use of fossil fuel
and the development of other renewable alternatives such as hydrogen fuel and electric vehicles [77–79].
It is important to stress that this research will not be directed towards one answer, but rather assesses
collected knowledge to provide an overview of the interrelations between the production industry and
the sustainability and highlight the apparent distinctions and characteristics. This research correlates
the different biofuel production characteristics with the sustainability of the biofuel industry in the
context of economic, environmental, socioecological, and geopolitical facets. Hereafter, both subjects
will be combined with a thorough assessment and discussion of literature and data obtained from
literature to create a correlation. Finally, an outlook will be provided to evaluate possible external
influences on the biofuel industry in the future.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Problem Context
The problem context indicates a research interest in the sustainability of the biofuel production
processes. Understanding the interrelation between the two is essential for the future of biofuels since
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it is its sustainability, both economically and environmentally, which has created greater attention for
biofuels among the many other alternative energy sources [80–90]. Since the possibilities in production
processes depend on the type of feedstock used in the processes, several feedstocks are taken into
account [91–94]. To further limit the number of different production processes, only the three biofuels
will be considered: Bioethanol, biodiesel, and biomethane.
The scope of the sustainability aspects is discussed by specifying the key issues of the sustainable
development of biofuels which are divided into four subsections: Economic, environmental,
socioecological, and geopolitical. The first three sections combined provide the sustainability factors
involved with biofuel production as found in literature and the subdivision is supported by the
framework of Mangoyana et al. (2013) [95]. Since the social factor introduced in the framework
includes aspects such as land use and biodiversity, the term ‘socioecological’ is deemed more suited.
Finally, the geopolitical substratum is added to consider the effect of governmental support and their
policies on biofuel development. The support still differs between countries in the EU due to their own
individual interests [14]. Moreover, the independence of energy supply is a driving force for adopting
biofuels in the EU.
The factors influencing the economic sustainability of the biofuel industry are all related to the
economic feasibility of production [96]. The key factor is the start of new biofuel production companies,
or the extension of current production lines, for the development of the biofuel industry in terms
of its market size with respect to other fuels. Hence, the focus will be on the choices in production
processes, including the type of biofuel and feedstock, and its relation to the sustainability facets.
The environmental facet includes the GHG emission of the process to the discussion of sustainability.
The emissions of fossil fuels are an important driving force for the development of biofuels, which are
expected to have a lower net GHG emission due to the plant feedstock [97–101]. In addition, there are
the factors that have both an impact on the environment, the society, and the quality of life of the
individual inside that society, that are covered in the socioecological facet [102].
The inputs of the system are the commercially applied production processes of bioethanol,
biodiesel, and biomethane together with the factors that determine the economic, environmental,
socioecological, and geopolitical sustainability of the production processes that will be determined
and will be discussed in the methodology of this research. It is projected to deliver insights into
the performance of the different production technologies, feedstocks, and final biofuel product with
respect to the sustainability of the biofuel industry. First, the different possibilities in the production of
bioethanol, biodiesel, and biomethane have to be determined. Thereafter, it has to be determined how
different biofuel production characteristics contribute to the sustainability facets described in the scope
of the research and summarized in the economic, environmental, socioecological, and geopolitical facets.
The main sources of information will be review articles on biofuel technologies to provide
an overview of the existing technologies. Moreover, technical reports of different associations focused
on renewable energies and fuels will be used to obtain data on the recent commercial production.
Quantitative data regarding, among others, production cost and GHG emission of these reports will
then be combined with the research articles obtained from databases. Search terms including ‘biofuel
production process’, ‘bioethanol/biodiesel/biomethane production’, ‘feedstock biofuels’, ‘biomass
conversion’, ‘biofuel conversion technology’, ‘production cost biofuels’, ‘policies biofuel production’,
‘water use biofuel’, ‘life cycle analysis biofuel’, ‘politics biofuel’, and ‘land use biofuel’, will be used to
obtain the articles from the literature database.
From the analysis of the different feedstock types and conversion processes for bioethanol, biodiesel,
and biomethane, a simplified overview of the production pathways is provided in Figure 1. Overall,
the feedstocks can be subdivided in the first-generation complete crops and the second-generation,
or advanced, biofuels from residues, wastes, and lignocellulosic biomass.
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Figure 1. The different production pathways from feedstock to biofuel, self-constructed. The arrows
indicate conversion processes, and the rectangles indicate the inputs and outputs of those
conversion processes.
The factors from the sustainability facets that are directly affected by the biofuel industry will
be determined by a PESTLE analysis. The final deliverable, the interrelation between the biofuel
production characteristics, and the described sustainability factors, will be determined by an assessment
of both qualitative and quantitative data obtained using the described literature research. In addition
to the definite results, a discussion of the results will be incorporated to address and include the
complexity of the biofuel industry and the linkages between the different sustainability facets.
2.2. PESTLE Analysis
The PESTLE analysis will be used to evaluate the external influences on the biofuel industry.
It originates from marketing analysis, but these external influences on the industry will be used to
determine the factors influencing the long-term sustainability of the industry. PESTLE stands for
Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental. It provides a broad view of the
complete environment of the biofuel industry. The analysis will determine the factors for the economic,
environmental, socioecological, and geopolitical sustainability facets. It provides the framework for
the correlation with the production technologies to determine the strength and weaknesses of the
different production pathways.
2.2.1. Political and Legal
The political and legal aspects of the biofuel industry in the EU are driven by directives developed
by the European Commission such as the RED. Each country has developed its own legal framework
to support the national biofuel industry in achieving the target of 10% renewable transportation fuel by
2020 [12]. Recently, the RED has developed in recognizing the effect of indirect land-use change [33,34].
Furthermore, the competitiveness of biofuels in industrialized countries is driven by the subsidies and
import tariffs in place. These tools create a significant barrier to international trade from the EU to
other countries and therefore create a captive market for the national biofuel producers in the EU [103].
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Politically, there are several factors impacting the national biofuel market, including employment laws
and tax policies. However, to understand the overall political and legal impact on the EU biofuel
market, the focus is on the differences in support policies for the biofuel development for each country.
The support system for each biofuel significantly impacts the long-term sustainability of the biofuels.
2.2.2. Economical
As mentioned, the political aspect influences the economics of the biofuel industry by providing
subsidies and creating import tariffs to protect and support the market. The biofuel industry, like any
other industry, will be affected by changes in the economic environment which are, among others,
tax, interest and exchange rates. However, specifically for the long-term sustainability of the biofuel
market, the factor that will be addressed is the demand and supply of biofuel. The production cost of
the different biofuels relates to the price, which affects the demand and therefore influences the supply.
This circle is impacted by political influences, social behavior, and the development of technology.
Hence, the application of PESTLE analysis to obtain a complete overview of the long-term sustainability
of the biofuel industry.
As a replacer of fossil fuels, the competitiveness of biofuels does not only depend on its own
production cost but even more so on the price of fossil fuels. Moreover, the current subsidies largely
influence the competitiveness of the biofuel production cost. Biodiesel, bioethanol, and biomethane
all have their own economic sustainability, influenced by factors including the feedstock, the type of
conversion technologies, and the number of required processing steps. First, the cost of buying and
cultivating feedstock differs depending on the type. Moreover, each feedstock has its own productivity
influencing the overall cost per unit or volume of the feedstock [95]. Depending on the feedstock and the
type of biofuel, there is a different conversion technology to produce the biofuel. Each conversion type
has its own cost to implement and execute in a production process. However, the cost will develop with
time, influenced by the learning and scaling effects [104]. In addition, the type of feedstock influences
the number of production steps, since some types require pre-treatment or purification processes.
2.2.3. Technological
First, the technological aspect covers the technological developments and innovations in the
industry [105–107]. The scope of this research on commercially available production technologies
limits the effect of innovation on long-term sustainability. It is, however, important to notice that the
development of the third generation biofuels, produced from algae, is a future development that could
render the biofuels considered in this research relatively less sustainable [108–115].
Important to consider, is the overall development of the fuel and transportation industry,
as electrical transportations vehicles become more important. The consideration of starting a biofuel
production company at this moment of time should include the expected life cycle of the industry.
If the electric vehicle industry developments increase significantly, the investments in biofuels could
be unprofitable because of a decrease in demand. The technological influence on the biofuel industry
highlights the importance of the expected demand and raises the question: Is the expected time until
the demand of biofuel that will decrease due to other technologies long enough to be a profitable
investment? On the other hand, the ability to convert the production process or use it for other
applications will influence the expected lifetime of the investment.
2.2.4. Social
The influence of the social aspect of the biofuel industry relates to social changes and social
stability. The common examples are the competition with the food supply and the cost of biofuels [95].
Moreover, water use in the biofuel industry will impact social stability. Water is already a scarce
resource in many parts of the world, and the continuing development of the biofuel industry can add
to the existing pressures [116].
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A significant amount of the feedstock discussed in the previous chapter are also agricultural
products used in food production, for example, corn and sugar beet. Therefore, the development of
biofuel production has a significant impact on the world’s agricultural market and food security [117].
Moreover, cultivation of the biofuel feedstock competes directly for land with other food crops such
as coffee beans or rice. The feedstock that is also used for food and feed production including corn,
wheat, sugar cane, soybean, rapeseed, and sunflowers are denoted as the first-generation feedstock.
On the other hand, the second-generation feedstock, which includes lignocellulosic biomass and waste
oils, do more increasingly support the co-existence of biofuel and food production [1].
Due to the existing pressure on water, the water consumption of the cultivation and conversion
processes of the biofuels impact the overall sustainability of the production processes [116]. The different
feedstocks will be analyzed on the use of water in the harvesting techniques. Moreover, the relative
water consumption of the production process for each biofuel and feedstock will influence its impact
on water scarcity. The ability to recycle the water streams in the process, thus reducing the net water
use, is a significant factor that affects the performance of the process regarding water use.
2.2.5. Environmental
In the case of the biofuel industry, the environmental facet is extremely important since the
reduction of the GHG emission is one of the key components in the sustainable development and one
of the factors driving the transition to biofuels [118]. Moreover, it is important to note the interrelation
between the social and the environmental aspects influencing the biofuel industry. This research
defined the socioecological facet to summarize the factors that influence both aspects, including water
scarcity and food competition. It also includes the aspect of land use for the cultivation of feedstock
that has a large impact on the environment and social factors of the biofuel industry. Several life
cycle assessments (LCA) obtained from literature, describe the improvement in GHG emission for
different types of biofuels. Important are the different aspects influencing the GHG emission of
biofuel production. The aspects include the type and management of the feedstock and the conversion
technologies [119]. However, the results may also differ depending on the system boundaries of the
LCA. Hence, the importance of an overall assessment of different sources in the following analysis.
The general assumption in the LCA studies, regarding the GHG emission, is that CO2 emissions from
biomass combustion are climate-neutral due to the biomass absorption of CO2 during growing [120].
Hence, the GHGs will depend more on the production processes surrounding biomass combustion.
The aspect of land-use incorporates the essential difference between the restoration of degraded
farmlands or removing forests for biofuels [121]. The term indirect land-use change (ILUC) describes
the change of natural environments to croplands to grow crops that replace the feedstock used for
biofuels. Essentially, it is the effect of competing with the same resources as the food industry. The ILUC
leads not only to a loss in biodiversity but also increases the GHG emission and impacts the prices of
food [122]. The potential GHG savings are important for biofuel development, but they are reduced
due to land-use change by, for example, deforestation. The exact land-use effects depend on the
type of land that will be used and if deforestation is avoided [14]. These motives are hard to predict,
therefore this study will take the land requirement of the feedstock, feedstock productivity, and the
ability to grow on more degraded land as key factors influencing the land use [14]. The conversion
of waste streams to biofuels is an important example of a feedstock that minimizes the land use.
The interrelation between the land use and the environmental sustainability is recognized, but it is
considered as socio-ecological due to its causal relationship with feedstock cultivation and its effect on
the biodiversity, food competition, and water use.
Finally, biodiversity is also affected by the increase in crop cultivation due to biofuel
development [123]. Biodiversity is supported by an environment with multiple crop species,
while biofuel production yields are increased by the reduction of feedstock types that are cultivated
in one area. The water use of the biofuel production can also be argued as an environmental aspect,
hence the allocation to the socio-ecological facet.
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2.2.6. Overview of Sustainability Framework
The results of the PESTLE analysis are summarized in Table 1. The collected factors
will be correlated to the different production technologies, depending on the biofuel, feedstock,
and conversion technology.
Table 1. The results of the PESTLE analysis as obtained are summarized per subcategory.
Political & Legal Economic Social Technological Environmental
• RED
• National Policies














• Direct and indirect
land use
• Biodiversity
The different factors from the PESTLE analysis all affect the long-term sustainability of the
biofuel industry. The factors are subdivided into the sustainability facets where both the political and
economic factors are directly assigned to the geopolitical and economic sustainability facet, respectively.
Socioecological governance comprises the factors of food competition, water scarcity, and biodiversity,
all affected by the discussed land-use change phenomena. The GHG emissions are covered in the
environmental facet, which emphasizes one of the driving forces of biofuel development.
3. Correlation between the Production Processes and the Sustainability Framework
3.1. Economic Landscape
First, the distinction of biofuel produced from food crops and biofuel produced from waste and
residues streams is often used in literature and is referred to as first- and second-generation biofuel,
respectively. Regardless of the large variety in the production cost of biofuel that is influenced by
feedstock, conversion process, the scale of the production, and the region, a general trend is determined.
The first-generation biofuels have a significantly lower capital cost compared to the second generation.
However, the feedstock cost of the first-generation biofuel poses a threat to its viability since it generally
represents around 60–90% of the total production cost [35]. In the long term, the feedstock cost accounts
for 30–45% of the total production cost for biofuels from lignocellulosic biomass. The second-generation
biofuels will become competitive as the high capital costs reduce by the development of the relatively
new conversion technologies. Nevertheless, the price of oil also impacts the biofuel industry to the
extent that an oil price below US$80 per barrel will deem the second-generation biofuel uncompetitive
with the fossil fuel market for the next 30 years [124].
Due to the high contribution of the feedstock to the total cost of the first-generation biofuel,
the crop feedstocks are evaluated on, among other aspects, their efficiency. Table 2 indicates the high
potential energy yield of the sugar feedstock compared to the starch feedstock. However, the conversion
efficiency strictly dictates the overall productivity of the complete feedstock to the fuel process. It is
notable to mention that raw sugarcane is not produced in the EU, it is always imported in the framework
of preferential trading relationships. Raw sugarcane is processed in European countries contributing
to the biofuel industry. Table 4 shows some results where the bioethanol from sugar crops still is
superior considering the overall productivity. The energy productivities indicate a lower efficiency
in terms of liters/ha for biodiesel crops production compared to both bioethanol and biomethane.
However, the energy in terms of GJ shows more similar values, implying that the energy value of
bioethanol in GJ/liters is significantly higher than that of biodiesel. The bioethanol from lignocellulosic
biomass, see the cereal straw in Table 4 does not have competitive energy productivity. The overall
economic sustainability could, however, profit from the low cost of waste streams as a feedstock [125].
Similar conditions apply to the residue feedstock-types used for both biochemical and thermochemical
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biodiesel. The woody crops and short rotation plants do show competitive energy productivity values
of around 90 GJ/ha for thermochemically produced biodiesel.
Table 2. The yields of possible crop feedstock for biofuels in terms of its weight (tons) and energy (GJ)
per hectare of cropland [126–128].
Feedstock Yield (t/ha) Yield (GJ/ha)
Sugar cane 68.7–70.9 370




Sunflower seeds 1.8–2.4 58
Soya beans 2.8–2.9 56
Woody crops 11–27 87–239.4
In terms of availability, the cultivation of crops as a biofuel feedstock is not directly a problem as
additional land could be acquired. It does significantly affect other sustainability facets of the industry
as will be discussed later this chapter. The non-food crop feedstocks for biofuels including the woody
residues used cooking oil, and animal fats also have an application in competing sectors. Nevertheless,
it is determined that, as the total amount of these feedstock-types available is significantly larger than
the demand from the competing sectors, the feedstock is available in a considerable amount for the
biofuel industry. However, the availability of waste and residue streams has its limitations since the
dedicate production of that core product for biofuels eliminates practically all benefits of the feedstock,
which will be encountered when the demand increases.
Now, the efficiency of feedstock does influence economic competitiveness, but in the end, the cost
of the energy source is the most important. Therefore, considering the cost not only with respect to
volume but also the energy contribution is key to the sustainability assessment. The trend in first-
and second-generation biofuels and the influence of the oil price, as described before, is also visible
in Table 3, where the cost is normalized with respect to energy productivity. The values of energy
productivity used in the previous study [125], from Table 3, differ from the values stated in Table 4,
and these types of values are influenced, among others, by the region of feedstock origin and the
weather [128]. However, the key message to extract is that for production of one fuel, the common
values to consider are the cost per volume of fuel, whereas for the final consumption it is about the
energy that can be extracted from the volume of fuel which will influence the cost assessment. Table 3
shows that the biodiesel produced from waste oil has a competitive production cost that will decrease
even further with the development of the technology. The bioethanol from lignocellulosic biomass
shows the prospects of the reduction in capital cost that directly creates a competitive production cost
in the year 2020. The cost of conversion for the crop feedstock will not change significantly over time
as the technology is matured, implying that the increase in production cost is imposed by the expected
increase of crop prices [125]. Table 3 also depicts the smaller cost range for lignocellulosic bioethanol
and biodiesel from waste oils, which implies that these products are the least sensitive for oil price
changes. As the cost of the conversion process is more significant for the second-generation biofuel,
the data in Table 5 addresses the different types of cost for both the biochemical and the thermochemical
production pathway.
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Table 3. The production cost for different biochemical produced biofuels and feedstock under varying
oil price scenarios for both the year 2015 and 2020. The results are adapted from [125]. The total costs
are normalized based on the energy density of the biofuel with respect to the energy density of fossil
fuel to ensure the comparability of the total cost of the different biofuels.
(Bio-) Fuel Raw Material Crude Oil
Price [€/Barrel]
Total Costs Normalized on Energy
Density (€Cent/L)
2015 2020
Fossil fuel Crude oil 50–200 36.5–130.8 36.5–130.8
Bioethanol Maize 50–200 105.6–140.2 110.6–145.3
Bioethanol Wheat 50–200 136.4–186.1 151.3–202.6
Bioethanol Lignocellulosic waste material 50–200 157.3–171.2 81.5–95.4
Biodiesel Rapeseed oil 50–200 117.5–171.4 138.4–192.3
Biodiesel Palm oil 50–200 70.0–121.9 63.7–115.5
Biodiesel Waste oil 50–200 61.8–89.9 45.4–73.6
Table 4. The yields of the different biofuel types per hectare of crop feedstock in terms of energy (GJ)
and volume (liters) expected in the year 2020. The conversion technologies are all biochemical with
exception from the thermochemical Fischer-Tropsch (FT) biodiesel. Adapted from [129].








Sugar beet 145 6840
Sugar cane 118 5570
Biomethane Silage Maize 123
Biodiesel
Sunflower oil 24.5 740
Palm oil 88 2660
Rapeseed 52 1570
Soybean 17 530
Bioethanol Cereal straw 15 710
FT Biodiesel
Miscanthus & Switchgrass 90
Short rotation plantation 97
Forest residues 5.8/year
First, a large variation in feedstock price for the biochemical production of biomethane is apparent.
The opportunity for biofuels is the low feedstock prices that can be obtained from using waste streams,
which will be the type of zero cost feedstock [130]. The range of the production cost for biochemically
produced biomethane can thus largely be allocated to the type of feedstock. Therefore, the more
advanced and less mature thermochemical processes do show a slightly higher production cost
compared to the biomethane after biogas upgrading. For the biochemical produced bioethanol from
lignocellulosic biomass, the production cost will be higher as for crop-based bioethanol due to the
additional process steps for lignocellulosic biofuels as discussed in the earlier chapter.
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Table 5. Overview of the production cost (range) per unit of energy of both the biochemical (biomethane
and bioethanol) and thermochemical (biomethane and biodiesel) for predefined feedstock. The cost of












Biomethane Biochemical - 0–80 40–120 11–34
Bioethanol Biochemical Cellulosic biomass 10–13 85–103 24–29
Biomethane Thermochemical Waste and wood biomass 10–20 56–91 16–25
Biodiesel Thermochemical Wood biomass 10–20 90–139 25–35
For the overall economic sustainability of the different biofuels, a trend is clear that the expected
feedstock cost favors the use of biomass, wastes, and residues. Only considering the feedstock
cost, the fuels produced from lignocellulosic biomass: All thermochemical production process for
the three biofuels, and the biochemical pathway for bioethanol, and the production from wastes
and residues, which include the biochemical production of both biodiesel and biomethane. Hence,
the biomethane has the highest number of production possibilities which provide a competitive
feedstock cost. Moreover, the biochemical production of biomethane from biogas is a more mature
technology, similar to the other biochemical production processes from crop feedstock that show
competitive cost figures. However, the capital cost of the second-generation feedstock is expected to
become competitive due to the development of the industry. A similar effect needs to apply to the
thermochemical production path to support the economic sustainability of the biofuels produced via
the syngas pathway from lignocellulosic biomass. To invest in these advanced biofuels in the current
circumstance, long-term policy support is the only tool to provide certainty that investors will achieve
a return on investment [131]. An extended scope, outside of the biofuel industry, shows that a low oil
price could still render all the biofuels less economic sustainable due to the resulting uncompetitive
production cost.
For the deployment of biomethane as fuel, the additional cost barrier exists of extending the
distribution and fueling infrastructure of gaseous fuels [132]. Here the support, both in realizing and
financing, of the national governments is necessary to allow a connection with the natural gas grid
system. In addition to the investments required to start a production plant for one of the biofuels,
these infrastructure costs for biomethane do affect its economic sustainability but they are essential to
ensure demand for the fuel.
3.2. Environmental Governance
The GHG emissions will be correlated to the different types of feedstock and the different
production processes. A variance in the GHG emission among the feedstock types is especially
highlighted by the recent attention to the effect of indirect land-use change imposed by crop feedstock.
A broad overview of the emissions from the supply chain of the biofuels is depicted in Figure 2,
distinguishing between the contribution of cultivation, processing, and transport to the total emission
of the supply chain [128]. The study used the BioGrace [133] tool for calculations of the different types
of emission that are expressed in CO2-equivalents. The data in Figure 2 shows clearly that cultivation of
the feedstock, if applicable, contributes on average for at least 50% to the total supply-chain emissions.
Therefore, both biomethane production and biodiesel from waste oils have a superior position by
non-agricultural waste streams as feedstock. The agricultural waste stream of lignocellulosic biomass
used in the advanced ethanol and FT diesel contributes to the GHG effect by the utilization of fertilizers
during cultivation [128].
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Figure 2. Supply chain emission factors expressed in the equivalent grams of CO2/MJ of the end
product, adapted from [128]. The results are based on [134] for the advanced biofuels and based on
BioGrace [133] for the others, taking co-products into account. All processes are biochemical except
for the thermochemical Fischer-Tropsch (FT) biodiesel. The text between parentheses in the ethanol
category refers to the feedstock for processing.
The emissions during the conversion processes of the biofuels are influenced by the fossil energy
consumption as clearly depicted in the case of lignocellulosic biomass where it is assumed that the
conversion energy will be derived from the biomass itself. The same applies to the results depicted
for sugar cane, where the conversion emission are calculated under the assumption that energy is
produced from the by-product bagasse.
Overall, this discussion of recycling of waste streams in the biofuel processes creates not only the
challenge in the analysis of emissions but will also affect production costs. Another example is the
case where bagasse can also be used as lignocellulosic biomass for biochemically produced bioethanol
or the thermochemical production. However, in this case, the bagasse can be a waste stream of the
food industry compared to an internal waste stream as with the utilization of sugar cane. Another
possibility one could imagine is the replacement of fossil fuels used in transport and conversion process
by biofuels.
For environmental sustainability purely, this implementation would be ideal since it will reduce
the emissions of the supply chain. However, considering the economic landscape, it would only weaken
the efficiency of a production process since the land use will increase to produce similar amounts of
biofuel. Such implementation would thus require the development of policies and production criteria
and to a higher extent analysis of emissions imposed by the additional land use. If a fossil system is
an alternative to using residues for energy production, the use of food waste for biofuel production can
show overall negative GHG emission effect since the loss of energy will be compensated with fossil
fuels. This relation will develop on the long-term as sources for the electricity and heat sector will be
less pollutive for the environment [135].
Overall the land-use change imposes reduces the environmental sustainability of biofuels produced
from food crops compared to alternatives. There is even research that reports a net increase in GHG
emission for food crop biofuels imposed by the land use impacts compared to fossil fuels [135]. Table 6
clearly shows the higher land-use emissions for the biodiesel feedstock compared to bioethanol.
First of all, a relation is visible between crop productivity and the land-use emission, as less land is
required to produce the same amount of energy. This effect benefits the first-generation bioethanol
feedstock over the oil crops for biodiesel. Moreover, the land used to grow the crops impacts the
83
Sustainability 2019, 11, 5981
overall emission. For biodiesel, specifically for palm oil, the emission is a consequence of the high
conversion of peatlands into palm cultivation areas [129]. This impact is confirmed by the study of [128],
where direct land-use change from grassland is significantly favorable compared to the conversion
of forest lands to biofuel croplands. Hence, the negative values for the fast-growing plantation for
FT biodiesel, which are particularly grown on marginal lands and thus improve the conditions of the
land resulting in an overall reduction of emissions. The land-use emission for biomethane production
shows no significant differences with the bioethanol production from crops. The use of agricultural
wastes from the food industry could to an extent reduce these emissions since the cultivation is not
directly influenced by the biofuel demand.
Table 6. The land use emissions for various feedstock that include both the direct and indirect
effects of both land use and land-use change. All conversion processes are biochemical, except the
thermochemically produced Fischer-Tropsch (FT) biodiesel. Adapted from [129].













Bioethanol Cereal straw 16
FT Biodiesel
Miscanthus & Switchgrass −12
Short rotation plantation −29
An analysis of recent studies regarding the ILUC emissions shows varying results and the
overall ILUC effects are therefore considered difficult to precisely define [136]. However, wood and
crop residues are considered promising as the ILUC GHG emission are considerably lower than the
first-generation crop-based biofuels [129,137]. The study of [136] does indicate a trend where on
average biodiesel has higher ILUC emission (median of 52 g CO2-eq/MJ) compared to first-generation
ethanol (median of 21 g CO2-eq/MJ), with the sugar crops showing the lowest ILUC emissions.
The negative effect of the application of crops as a biofuel feedstock is once more highlighted by
the land-use emission analysis. The general emission from the biofuel supply chain already did not
depict favorable equivalent CO2 factors. Overall, the environmental sustainability of crop feedstocks is
impacted especially with the available superior feedstock. Not only the supply chain emissions are
competitive, but the residue streams as feedstock also do not impose the land-use impacts seen by the
first-generation bioethanol and biodiesel feedstock. In addition to the thermochemical conversion of
grasses to biodiesel that shows negative land-use emission, the biochemical conversion of waste oils
already shows an environmental favorable supply chain and the land-use effects are not applicable.
3.3. Socioecological Aspects
The essence of the socioecological sustainability originates from the origin of the feedstock,
whether it is cultivated on agricultural land or a waste stream from an industrial process for example.
Considering only first-generation bioethanol and biodiesel, the study of [138] analyzed the water,
land, and food use with data from 85% of the global bioethanol consumption and 81% of the global
biodiesel consumption in 2013. The results indicate that for only crop feedstock, biodiesel requires
on average 90,000 m3/TJ of water compared to 74,000 m3/TJ for bioethanol. The land required is on
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average 9 ha/TJ for bioethanol and 29 ha/TJ for biodiesel. However, based on the food calories used for
the production of the first-generation biofuels, the biodiesel is less competitive with the food industry
with an average of 95 people/TJ of biodiesel that could be fed compared to 107 people/TJ of bioethanol.
Considering the production processes of both bioethanol and biodiesel it can thus be concluded that
the overall efficiency of land to biofuel is significantly lower for biodiesel. However, the use of waste
oils, for example, the waste cooking oils from households, does not require the extraction processes
compared to the oil crops, which would favor the increase the production yields per volume of
feedstock used. In comparison, the biochemical production of bioethanol from lignocellulosic biomass
still does not convert all biomass to biofuel. The thermochemical conversion technologies would
reduce the waste stream since the complete biomass can be converted to syngas. However, this does
not directly implicate that thermochemical conversion can produce more biofuel from less land since
not all the feedstock has the same amount of bioethanol yield. Moreover, the biochemical production
processes do consider the recycling of waste streams such as the use of lignin to generate the required
heat for the process, as discussed in the conversion technologies. Overall, the distinction between food
and non-food feedstock is essential for the discussion and implication of land use, as is recognized by
the European Commission, which presented the Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC) Directive in 2015 to
tackle those negative effects of food-based feedstock. It limits the share of biofuels from crops grown
on agricultural land to 7% and directs the Member States of the EU to develop national targets for the
second generation biofuels [34].
Considering the feedstock for biomethane, the biofuel has a strong socioecological position due
to the extensive possibilities in the application of feedstock other than complete agricultural crops.
However, bioethanol could still be a competitive biofuel as national targets are set to develop the
production from lignocellulosic biomass. On the other hand, biodiesel production from used cooking
oils is even more technologically mature, as it is the feedstock for 86% of the UK biodiesel [139].
Thermochemical conversion to syngas implies that the same feedstock can be used for all three biofuels,
implying that socioecological sustainability is less a decisive factor for the biofuel choice with this
technology. Since the feedstock for the gasification process originates mainly from residues and
biomass, the impact of thermochemical production on the socioecological sustainability factors will
generally be less as to the biochemical conversion pathway, especially with the food crop feedstock.
However, conversion efficiencies of the different technology could reduce this effect and would increase
the possibilities for feedstock that impose less pressure on agricultural land use.
To reduce the impact of land use and the competition with the food industry there are crops
that are non-edible and grow well on marginal lands including the discussed Jatropha (Bhuiya et al.,
2016). However, similar to the other crops, these crops do also require significant amounts of water
to grow and cultivate compared to the water footprint of crop residues [140]. Table 7 is indicative of
the reduction in water use if residues of crops are used for biofuel production instead of complete
crops. It would only be favorable if the residues could be obtained from normal agricultural activities,
such that it is a waste stream of another industry instead of specially cultivated to produce biofuel.
Further analysis of the crop yields in Table 7 shows that the water footprint is lowest for the sugar
feedstock used for bioethanol and that the oil crops for biodiesel have a higher water footprint. This is
the same trend as depicted by the first-generation biofuel data of [138] as discussed.
The change in biodiversity due to the biofuel industry is mainly driven by land use [141].
The negative impact of deforestation on biodiversity has already been described. However, for the
conversion of abandoned cropland or marginal lands to biofuel croplands, the impacts are not that
clear. In general, the use of the second-generation crops is considered to have a less negative influence
on the biodiversity compared to the first-generation [141]. The improvements in the biodiversity
impacts by the cultivation of second-generation feedstock are also supported by the study of [142].
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Table 7. The water footprint in m3 per ton of crop yields and residues. It states the amount of water
used in growing the useful part of the crop (the yield), and for what is considered the residue [140].
Crop Water Footprint of Crop Yield (m3/t) Water Footprint Residue (m3/t)










For the food competition and water use issues, the important driver is the type of feedstock and
the land that cultivation requires. Biodiversity does also improve by minimization of crop feedstock
but is to a higher extent influenced by the type of land that is converted for cultivation [142]. In other
words, biodiversity is the easier factor of the socioecological facet to improve by creating legislation
that restricts certain areas of land to be used for cultivation of biofuel crops.
3.4. Geopolitical Substratum
Towards the renewable energy goals of the EU of the year 2020, all 28 member states are obliged
to report on their progress every two years. The binding target for the transportation sector is to obtain
a renewable energy share of at least 10%, which support the development of the biofuel industry to
achieve this target [12,33]. As the biofuels are developed as renewable energies, the environmental and
socioecological facets can be considered as drivers for the biofuel policies. Therefore, the geopolitical
sustainability, the extent to which distinctive parts of the biofuel industry are supported by the
geographic characteristics and the developed policies, is strongly affected by the assessment of its
environmental and socioecological sustainability. A substantial amount of the current policies now
incorporates a system of certification that ensures sustainable production of biofuels. To which extent
the term ‘sustainable’ includes all facets covered in this research is difficult to determine, but the
programs were initiated after the publication of reports about the interrelation of biofuel production
and food shortages, biodiversity loss, and the land-use change [143]. Moreover, to directly reduce the
impact of food crops on these types of issues, a restriction is introduced which limits the use of food
crops, the sugar, starch, and oil crops, to 7% of all the feedstock used to produce biofuel.
Among the EU member states, Germany is the country with the highest level of development of
bioenergy. Their target for the transportation sector is set at 13.8% renewable energy by 2020 [144],
aiming above the guideline of the EU. In comparison, Poland has aligned the 2020 target of renewable
energy in transport with the minimum 10% imposed by the EU but aiming for 8.5% renewable fuels
and 1.5% contribution from electricity used in transport [145].
The Netherlands was the first, in 2009, EU country to have legislation in place that supported the
production of biofuels from waste, residues, and lignocellulosic biomass by counting these advanced
biofuels double towards the targets set for the industry [146]. In practice, these types of biofuel
contributed for 50% to the total renewable energy used in the Netherlands in 2016, of which used
cooking oil and animal fats for biodiesel production were the primary sources. Recently, Italy as
a pioneer legally required all fuel suppliers to include 0.6% advanced biofuels in the gasoline and diesel
produced from 2018 [147]. In contrast, Poland did not implement the directive supporting the advanced
biofuel in its legal system, including a double counting system, until 2018 [145]. Hence, no data on the
use of this type of feedstock in biofuel production is available in the prior years. Romania, another
country in non-western Europe, experiences similar problems in supporting advanced biofuels. In this
case, they explicitly refer to budgetary problems that limit their development of support schemes
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especially required for the infrastructure that is needed to produce the more costly biofuels from
wastes, residues, and lignocellulosic biomass [148].
Overall in the EU, there is a direct intention to limit the use of first-generation biofuels.
The alternatives, including the use of waste and residues, do require additional support that cannot
yet be provided by all countries. Hence, the geopolitical sustainability of food crop-based biofuels
decreases, while the use of advanced biofuels is increasingly promoted. However, in the current state
of policies, the economic support for advanced biofuels seems more developed in western Europe,
whereas other countries face difficulties in providing a support system that can lower the higher capital
cost of advanced biofuel production.
The development of the biofuel industry can be linked to the availability of feedstock as input to
the production process. From Figures 3 and 4, it can be derived that, especially for bioethanol, a large
majority of the feedstock used for the EU biofuel industry originate from Europe itself. Regarding the
support of the biofuel industry by the development of policies, the application of native feedstock
will support policies that address the whole supply chain of the biofuel industry. However, there are
a growing number of voluntary schemes that can be used worldwide to prove compliance with
the EU biofuel sustainability criteria. The 63.7% of biodiesel produced with feedstock from the EU
originates for 33% from used cooking oil and animal fats [149]. These feedstock types are available
worldwide and meet the trend of requirements set for the sustainability of biofuel feedstock. The 20.6%
of feedstock imported from Malaysia and Indonesia, which is primarily palm oil, is not compliant
with the developing policies. Recent criteria set by the EU deem all the palm oil produced on land
larger than 2 ha unsustainable, which implies that biofuel from palm oil cannot be counted towards
the renewable energy targets imposed by the EU [150].
 
Figure 3. The origin of the feedstock used for bioethanol consumed in the EU in 2016. The percentages
with respect to the total bioethanol consumption are included. The figure is adapted from data of [149].
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Figure 4. The origin of the feedstock used for biodiesel consumed in the EU in 2016. The percentages
with respect to the total biodiesel consumption are included. The figure is adapted from data of [149].
The creation of the national laws to achieve the targets of EU is empowered in the RED, on the only
condition that there is no legislation that restricts the free movement of fuels and feedstocks among the
EU countries [150]. For countries outside of the EU, anti-dumping duties are imposed on, for example,
the US ethanol in 2013, since that market price was below what EU producers could offer [151]. Hence,
the consensus among the EU countries appears to be the use of the EU biofuel market to support the
development of the EU production companies. This trend, together with the extent of imposed EU
tariffs on biofuel, drives the EU towards the creation of an isolated biofuel market [151]. Depending on
the trade of the feedstock, such an isolated market will have more impact on the variety of feedstocks
used in the EU biofuel than on the distribution of the biofuel types that are consumed, since, for all
biofuels, the necessary feedstock is available in the EU itself.
4. Discussion
From the start of this integration project, a broad research-oriented approach is deemed suited to
address the existing knowledge gap that restricted biofuel development. The variety of the production
characteristics and sustainability factors that are analyzed as a result of this approach highlight the
complexity of the industry faced by policymakers and production companies. The research structures
this complexity by identifying key relationships between the industry and its sustainability. However,
some relationships are more extensively discussed and highlighted compared to others due to the lack
of recent representative research. Further research could, for example, specifically address production
characteristics of the biogas upgrading for the biomethane production to allow a more equal comparison
with the more mature bioethanol and biodiesel processes. Moreover, further research should build on
the positive relationships between a production characteristic and the sustainability identified in this
research by analyzing how to optimize the positive effect and neutralize additional consequences on
other sustainability facets. That knowledge will contribute to effective future development of biofuels
by companies and governments while ensuring its sustainability.
An understanding of the key aspects of the biofuel production process and how they all affect the
sustainability of the industry can contribute to the sustainable development of biofuels. To address the
existing knowledge gap, this research correlates key production characteristics of bioethanol, biodiesel,
and biomethane with the sustainability factors that are affected by the biofuel industry. The results
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show a significant number of possibilities in the supply chain of the biofuel industry. First, the feedstock
for bioethanol and biodiesel can either be food crops, the first-generation, or lignocellulosic biomass,
waste and residue streams, the second-generation. For biomethane, the main feedstock sources are
waste and by-products from the agricultural, industrial, and municipal sectors. Second, the conversion
process of feedstock to biofuel can be subdivided in the biochemical and the thermochemical pathway.
The latter is commercially available as the syngas-route, where lignocellulosic biomass is the most
common renewable feedstock.
The correlation executed in the research shows that the current technological developments in
the industry significantly affect the competitiveness between different production characteristics with
respect to economic sustainability. The characteristics of biomethane show a good potential to maintain
a competitive production cost both in the current perspective as in the near future. The low feedstock
cost of the second-generation biofuels gives a competitive advantage to the lignocellulosic bioethanol
and biodiesel from waste oils via the biochemical production pathway which will only increase over
time as the technologies become more mature. In general, the biofuels from lignocellulosic biomass
produced via the thermochemical pathway become also more competitive as the capital cost will
decrease. Overall, the economic sustainability of biodiesel and bioethanol from crop feedstock will
decrease as the alternatives and their conversion technology develop.
The environmental impacts of the different biofuels differ significantly. Biomethane and biodiesel
from waste oils show favorable properties because there are no emissions from crop cultivation and
the land-use impacts are minimized. The ability to use the feedstock to generate energy contributes to
a reduction in emission for some crops, including sugar cane and wheat, and the biofuels produced
from lignocellulosic biomass. The latter also avoids largely all impacts from land use and land-use
change. Additionally, the impact of land use and land-use change induced by crop feedstock affects
socioecological sustainability. The use of residues and waste streams would reduce the impact on
food competition, water use, and biodiversity. Biomethane shows the largest number of possibilities
in avoiding crop feedstock and using different waste and residue stream. For the use of food crops,
the environmental and socio-ecological sustainability of the bioethanol production process shows more
favorable results compared to biodiesel production.
The drive for the biofuel production still originates from EU directives and the related government
legislation. In policy development, there is a focus on the feedstock types and their origin,
with limitations for the use of crop feedstock and the first initiatives being introduced that support
the second-generation biofuels. However, the development is not uniform for all the EU countries,
as not all countries have the economic capacity and infrastructure required for such extensive support.
Overall, the results of the correlation can be used as the starting point for a multiple-scenario assessment
which is required to develop a policy that supports the sustainable development of biofuels. Moreover,
production companies can start an assessment of their production characteristics to ensure that these
will suit future policies incorporating the importance of sustainable development.
5. Summary
A broad research-oriented approach was deemed suitable to address the existing knowledge gap
that restricts biofuel development. The variety of the production characteristics and sustainability
factors, that were analyzed as a result of this approach, highlight the complexity of the industry faced
by policymakers and production companies. The research structured this complexity by identifying
key relationships between the industry and its sustainability. However, some relationships were more
extensively discussed and highlighted compared to others due to the lack of recent representative
research. Further research could, for example, specifically address production characteristics of the
biogas upgrading for the biomethane production to allow a more equal comparison with the more
mature bioethanol and biodiesel processes. Moreover, further research should be built on the positive
relationships between a production characteristic and the sustainability identified in this research
by analysing how to optimize the positive effect and neutralise additional consequences on other
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sustainability facets. That knowledge will contribute to an effective future development of biofuels by
companies and governments while ensuring its sustainability.
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Abstract: The growth in biofuels’ investment brings with it concerns about the social and environmental
impacts of the sector. Several tools and frameworks have been used to address these concerns,
including the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) framework. This paper analyzes whether
this framework can be applied in contexts where local culture and values shape differently the freedom
of speech and engagement, such as in developing countries in which biofuel innovation projects
are often implemented. A literature review focused on eight case studies of other authors was used
to explore the role of “participation” as a structural element of the RRI framework and the impact
of its absence where effective participation in the innovation development process is not possible.
In conclusion, we highlight how this inspirational normative framework, designed to influence
innovation, is misused to judge its impacts. More than that, the conclusions of such misused
applications reflect more the difficulties involved in applying guidelines than the responsible character
of the innovation, whose impacts are usually defined upfront materially and measurably.
Keywords: responsible research and innovation; biofuels; effective participation; inclusion;
institutions
1. Introduction
There is a growing demand for alternative, renewable energies. One of them is biofuels, which are
well-suited to the transport sector due to their liquid form and the diversity of raw materials and
potential local production sources. However, along with the growth in this sector’s investments,
concerns have emerged regarding social and environmental impacts, such as land-use changes,
food security, and biodiversity loss.
Different frameworks and assessment tools have emerged to analyze these social and environmental
impacts, among them, the Responsible Research and Innovation Framework (RRI). The RRI framework
was first employed in Europe after the economic crisis of 2008 and introduced the consideration
of values and concerns related to innovation. As an inspirational normative framework aimed to
influence researchers and innovators through its four pillars, the framework played a relevant role in
the development of research and innovation in Europe since it was adopted by important research
institutions in The Netherland and UK and is a transversal guiding principle of the “Horizon 2020
Research and Innovation Program” from the European Union [1–6].
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However, biofuel projects are implemented in Europe’s technological innovation centers and
the US and countries far from the developed countries where the framework was created. As different
cultures and values have different ways of interacting and building solutions, we must consider
whether the use of the RRI framework truly reflects the responsible nature of innovation itself or
whether it reflects the difficulties involved in applying guidelines that were, perhaps unconsciously,
embedded with western values. Section 2 presents how the analysis through a literature review
focused on case studies (from the biofuel and other sectors). The research about the framework’s
structural elements was used to complement the analysis and reach more accurate conclusions about
the responsible character of innovations.
Section 3 describes the growing importance of biofuels in the transition towards a biobased society
and some of this sector’s characteristics. Section 4 is dedicated to exploring the origin and aims of
the RRI framework to analyze innovation’s responsible character. Aspects such as the participatory
process and stakeholder engagement are at the core of the framework’s recommended activities.
However, the inclusiveness dimension encapsulates them and, because of that, demand more attention
to the effectiveness of all other dimensions. These reflections highlight the processual meaning of
the term “inclusion”, as well as the meaning of the term “responsible” and the impact of these
characteristics on the application of RRI in contexts where different values and behaviours shape
matters of participation and engagement.
In Section 5, we introduce the “institutional approach” as a possible complementary analysis
to understand these different contextual elements which shape the participatory process and
the application of RRI. Institutions have a dual role: as “action arenas” or deliberative forums
where stakeholder discussions take place and acquire deliberative functions and coercion; at the same
time, institutions are key elements in understanding the local context, culture, values, and behaviors.
Section 6 discusses what happens when such institutions are not in place, illustrating several case
studies carried out by other authors. These cases are analyzed to understand RRI applicability’s limits
as an assessment and the institutional analysis’s complementary role.
Finally, we describe the research’s main conclusions about using RRI in assessments to describe
the “responsible” character of innovation and complementary ways to improve the analysis.
2. Methodology
We conducted a literature review using the Web of Science and Science Direct. The search terms
on topics included “responsible research and innovation,” “responsible research and innovation
AND biofuel”, “responsible research and innovation AND bioeconomy”, “responsible research and
innovation AND developing countries”, “responsible research and innovation AND global South”,
“responsible research and innovation AND southern countries”, and “responsible research and
innovation AND South America”. An overview of the search procedures is presented in Figure 1.
Details about the selected studies are in Table 1. The articles are presented in the table by alphabetic
order of authorship.
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Figure 1. Search procedures.
3. Biofuels as Cleaner Energy and Global Commodity
The worldwide concern about fossil fuels, both in terms of their environmental impact and energy
security, has resulted in searching for alternative energy sources to replace or supplement countries’
energy matrix. Such alternative energies include hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal, and biofuels,
as presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Global installed capacity of renewable energies [7].
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Biofuels have been developed for some time now as a renewable, drop-in alternative for fossil
fuels. They are well-suited for use in the transport sector. Their liquid form favours transportation
to the final consumer and can be easily incorporated into the existing distribution infrastructure,
for example, through blending [8]. This makes biofuels an essential energy source in the transition from
fossil fuels to clean energy. However, the global renewable energy debate is now shared with other
alternatives, especially wind and solar PV, whose investments have grown significantly [9,10]. Support
for renewable energies and energy efficiency in road transportation largely occurs by incentivizing
biofuels, electric cars, and fuel efficiency. Another benefit of biofuels is that they can be obtained from
various raw materials produced in a range of locations, which may improve countries’ autonomy and
energy security and reduce their dependence on fossil fuels.
Many countries now have blending targets in place, which has led to an increase in the demand
for liquid biofuels, especially in the United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan, and reflected
a rise in the trade and import of biofuels, such as Brazilian ethanol, Jatropha, palm oil, and other
sources of vegetable oil and biodiesel, from the United States, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
The production of biofuels has created new markets, and energy trade flows worldwide [11]. Based on
the international liquidity of capital during the 2000s and the increased demand for biofuels worldwide,
several investments were made in different countries, in other crops and contexts.
3.1. Concerns about Biofuel Expansion
However, the growing demand and investment in biofuel production implied new environmental and
social concerns. Questions about the impact of biofuels on land-use changes [12–14], food security [15–18],
deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions [19–22], have formed the core of the biofuel expansion
debate [23–25]. The literature recognizes different types of impact depending on the source of the biofuels
(1st generation, 2nd generation or biodiesel). However, the usefulness of an assessment approach to verify
the extension of those impacts keep useful regardless the type of the biofuels in question.
On the other hand, positive aspects have been added to the food/energy/forest “trilemma”
debate [26–28] to analyze the trade-offs involved. Examples include job creation and improved working
conditions in the value chains [29–32], rural development [33–35] and integration with smallholder
farming practices [36]. Therefore, if biofuel production is to attain sustainable decarbonization and
other renewable energy targets, the societal context must prevent or minimize negative outcomes and
increase benefits.
3.2. How to Address These Concerns
In Brazil, where developments in the bioenergy sector are centered on advanced biofuels
(first-and-second-generation ethanol), interest has been shown from relevant sectors to address these
concerns. Emerging bioenergy sectors include, for example, second-generation ethanol, new drop-in
applications such as jet fuels, and the diversification of biodiesel sources and technologies for lignin
extraction. The processes involve mature technologies and intermediate and emergent sectors [37,38].
This interest is illustrated by the growing partnerships between biofuel developers and users,
and societal actors such as NGOs, as well as their participation in voluntary sustainability certifications
such as the Better Sugarcane Initiative, now Bonsucro (https://www.bonsucro.com/), Roundtable on
Sustainable Biofuels (https://rsb.org/) (RSB), among others [31,39–41].
One way to address societal concerns is to influence the researchers and entrepreneurs when
the innovation is at the initial stages of development. In Europe and the United States, Responsible
Research and Innovation (RRI) guidelines were drawn up to increase all interested stakeholders’
participation to promote the alignment of social needs and values with the technology being
developed [42,43]. Besides its use as an analytical framework, the RRI approach can address emerging
societal and environmental concerns in ongoing developments in the biofuel sector or any other
emerging technology field. The implementation of RRI is not only in the interest of the public and
the RRI community but also in the biofuel sector’s interest in addressing concerns.
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However, since many biofuel projects are implemented in developing countries in the Global
South [4,44,45], it is not clear whether the RRI approach can be used in contexts other than Europe
for this purpose. In the following section, we describe the main concepts of the RRI framework and
the reasons for these doubts.
4. The RRI Framework and the Role of “Participation” in Innovation Projects
The RRI approach fundamentally looks to generate ethical practice and awareness by influencing
emerging technologies in innovation research and ventures. The strategy to do so is to inspire
the innovation process through the effective participation of a range of stakeholders that guarantee
the consideration of sustainable aspects in socially desirable projects and, in doing so, respond to
the main problems faced by humanity [1,42,43,46]. Its design emphasizes that innovation is a collective
action involving several agents and institutions engaged at all stages of the process, from agenda-setting
to design, implementation, and evaluation. Agents include researchers, policymakers, educators,
entrepreneurs, and civil society organizations, encompassing the people directly impacted by
the innovation. These ideas were promoted by the EU and incorporated, for example, into the Dutch
Research Council (NWO) guidelines, and as a result, spread throughout the academic arena in Europe
and the US [47]. It is important to note that the societal context that shaped this framework was marked
by essential debates in society on ethics, the role of science and innovation, sustainability, climate
change, nanotechnology, and increasing demand for participation in the decision-making process in
democratic societies [48].
However, the framework presents some limitations [1,49–52]. Its normative character is considered
one reason why it doesn’t have a central role in Horizon Europe. However, its principles and aims
remain relevant in the context of this new phase of the European research agenda and academic debates.
In this section, we aim to analyze how “effective participation” is a core attribute for its four pillars’
efficiency and, therefore, a reason why using the scheme as an assessment tool is inappropriate. This is
because local culture and historical contexts shape the ways of interaction in each country or region
differently and, therefore, produce variable results in the process of participation and applicability of
RRI pillars, which may have no connection to the positive impact of the innovation itself.
4.1. The Main Pillars of RRI
The framework was built based on four main pillars that continuously reinforce each other.
The proposed dimensions have been broadly accepted as requirements for responsible research and
innovation through normative guidelines, although many authors have made amendments and
additions. The framework is meant to be used as a proactive and inspirational guideline to meet
societal expectations. Therefore, its use in a retrospective way should be avoided or, at least, used with
care to avoid conclusions and judgments over innovation impacts while assessing just the innovation
development process. The same holds for actors and activities that were not planned to be aligned
with such a framework built afterward. We also question its use as an assessment tool due to the lack
of objectivity and defined comparable parameters.
According to Stilgoe et al. [43], the four dimensions are:
• Anticipation: to consider what we know and what is probable in terms of technology use.
Anticipation aims to foresee the potential risks of the new technology and require a “well-timed”
approach to be meaningful and constructive. Another essential requirement is “transparency”
since the shared knowledge and information are crucial to enabling participants to assess the risks
and future impact of innovations [1].
• Reflexivity: to recognize the moral views, interests, and roles of all relevant stakeholders and critically
examine the assumptions behind them. Stilgoe et al. [43] also highlight that reflexivity should be
present not only at the laboratory level but mainly at the “institutional” level (research funders,
regulators, and other institutions). These organizations should help build the reflexive capacity
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among engaged stakeholders and reflect on their value system, shaping the innovation process.
To do so, the independent thinking of the participants is crucial.
• Responsiveness: the capacity to respond to the questions and insights raised during the innovation
process. In this sense, the “actors” involved should have enough power, resources, capabilities,
and skills to do so. According to Stilgoe et al. [43], it implies the notion of innovations being
shaped so that they are “as responsive as possible” to the adjustments that occur throughout their
development while recognizing the insufficiency of knowledge and control. However, the authors
point out the need for diversity (of stakeholders) to have a responsive innovation system.
• Inclusion: refers to how relevant stakeholders are engaged in the innovation process. To achieve
qualified outcomes of the inclusiveness process, Stilgoe et al. [43] refer to three criteria as proposed
by Callon [53]: intensity, or how actors are invited to participate promptly; openness, in other
words, how the group is composed and how diverse it is; and the quality of the discussion which
depends on the participants’ critical thinking skills.
One crucial challenge highlighted by the author regards the power imbalance among
the participants, which can jeopardize discussion outcomes. Additionally, issues such as confidentiality,
information asymmetry, and power imbalance are frequently observed during the use of the approach.
All these elements highlight the importance of effective participation to achieve “substantive inclusion,”
which can achieve the framework’s aimed outcomes [49].
4.2. RRI Demands an Effective Participatory Process
Through its architecture and dimensions, the RRI framework emphasizes inclusion as a process
of participation and engagement, and this is based on a belief that, if this processual inclusion is
well-executed (effective participation), we will have a substantive inclusion [49], the stakeholders will
together be able to build the best solution (or material results), taking into account society’s needs and
the interests of all groups. This characterizes RRI as a processual framework where the stakeholder’s
inclusion and participation are key to achieve the desired societal outcomes brought to the table
by these participants [50]. Participation is, therefore, a key element to the successful execution of
all RRI dimensions. Still, it requires the right set of stakeholders to produce results aligned with
the RRI framework effectively. The right set of agents, who would be chosen or invited by trustable
organizations, would have characteristics such as representing a diverse range of stakeholders,
consisting of independent skilled people with a high level of critical thinking who can discuss
and avoid manipulation. Only the right set of stakeholders in a process coordinated by a trustable
organization would deliver the anticipation, reflexiveness, and responsiveness dimensions required by
the framework.
Therefore, it is reasonable to deduce that the term “responsible”, as pursued by the RRI theoretical
framework, is directly related to organizing a participatory process (by inviting relevant audiences
who would perform the four pillar activities) effectively. This “effective participation” could ensure
the four pillar activities’ satisfactory performance while indirectly achieving the innovation process’s
material outcomes. What are the requirements for “effective participation” in the implementation of
a biofuels project?
We understand that two requirements are essential to guarantee an effective participatory process
to achieve the final goal of the RRI approach: (a) an adequate set of stakeholders and (b) adequate
institutions for coordinating the process and working as an “action arena with deliberative power to
achieve”responsible innovation impacts.
The former, referring to the set of stakeholders, is relevant since the outcomes of each one of
the four pillars are not given upfront but are defined by the participation and positioning of the group
of invitees representing their interests. It can also be extracted from an in-depth analysis of the four
pillars’ implementation [43]. Each one of the posts requires specific attention to the definition of
representativeness to attain the best results. Thus, the anticipation pillar requires a well-informed
and diverse range of participants who can challenge and question potential risks. The reflexiveness
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pillar requires stakeholders’ independence, the ability to rethink moral values, enriched with different
stakeholders’ perspectives. The responsiveness pillar requires openness, transparency, and response
capabilities, which can only be attained through the participants’ assertive group invited to the process.
Finally, the inclusiveness itself requires different views from a range of interests and fields (scientists,
governments, laymen, community leaders, and external experts) with different perspectives and a good
representation of society.
Therefore, effective participation is a crucial element to discuss the future perspectives of emerging
biofuel technologies, which are inherently uncertain and depend on the set of representatives’ best
configuration. Thus, it is necessary to consider the requirements these actors must fulfill to reach
the process’s best outcomes.
In fact, “effective participation” assumes that some values are present or given in any context or
society [48]. However, the forms and patterns of interaction among stakeholders seem to differ in each
country or region [51]. It is crucial to understanding how the local context, culture, and beliefs interfere
with and shape the discussions on achieving the desired responsible innovation. This is particularly
important when discussing research and innovation, which are developed in one place and implemented
in another, as is usually the case of biofuels and other technological innovations [48,52,54,55].
Effective participation is related to the definition of groups and names and a second important
element: the institutions where the discussions take place. This element from institution analysis
theory [56] is usually responsible for answering organizational questions: when does the discussion
occur? Is the frequency of meetings sufficient? Are the meetings multidimensional or just one-way
communication events? Where do these meetings take place? Are all stakeholders able to attend?
How do people interact with each other? How much freedom do they have to speak freely? How do
gender and religion affect the ability to speak out and develop the right solution for everyone?
Answering these questions is out of this study’s scope; nevertheless, they are mentioned here
as they reveal the importance of understanding local practices. Some of these details are efficiently
managed; others, however, are more difficult to deal with since they have hidden rules, behaviours,
and beliefs that are difficult for an external stakeholder or an assessment body to understand and create
global metrics to measure it, especially when discussing transcontinental projects where long distances
impact closer coordination and recognition of context limitations [57]. In all cases, institutions are
critical to effective participation and responsible innovation analysis. Because of this, their importance
is further explored in the following section.
5. Institutions as Key Elements of the Innovation Process Analysis
Social and economic structures give rise to different configurations of actors in different countries
at different times, who exercise influence not only on the making of policy but also on the making of
institutions [58].
5.1. Institutions as a Proxy for the Local Context
Barney et al. [59] define an institution as an organized pattern of constitutive collective behaviour
and its evolution. In this sense, institutions are made up of values, norms, beliefs, meanings, symbols,
customs, and socially learned and shared standards, which define the range of expected and accepted
behaviour in a particular context. Aligned with this, Taebi et al. [52] explain that technological
development occurs in specific institutional contexts involving individual stakeholder dynamics.
These contexts, constituted by formal and informal institutions, reflect values that have significant
ramifications for the governance structure, the distribution of power between stakeholders, transparency
processes, gender equality, and the definition of priorities.
Echebarría et al [58] explains that institutions are path-dependent since the historical facts influence
institutional evolution and its characterization. The institutional path and the social development
path are not easily comparable or compatible with each other historical, economic, social, political,
and cultural aspects influence the constitution of an institutional network, establishing specific and
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local forms of the development pattern [60]. All these factors set the limits within which the actors
involved in these processes can act. Specifically, with regard to impact assessment, the mentioned
factors can also limit the supervisory role of the responsible institutions. There are difficulties in
carrying out impact analysis, financial and methodological challenges stand out. Once these studies
are in place, even if measurable, there are also limitations in translating the results into norms and
laws, and incorporating them into policies and the policy agenda.
In their place, important debates or frameworks can create resistance from stakeholders, as local
organizations or society. The main reason is that, in general, these models are impregnated with
values and realities that are very different from the local ones. In this sense, the network with
other organizations and institutions is important to maintain objectives and inspire adaptations. Then,
local multilateral organizations can act on adapting more general parameters to local realities at the more
concrete level, we can mention agencies responsible for the regulation of biofuels, social policies and
rules, even civil society represented by NGOs. The institutions, treated on a more general level of action
arenas, manifest themselves in a dispute in the general plan of laws, rules, values and behaviours.
This arena starts from the parliament, responsible for formulating rules and laws. In democracies,
the members of the parliaments are elected, which theoretically, gives them independency to challenge
agencies, institutions, organizations, and even the government [58].
Ostrom [61] also emphasizes the importance of local context, stating that exogenous variables such
as (a) the biophysical and material conditions; (b) community attributes, including values, behaviours,
and traditions; and (c) rules—formal and informal—that affect the action arenas (or institutions) where
a group of participants (or stakeholders) interact with a specific purpose (or action situation). In this
approach, “action arenas” shape and characteristics depend on the local contexts’ exogenous variables.
Therefore, we argue that institutions are a proxy for analysing and incorporating local context
specificities and that RRI should take these aspects into account. After all, each context manifests
a specific reality that can impact the implementation of the dimensions and objectives of RRI.
Incorporating these aspects would enable researchers and policymakers to shape and adapt
the framework elements to the specific necessities regarding responsibility in the research and
innovation processes.
Understanding the institutional contexts is important since limitations concerning
the implementation of RRI may be more related to broader and deeply rooted socio-political factors
and institutional contexts than to specific initiatives. Regarding this, Wickson and Carew [62] classify
the “clear and explicit identification of institutional and contextual limitations and a structured effort
to acknowledge and improve upon these conditions” as an exemplary criterion of reflexiveness
and responsiveness.
5.2. Institutions as “Action Arenas” for Innovation Process Discussions
Another critical factor in incorporating an analysis of institutions into the RRI approach is
that they represent the arena (or deliberative forum). The controversies surrounding and evolution
of the innovation process occur. In Ostrom’s words, an “action arena” is the “social space where
individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” [56].
In sum, action arenas are collective spaces where the participation process takes place and, because of
this, the characteristic of institutions is fundamental.
The question arises: which factors differentiate contexts with weak institutions from those
with strong institutions? How is this linked to a potential RRI application? Levitsky and Murilo [63]
highlight some features that support the differentiation of these institutional contexts: (1) socioeconomic
inequality, (2) institutional borrowing, and (3) hasty institutional design.
Socioeconomic inequality is a factor that contributes to distancing society from important debates,
particularly in contexts where there are low levels of education and access to information. There is
a reduction in society’s confidence in the institutions. Institutions are often imported from abroad
without reflecting on the alignment with pre-existing domestic power structures or norms, leading
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to discrepancies. The rapid institutional design, in turn, affects institutional quality and durability,
as there is inadequate time to anticipate impacts, include stakeholders, or further discuss issues.
Based on the argumentation described earlier, nations with a strong institutional configuration
can conform to the RRI principles more easily than countries with a weak structure. The difficulty lies
mostly in the concentration and imbalance of power, the lack of collective prioritization, aspects that
impair representation (such as educational level), and political instabilities, to give some examples [63,64].
There may be no commitment to being “responsible” in these local contexts, one of the RRI framework aims.
To summarize, we have so far argued that (1) institutions are a proxy of local context and because
of this can be used to improve strategies to implement RRI approach, and (2) institutions work as
action arena or deliberative forum and are fundamental to coordinate the participatory innovation
process. In the following section, we aim to illustrate these two points by presenting selected case
studies from outside Europe (based on literature) that used RRI as an analysis tool to show how they
failed to be objective and provide relevant comparisons. Several studies indeed illustrate the relevancy
of the impact of institutional context on the performance of RRI pillars.
6. The Weaker the Institutional Context, the Harder the Effective Participation and Application of
the RRI Approach
Following the previous section, institutions play an essential role in coordinating the innovation
process since they represent the local context’s crystallization. At the same time, institutions act as
an approximation for understanding the values and behaviours behind how people interact and work as
a “locus” or as an “action arena” that legitimizes the outcomes of such interactions. Therefore, the quality
of the institutions is essential since it controls the different ways that stakeholders interact, different
levels of effective participation and, thus, impacts the ability of members of the local community
(researches, entrepreneurs, policymakers, NGOs) to perform RRI activities to achieve responsible
innovation process effectively.
Strong institutional contexts facilitate the effective participation of stakeholders. In such cases,
RRI guidelines, which demands freedom of speech, gender equality, power balance, among other
attributes to perform effective participation, are easier to apply, and the results from the participatory
process can be interpreted as an indication/good representation of how participative the innovation
process is. On the other hand, the effects are the opposite in the case of weak institutions when
the participatory process required by the RRI framework can be jeopardized by a lack of coordination
in the process of engagement, an imbalanced discussion impeding the free access to information and
freedom to speak out [65].
It is the case for most biofuel innovation implementation processes since biofuel production often
occurs in rural areas in developing countries, far from the large urban centers where the developers
of the technology or the framework’s creators are found. It highlights the inherent difficulties in
the implementation phase in regions where the culture of participation, history, and economic context
are very different from the Western developed countries, where these contextual RRI elements are largely
accepted and implemented through traditional and robust institutions. Brazil is an interesting case
since it is considered technologically developed and with good institutions. However, due economic
history, cultural values, and deep inequality context, the implementation phases are often done in
top-down manner and therefore, is not aligned with the participative process as required by the RRI
framework. Even though this lack of participation in the implementation process of biofuels projects,
the outcomes of these projects for the local communities seem to point to inclusive impacts [66].
Timmermans [6] described the RRI approach as still a “predominantly Western affair”. The absence of
credible and stable institutions can jeopardize the free and effective participation of less privileged
people who may not have full knowledge of their rights or access to information and, consequently,
may have a limited capacity to analyze innovation’s potential issues.
In a case study carried out in Tanzania described by Balkema and Pols [67], Jatropha’s investments
were stimulated by the 2003 EU directive to promote biofuels. However, the authors noted that small
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biofuel producers were left behind in the discussions on Jatropha’s expansion. The “exclusion” of
this vital stakeholder has led to missed opportunities. Considering this “weak inclusion” or failure
to assure “effective participation” of the right set of agents, the authors claim that the EU failed to
anticipate the impacts of its biofuel policy and did not include small farmers’ voices.
There was a shift in expectations regarding biofuel production from Jatropha from the large-scale
cultivation of a “miracle culture” that could provide sustainable biodiesel for Europe to a “biofuel niche
culture”. It turns to be viewed as a crop with relatively low yields, suitable for bio-oil production for
local use. The authors conclude that the impacts of large-scale production of Jatropha have contributed
to a series of problems that conflict with sustainability ideals, such as food insecurity (through land-use
changes that negatively impacted food planting), the marginalization of small farmer participation as
an actor of interest, loss of soil fertility and biodiversity loss. They, therefore, concluded that the case
has proven to be unsustainable and irresponsible.
However, the article did not analyze the role of Tanzania’s historical and economic context.
How can an external institution such as the EU, with such a major difference in values and culture
to an Eastern country, be responsible for identifying the legitimate stakeholders who should sit at
the negotiation table? To what extent did small-scale farmers trust the process and the mediators?
Were these farmers able to make their voices and concerns heard? It seems that the lack of
a local institution as coordinator, with a better understanding of Tanzania’s context and traditions,
has jeopardized the whole RRI process, failing to establish an adequate set of engaged stakeholders.
Therefore, what can be concluded from the use of RRI in this case study is the failure to achieve
effective participation. These failures led to a poorly implemented innovation with negative impacts.
The “irresponsible character of the innovation” is connected with the implementation process and not
with the biofuels innovation’s direct material impacts in this local context. Indeed, we could judge
biofuels as irresponsible if the framework had specific impact criteria to do so. For example, about food
security (total food imported versus locally produced), loss of soil fertility (percentage of fertilization
need compared to the past), and biodiversity loss (percentage of deforestation). Although RRI is about
meeting grand challenges and aligning with society’s values, the framework does not have these direct
material criteria. Material issues as food security, loss of fertility, biodiversity loss, and others can
appear if, and only if, the chosen set of invited stakeholders effectively participate in the discussions
and bring those themes to the negotiation table. Instead, the RRI as a normative processual framework
has the criteria of inclusiveness, which were done without considering institutions. Then, its results
are not enough elements to judge the impacts of the innovation itself as irresponsible.
In another study on India, De Hoop, Pols, and Romijn [44] studied a Jatropha project carried out by
the University of Agricultural Sciences in Bangalore (an entrepreneurial actor with an academic profile).
One of the project’s main goals was to improve the natural environment’s quality and the lives of
the people involved (inclusion as an outcome). In practice, however, several problems were highlighted
due to the lack of proper inclusion of local producers in the project’s design (inclusion of process
or effective participation). Although the authors mention that the process respected the inclusion
pillar, they expressly pointed out the low quality of involvement, which meant that farmers failed to
adhere to the project due to restrictions on water access for irrigation (failure in participation implied
failures in anticipation process activities). Both the farmers and the researchers had to deal with power
structures. The local institutions responsible for carrying out the process were not strong enough to
mediate these power differences or effectively include a range of stakeholders and guarantee their
right to free speech (failure in responsiveness). The authors concluded that, although the project did
not negatively impact the local population and the environment, it also did not result in the expected
positive impacts. The authors present evidence that the project did not sufficiently meet the four
dimensions of RRI. Therefore, it concluded that the innovation project should not be implemented
since RRI is about ‘innovating responsibly—or not innovating at all’ [44] (p. 129).
However, our interpretation of the proposal of Stilgoe et al. [43] together with other authors
on institutional theory such as Ostrom [56] and Acemoglu and Robinson [60] leads us to conclude
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otherwise. We understand that due to the lack of effective local actors’ participation, the inclusion,
anticipation, reflexivity, and responsiveness dimensions were jeopardized. There was no vital institution
to lead the project that impaired the RRI dimensions, and idiosyncrasies emerged. For example,
should a university that does not have an entrepreneurial mindset be responsible for carrying out
a “business enterprise” with all inherent conflicts of interest of these roles? Should universities
be responsible for advocating biofuel policy or negotiating trade agreements with biofuel dealers?
Would the recommendation of “abandoning the innovation process”, as proposed by the authors,
be considered a well-thought-out and fair decision for the local community? Would that put the potential
positive impact of the venture at risk just because it did not meet the expectations of participation
included in the assessment tool created according to values different from the local culture? Again,
the question is posed: should this conclusion be interpreted as a failure on the part of the biofuels
project in India or the failure to adhere to, adapt, and implement the core RRI concepts? The analysis
must first examine contextual elements of governance and local institutions in greater depth to be
considered valid alternatives. After all, is it better to achieve some benefits or no benefits at all?
The academic community must address this ethical question.
The two cases above did not consider the local contexts in their analyses to interpret the “possible
participation process” to be implemented. As a result, we understand their conclusions reflected more
a lack of adherence or adequacy of the RRI process to those contexts than the “irresponsible character
of the innovations developed” in terms of its potential impacts. Both cases make conclusions about
the final impacts of the innovation (calling them irresponsible or suggesting to give up the innovation)
using an assessment tool (RRI) that focuses mainly on its development’s participatory process.
When the participation is not ideal according to RRI requirements, instead of analysing the role of
institutions that coordinate the process, the author criticizes the innovation itself’s potential impacts.
In contrast, reflections on the RRI approach’s limits and claims for a local context analysis
through an institutional approach were echoed in several studies. Chaturvedi et al. [68], for example,
analyze governments’ role in defining the pathways to develop innovations in the transgenic cotton
sector. The authors highlighted the lack of transparency (China) and credibility (India) as evidence
of weak institutions that jeopardize the RRI process and responsible innovation. Hartley et al. [69],
from a different angle, analyzed the difficulties in implementing low-tech innovations using the RRI
approach in transcontinental projects (Europe and Africa) and, even when the research team considered
the approach, the “inclusion pillar” reflected “a process of discursive exclusion.” In the case of Vietnam,
Voeten and Naudé [70] analyzed the impact on weaker institutions’ responsiveness dimension
previously coopted by entrepreneurs. They were unable to coordinate the process to reap benefits for
society as a whole.
In Latín América, de Campos et al. [71] defend an interconnection between the notion of
political accountability (one aspect of responsiveness) and institutions, since the difficulty in
predicting the trajectory of innovation and the absence of a deliberation arena can strongly impact
the innovation trajectory of a vaccine for the dengue mosquito. Macnaghten et al. [45] and Vasen [65]
explore the difficulties and limitations of employing the RRI framework in contexts with different
capabilities, values, and institutions, and the risk that this can be perceived as a new model of
intellectual neo-colonialism.
Figure 3 represents how the complementary analyses of institutions can help define strategies
to implement the RRI approach to achieve the effective participation required and how to analyze
the results of the RRI application when the local institutions are not capable of achieving an effective
participatory process.
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Figure 3. Complementing Responsible Research and Innovation Framework (RRI) analysis (created by
the authors).
A preliminary institutional analysis is required to understand actors’ ability in different contexts
to implement effective participation. When local institutions can guarantee effective participation,
the four pillars of RRI will probably achieve their aims. The participative process tends to generate
positive impacts of the innovation, achieving the responsible innovation’s ultimate goal.
However, when the institutional framework is not capable of coordinating the process (lack of
trustable organization or properly enforcement power, for example), the institutional analysis helps to
explore alternative strategies to improve local stakeholders’ participation, taking into account their
culture, value, beliefs and ways of interacting. In such cases, three possibilities are listed below,
based on the literature referred to in the previous sections and the author’s reflections:
(1) Improve institutions. As stressed by Taebi et al. [52] and Acemoglu and Robinson [60],
this alternative is a lengthy process and one that requires strong political capabilities with solid
social movements. Although it is the most laudable and sustainable alternative in the long run and
hence it should be strived for continuously, it is not an option for some projects since institutional
strengthening requires a longer timeframe than the innovation processes usually addressed by
the RRI. It is possible that, in some cases of grassroots innovation (one which is raised from
the ground or by the community), it may be an option.
(2) Abandon innovation. The second option, the most radical, should not be considered without
in-depth institutional analysis. As discussed above, abandoning an innovation because the effective
participation required in the RRI pillars are not strictly followed would impact communities and
hinder the local development process. Would this effect be ethical and fair to local communities,
just because the innovation process did not match the mindset of a framework designed
externally? This option seems to be applied when the institutional analysis has demonstrated
a lack of institutions that can minimally guarantee to use the RRI principles, therefore showing
that no participatory process is possible. Even in this case however, the impacts of the innovation
can be positive in amplifying the access to goods and services for a larger part of the population.
Should such kind of innovation be called irresponsible because of the lack of a participative
development process? Or its impact is what defines the responsible character of the innovation?
(3) Using alternative external schemes or standards as a trustable guide for a more participative
implementation process. For example, the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) or the IFC
Standards, Principles of Responsible Investment, and other sectorial schemes aim to assure
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an inclusive and participatory process as principles of action. From this, it is possible to define
strategies to guarantee the most participative process as possible (thus, responsible through
the RRI lens and given that specific context) and, as a result, the accomplishment of positive
outcomes in terms of inclusion, anticipation, reflexivity, and responsiveness.
It is important to emphasize that the three options above are alternatives to improve participation
during the innovation development and implementation phases and raise the chances to achieve
the positive impacts of the innovation. None of the options scanned guarantees that participation
alone will produce outcomes aligned with society’s needs. It depends on quality, diversity, critical
skills, access to information, and other factors. It is precisely the problem of considering the framework
to assess the responsible character of the Innovation. RRI is useful to inspire a participative process
but what can be evaluated through the RRI approach is the process of participation and engagement,
and not the innovation impact itself.
7. Limitations
Although mentioned in the literature review and discussion among our peers, we intentionally do
not describe the contours of “strong” or good institutions because we do not want to repeat the mistake
of crystallizing a vision of institutions that do not consider the local contexts that are naturally specific.
The same reasoning is applied to the definition of the ‘minimum requirements’ for a trustable private
sector organization to coordinate the development process when the institutions are not strong.
8. Conclusions
Worldwide biofuel expansion is essential if we are to transition to a biobased economy. In this
sense, emerging technologies cannot disregard societies’ social and environmental demands in
which the innovations are implemented. Several frameworks emerged to assess how sustainable is
the innovation in question, RRI among them.
To address the “responsible character of the innovation” as framed by RRI, it is important to
understand what “responsible innovation” means. Is it the innovation that counted on stakeholders’
effective participation during its development process or the innovation whose impacts are aligned with
society’s aims and needs? RRI framework seems to incorporate the premise that effective participation
(as extracted from the good performance of the four pillars) will guarantee responsible impacts as
defined by the participants and, therefore, the alignment of the innovation with the society needs.
However, there are three problems with this premise:
(1) It requires a quality of the participatory process dependent on culture, values, and behaviours
that vary among the countries and regions. What makes it difficult to define upfront processual
indicators that could assess effective participation quality in any context.
(2) Regarding the material elements that would generate indicators, metrics, and measurements
to assess the responsible innovation impacts, those elements are dependent on the quality
of the participation process. They cannot be upfront defined as common material metrics
and indicators.
(3) Even when the process dimension of the innovation development in RRI does consider those
contextual elements (culture and values) as fundamental requirements to perform effective
participation, nothing can be predicted about how positive are the innovation’s impacts.
The improvements over the process of participation cannot automatically guarantee the positive
impacts of the innovation.
Through the analysis of the literature about different case studies, we identified that conclusions
about the responsible character of innovation that uses the RRI as an assessment tool usually reflect
more the difficulties in applying the framework (the ideal participatory process in regions with
a different culture, types of institutions and values) than the real “responsible” impact of the innovation
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in the study. RRI is a normative framework designed to influence the process of innovation and not to
define the quality of the innovation’s impacts.
We then conclude that using the RRI framework in regions of biofuels implementation projects
reflects more the difficulties involved in applying guidelines that were, perhaps unconsciously,
embedded with western values than the responsible character of the innovation impacts, which usually
are defined upfront materially and measurably. Thus, RRI cannot be used as an assessment tool since
it does not have the material metrics to measure how responsible or positive or negative the impacts of
the innovation are implemented.
Irrespective of the critics, RRI remains a necessary normative framework to inspire and guide
responsible innovation through the participatory process (the core element to the effectiveness of
anticipation, reflexiveness, responsiveness, and inclusion) and achieve the innovation whose impacts
are good for society. Its application should complement an initial analysis of institutions’ quality to
encapsulate local context and values. Understanding the institutional context before RRI application can
help map the limitations and gaps and better define strategies to improve stakeholders’ participation
in the four pillars of the RRI framework and, consequently, raise the chances of promising outcomes
regarding inclusive impacts of the innovation.
Future research should be carried out to understand whether innovation can be considered as
responsible when substantive inclusion or effective participation is not entirely possible; whether it
is possible to achieve inclusion as an outcome of a biofuel implementation project without proper
participation (inclusion of process) in the innovation process, and how inclusive has the biofuel
expansion been in different contexts.
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9. Bórawski, P.; Bełdycka-Bórawska, A.; Szymańska, E.J.; Jankowski, K.J.; Dubis, B.; Dunn, J.W. Development of
renewable energy sources market and biofuels in The European Union. J. Clean. Prod. 2019, 228, 467–484.
[CrossRef]
10. Frankfurt School–UNEP. Global Trends Renewable Energy 2020. 2020. Available online: https://www.fs-
unep-centre.org/global-trends-in-renewable-energy-investment-2020/ (accessed on 14 December 2020).
11. Proskurina, S.; Junginger, M.; Heinimö, J.; Tekinel, B.; Vakkilainen, E. Global biomass trade for energy—Part 2:
Production and trade streams of wood pellets, liquid biofuels, charcoal, industrial roundwood and emerging
energy biomass. Biofuels Bioprod. Biorefining 2019, 13, 371–387. [CrossRef]
12. Borras, S.M.; McMichael, P.; Scoones, I. The politics of biofuels, land and agrarian change: Editors’ introduction.
J. Peasant Stud. 2010, 37, 575–592. [CrossRef]
13. Miyake, S.; Renouf, M.; Peterson, A.; Mcalpine, C.; Smith, C. Land-use and environmental pressures resulting
from current and future bioenergy crop expansion: A review. J. Rural Stud. 2012, 28, 650–658. [CrossRef]
14. Nassar, A.M.; Harfuch, L.; Bachion, L.C.; Moreira, M.R. Biofuels and land-use changes: Searching for the top
model. Interface Focus 2011, 224–232. [CrossRef]
15. Schlesinger, S. Biofuels: Energy Won´t Feed the Hungry; ActionAid Brazil: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2014;
Available online: https://actionaid.org/publications/2014/biofuels-energy-wont-feed-hungry (accessed on
15 December 2020).
16. Escobar, J.C.; Lora, E.S.; Venturini, O.J.; Yáñez, E.E.; Castillo, E.F.; Almazan, O. Biofuels: Environment,
technology and food security. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2009, 13, 1275–1287. [CrossRef]
17. Richard, T. Ask the Experts: The food versus fuel debate. Biofues 2012, 3, 635–648.
18. Rosillo-Calle, F. Food versus Fuel: Toward a New Paradigm—The Need for a Holistic Approach. ISRN Renew.
Energy 2012, 2012, 1–15. [CrossRef]
19. Mol, A.P.J. Boundless biofuels? Between environmental sustainability and vulnerability. Sociol. Ruralis 2007,
47, 297–315. [CrossRef]
20. Gallardo, A.L.C.F.; Bond, A. Capturing the implications of land use change in Brazil through environmental
assessment: Time for a strategic approach? Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 2011, 31, 261–270. [CrossRef]
21. Ribeiro, B.E. Beyond commonplace biofuels: Social aspects of ethanol. Energy Policy 2013, 57, 355–362.
[CrossRef]
22. Filoso, S.; Do Carmo, J.B.; Mardegan, S.F.; Lins, S.R.M.; Gomes, T.F.; Martinelli, L.A. Reassessing
the environmental impacts of sugarcane ethanol production in Brazil to help meet sustainability goals.
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2015, 52, 1847–1856. [CrossRef]
23. Ciervo, M.; Schmitz, S. Sustainable biofuel: A question of scale and aims. Morav. Geogr. Rep. 2017, 25,
220–233. [CrossRef]
24. Martinelli, L.A.; Filoso, S. Balance between food production, biodiversity and ecosystem services in Brazil:
A challenge and an opportunity. Biota Neotrop. 2009, 9, 21–25. [CrossRef]
25. Wilkinson, J.; Herrera, S. Biofuels in brazil: Debates and impacts. J. Peasant Stud. 2010, 37, 749–768. [CrossRef]
26. Pilgrim, S.; Harvey, M. Battles over biofuels in Europe: NGOs and the politics of markets. Sociol. Res. Online
2010, 15. [CrossRef]
27. Tilman, D.; Socolow, R.; Foley, J.A.; Hill, J.; Larson, E.; Lynd, L.; Pacala, S.; Reilly, J.; Searchinger, T.;
Somerville, C.; et al. Beneficial Biofuels—The Food, Energy, and Environment Trilemma. Science 2009, 325,
270–271. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
28. Harvey, M.; Pilgrim, S. The new competition for land: Food, energy, and climate change. Food Policy 2011, 36,
1–12. [CrossRef]
29. Assato, M.M.; de Moares, M.A.F.; de Oliveira, F.C.R. Impactos sócio-econômicos da expansão do setor
bioenergético no estado do Mato Grosso do Sul: Os casos dos municípios de Nova Alvorada do Sul e
Rio Brilhante. In Proceedings of the 49o Congresso da Sober, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 24–27 July 2011;
Available online: https://bv.fapesp.br/pt/auxilios/78723/49o-congresso-da-sociedade-brasileira-de-economia-
administracao-e-sociologia-rural-sober/ (accessed on 15 December 2020).
30. Bacchi, M.R.P.; Caldarelli, C.E. Impactos socioeconômicos da expansão do setor sucroenergético no Estado
de São Paulo, entre 2005 e 2009. Nov. Econ. 2015, 25, 218. [CrossRef]
112
Sustainability 2020, 12, 10581
31. Diaz-Chavez, R.A. Assessing biofuels: Aiming for sustainable development or complying with the market?
Energy Policy 2011, 39, 5763–5769. [CrossRef]
32. van Eijck, J.; Faaij, A.P.C. Socio-Economic Impacts of Bioenergy Production; Rutz, D., Janssen, R., Eds.; Springer
International Publishing: Cham, Switzerland, 2014; ISBN 978-3-319-03828-5.
33. Moraes, M.A.F.D.; Oliveira, F.C.R.; Diaz-Chavez, R.A. Socio-economic impacts of Brazilian sugarcane industry.
Environ. Dev. 2015, 16, 31–43. [CrossRef]
34. Rutz, D.; Janssen, R. Socio-economic impacts of biofuels on land use change. In Socio-Economic Impacts of
Bioenergy Production; Biomass, D.R., Janssen, R., Eds.; Springer: Munich, Germany, 2014; Volume 9783319038,
pp. 81–93. ISBN 978-3-319-03829-2.
35. GNESD. Bioenergy: The Potential for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation. Global Network on Energy
for Sustainable Development (GNESD). Summary for Policy-Makers. 2011. Available online: https://orbit.
dtu.dk/en/publications/bioenergy-the-potential-for-rural-development-and-poverty-allevia (accessed on
15 December 2020).
36. Creutzig, F.; Corbera, E.; Bolwig, S.; Hunsberger, C. Integrating place-specific livelihood and equity outcomes
into global assessments of bioenergy deployment. Environ. Res. Lett. 2013, 8. [CrossRef]
37. Souza, L.G.A.; Moraes, M.A.F.D.; Dal Poz, M.E.S.; Silveira, J.M.F.J. Collaborative Networks as a measure of
the Innovation Systems in second-generation ethanol. Scientometrics 2015, 103, 355–372. [CrossRef]
38. Bueno, C.D.S.; Silveira, J.M.F.J.; Buainain, A.M. Innovation, networks and the paradigm of biofuels. Int. J.
Entrep. Small Bus. 2018, 35, 452–484. [CrossRef]
39. Pashaei Kamali, F.; Borges, J.A.R.; Osseweijer, P.; Posada, J.A. Towards social sustainability: Screening
potential social and governance issues for biojet fuel supply chains in Brazil. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.
2018, 92, 50–61. [CrossRef]
40. Mousavi, S.; Bossink, B. Corporate-NGO partnership for environmentally sustainable innovation: Lessons
from a cross-sector collaboration in aviation biofuels. Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 2020, 34, 80–95. [CrossRef]
41. Fortin, E. Transnational multi-stakeholder sustainability standards and biofuels: Understanding standards
processes. J. Peasant Stud. 2013, 40, 563–587. [CrossRef]
42. Owen, R.; Macnaghten, P.; Stilgoe, J. Responsible research and innovation: From science in society to science
for society, with society. Sci. Public Policy 2012, 39, 751–760. [CrossRef]
43. Stilgoe, J.; Owen, R.; Macnaghten, P. Developing a framework for responsible innovation. Res. Policy 2013,
42, 1568–1580. [CrossRef]
44. De Hoop, E.; Pols, A.; Romijn, H. Limits to responsible innovation. J. Responsible Innov. 2016, 3, 110–134.
[CrossRef]
45. Macnaghten, P.; Owen, R.; Stilgoe, J.; Wynne, B.; Azevedo, A.; de Campos, A.; Chilvers, J.; Dagnino, R.;
di Giulio, G.; Frow, E.; et al. Responsible innovation across borders: Tensions, paradoxes and possibilities.
J. Responsible Innov. 2014, 1, 191–199. [CrossRef]
46. Asveld, L.; Ganzevles, J.; Osseweijer, P. Trustworthiness and Responsible Research and Innovation: The Case
of the Bio-Economy. J. Agric. Environ. Ethics 2015, 28, 571–588. [CrossRef]
47. Asveld, L.; van Dam-Mieras, R. Introduction: Responsible Research and Innovation for Sustainability.
In Responsible Innovation 3; Asveld, L., van Dam-Mieras, R., Swierstra, T., Lavrijssen, S., Linse, K., van den
Hoven, J., Eds.; Springer International Publishing: Cham, Switzerland, 2017; pp. 1–6. ISBN 978-3-319-64834-7.
48. Wong, P.H. Responsible innovation for decent nonliberal peoples: a dilemma? J. Responsible Innov. 2016, 3,
154–168. [CrossRef]
49. Bronson, K. Diversity by design: Substantive inclusion for transformative agricultural value chains.
In Proceedings of the IBIS Seminar—Building Inclusive Agricultural Value Chains Online Seminar Series;
Biotechnology & Society Section at TU Delft, Business Management & Organisation Division: Delft,
The Netherlands, October 2020.
50. Noorman, M.; Swierstra, T.; Zandbergen, D. Questioning the Normative Core of RI: The Challenges Posed
to Stakeholder Engagement in a Corporate Setting. In Responsible Innovation 3; Springer International
Publishing: Cham, Switzerland, 2017; pp. 231–249. ISBN 978-3-319-64834-7.
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